Nahas v. Polk Cnty.
Docket Number | 22-0239 |
Decision Date | 09 June 2023 |
Parties | JIM NAHAS, Appellee, v. POLK COUNTY, IOWA, TOM HOCKENSMITH, Individually and in His Official Capacity, ANGELA CONNOLLY, Individually and in Her Official Capacity, STEVE VAN OORT, Individually and in His Official Capacity, ROBERT BROWNELL, Individually and in His Official Capacity, and JOHN NORRIS, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Appellants. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Submitted December 15, 2022
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Brad McCall Judge.
County officials appeal a district court's order denying their motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that the qualified immunity provisions in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act did not apply retrospectively. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Kimberly Graham, County Attorney, and Meghan L. Gavin (argued), Assistant County Attorney, for appellants.
Nicholas Mauro (argued) of Carney & Appleby Law Firm, Des Moines, and Michael Carroll of Coppola, McConville, Carroll, Hockenberg &Flynn, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Carlton G. Salmons of Macro & Kozlowski, LLP, West Des Moines, for amicus curiae Heartland Insurance Risk Pool.
The court, in which all participating justices joined. Mansfield, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
An aggrieved former Polk County employee brings an array of tort claims against the county and the Polk County Board of Supervisors (the Board) under Iowa Code chapter 670 (2021). Polk County and those employers sought to dismiss the claims, arguing they were insulated from liability under Iowa's recently enacted qualified immunity provision. They also argued the former employee did not satisfy Iowa Code section 670.4A's new pleading requirement for qualified immunity defenses. The district court rejected these arguments and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants now appeal that ruling.
On January 5, 2021, the Board fired Jim Nahas, the Polk County Human Resources Director, after he refused to resign. Nahas challenged his termination by filing a lawsuit against Polk County and four members of the Board, claiming libel per se, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, extortion, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Iowa Code chapters 21 and 22.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Iowa Code section 670.4A, a new provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.421. On January 26, 2022, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding section 670.4A did not apply retrospectively. The court also concluded that Nahas's petition satisfied the notice pleading standards. The defendants filed a timely appeal, which we retained. See Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) ().
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
"We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction of errors at law." Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014)). In our review, "we accept as true the petition's well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions." Id. (quoting Shumate, 846 N.W.2d at 507).
At common law in Iowa, governmental subdivisions (e.g., cities and counties) enjoyed some measure of immunity from a lawsuit. See Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Iowa 1971) ( ); see also City of West Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 1996) ( ). Although the legislature has since broadly waived governmental immunity for tort cases through the IMTCA, it recently amended the IMTCA to narrow the scope of municipal liability. In 2021, the legislature codified qualified immunity in the IMTCA for the first time. 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022)). Specifically, the legislature codified a substantive qualified immunity protection and introduced a heightened pleading requirement for plaintiffs bringing IMTCA claims. Id. § 14(1), (3) (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A(1), (3) (2022)).
1. Section 670.4A(1)'s new qualified immunity protection. Iowa Code section 670.4A(1) provides:
Section 670.4A(1) establishes that qualified immunity protects employees or officers so they are not "liable for monetary damages" under the IMTCA if one of three conditions applies. Id. The first condition is that a legal right, privilege, or immunity that the plaintiff claims was violated was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. § 670.4A(1)(a). The second condition is that the law was not so clear that reasonable employees would have known the conduct the plaintiff alleges violated the law. Id. The third condition is not at issue in this case. See id. § 670.4A(1)(b).
2. Section 670.4A(3)'s new procedural requirements.
Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Schmidt v. Wilkinson, 340 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Iowa 1983)).
Defendants may file preanswer motions to dismiss for plaintiffs' "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f). "A court should grant a motion to dismiss 'only if the petition on its face shows no right of recovery under any state of facts.'" Young, 877 N.W.2d at 127 (quoting Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Iowa 1994)). In the past, we have explicitly declined to replace our notice pleading system with the heightened pleading standards that federal courts use. Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 607 (Iowa 2012). But the legislature may impose heightened pleading requirements for specific types of claims. See, e.g., Meade v. Christie, 974 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 2022) ( ).
The IMTCA now places a heightened pleading requirement on plaintiffs who bring claims against municipal corporations or those corporations' employees or officers. Iowa Code § 670.4A(3). This heightened pleading requirement has three features. First, plaintiffs "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the violation." Id. Second, plaintiffs must plead "a plausible violation" of the law. Id. Third, they also "must state . . . that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Id. Ultimately, section 670.4A provides that the failure to plead a plausible violation or that the law was clearly established will "result in dismissal with prejudice." Id.
The parties contest whether and to what extent the qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading requirement are applicable in this case. Nahas contends that applying the qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading requirement would be an impermissible retrospective application of new law. The defendants disagree. We begin our analysis of the dispute with an overview of the relevant law. We then analyze the qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading requirement separately.
"Whether a statute applies retrospectively, prospectively, or both is simply a question regarding the correct temporal application of a statute." Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Iowa 2021) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S.Ct. 1522, 1524 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgments)). In determining the correct temporal application of a statute, we generally apply a "three-part inquiry." Id.
"First [we] must determine whether application of a statute is in fact retrospective." Id. "With respect to the first part of the inquiry, application of a statute is in fact retrospective when a statute applies a new rule,...
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