Myrick v. Inch
Decision Date | 09 September 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D20-1772 |
Parties | Shird T. MYRICK, Petitioner, v. Mark S. INCH, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Shird T. Myrick, pro se.
No appearance for Respondent.
Shird Myrick filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the DeSoto County Circuit Court where he is serving a prison sentence for grand theft. The circuit court did not rule on the merits of his petition but instead converted the petition to a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion and then transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Dade County, where Mr. Myrick was originally sentenced. Mr. Myrick challenges the DeSoto Circuit Court's ruling. For the reasons explained below, we summarily affirm the circuit court's order.
First, a preliminary issue: how should we characterize Mr. Myrick's filing before us? He is (somewhat understandably) unsure, having titled his filing a "petition for writ of certiorari, or alternatively notice of appeal." Mr. Myrick's arguments encompass two aspects of the circuit court's ruling, the conversion of his habeas petition to a collateral proceeding and the transfer of the case to another county. Because of the second aspect, we will treat what he has filed as an appeal. We do so because in our view, an order to transfer a habeas petition to another county necessarily implicates venue, which is subject to our review under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A).
In so holding, we acknowledge that the District Courts of Appeal have not yet reached a consensus on how appellate courts ought to consider the discrete issue of transferring a habeas petition from one county to another. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 208 So. 3d 831, 831-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ( ); Baker v. State, 164 So. 3d 38, 38-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ( ); Harris v. State, 133 So. 3d 1169, 1170-71 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ( ); Williams v. Crews, 111 So. 3d 301, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ( ); Magwood v. Tucker, 98 So. 3d 725, 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ( ); Jean-Simon v. State, 5 So. 3d 682, 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) ( ); Franklin v. Kearney, 814 So. 2d 462, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ( ). We think the Third District's conclusion—that such rulings can be reviewed as nonfinal, appealable venue orders under rule 9.130(a)(3)(A) —is both congruous with rule 9.130(a)(3)(A) and preferable to navigating the jurisprudential shoals that extraordinary writs sometimes hold when they are used as a means to obtain review.1
We also find support for this conclusion in Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 2006), where the Florida Supreme Court held that a challenge to a circuit court's transfer of a prisoner's mandamus petition to another county was, in essence, a challenge to venue. Id. at 1211. The Bush court explained that "[v]enue is one thing; jurisdiction is another," id. (quoting Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So. 2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) ), but since all circuit courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, "the question here is where in the state a party should be held to answer such a petition, which is a question of venue," id.
So, too, here, we have a petition for an extraordinary writ that all circuit courts are empowered to issue. See Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const. So, too, here, an issue has been raised over which county's circuit court should consider this case.2 In light of Bush, we see no reason to characterize Mr. Myrick's argument against the transfer of what he filed (as a habeas petition) within yet another extraordinary writ proceeding (a certiorari petition) when this issue seems to fall squarely within rule 9.130(a)(3)(A). Therefore, we will review what he has brought before us as an appealable, nonfinal order on venue and turn to the merits of his argument.
The circuit court was correct in its analysis of Mr. Myrick's claim, see Barnard v. State, 949 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ( ), and so its order transferring Mr. Myrick's petition to Dade County was proper, see Clough v. State, 136 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (); Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 647, 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ( ); State v. Broom, 523 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) () . Accordingly, we affirm the order below in all respects.
Affirmed.
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Kunselman v. Offices of Governor
... ... transferring a postconviction motion to the proper ... jurisdiction "concern[s] venue." Fla. R. App. P ... 9.130(a)(3)(A); Myrick v. Inch, 303 So.3d 269 (Fla ... 2d DCA 2020) ... "In ... appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court ... ...