Najib v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | WD84454,WD84443,WD84344 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | MOHAMMAD Q. NAJIB, Respondent, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ET AL.; and Appellants, MERCY CLINIC JOPLIN, Appellant. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri The Honorable Jon Edward Beetem, Judge
Before Anthony Rex Gabbert, P.J., Lisa White Hardwick and Thomas N Chapman, JJ.
The Missouri Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission"); Alisa Warren, Executive Director of the Commission, in her official capacity ("Warren" or the "Executive Director");[1] and Mercy Clinic Joplin, LLC ("Mercy") appeal a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, which (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Mohammad Najib ("Najib") on his petition for a permanent writ of mandamus; (2) directed the Commission to rescind and set aside the portion of its April 16, 2020 determination that denied Najib a right-to-sue letter; and (3) directed the Commission to issue Najib a right-to-sue letter on his allegations occurring on and after August 28, 2017.
The Commission raises two points on appeal, contending that the Commission had no authority to issue a right-to-sue letter until it had made a determination that it had jurisdiction with respect to Najib's complaint; and that Najib was not entitled to a right-to-sue letter because it was disputed whether the alleged employer in Najib's complaint was an "employer" under the Missouri Human Rights Act (the "MHRA" or the "Act"), section 213.010 RSMo et seq.[2]
Mercy raises four points on appeal, contending that Najib failed to establish that he submitted a request for a right-to-sue letter after his complaint had been pending for 180 days that the Commission had no authority to issue a right to sue letter until it had made a determination that it had jurisdiction with respect to Najib's complaint; and that the Commission had authority to dismiss Najib's complaint after 180 days on the grounds that Mercy was either owned or operated by a religious organization.
Because the Commission was subject to a ministerial duty to issue a right-to-sue letter and terminate its proceedings at Najib's request when the Commission did not complete its administrative processing within 180 days of the filing of Najib's complaint, the judgment is affirmed.
On June 13, 2019, [3] Najib filed a complaint with the MCHR alleging that his employer, Mercy, had committed various unlawful discriminatory practices against Najib on the basis of Najib's national origin, ancestry, and/or religion. Najib submitted a written request for a right-to-sue letter along with his complaint. Section 213.111.1 provides a mechanism for a complainant to forego administrative remedies and pursue a civil action if the Commission does not complete its administrative processing within 180 days of the filing of the complaint.
180 days from June 13, 2019 was December 10, 2019. The Commission did not complete its administrative processing of Najib's complaint on that day. The Commission continued to investigate the complaint beyond 180 days from the filing of Najib's complaint. On April 16, 2020, the Commission issued to Najib a notice of "no right to sue" on his allegations occurring on or after August 28, 2017. The notice indicated that the Commission determined it lacked jurisdiction over Najib's complaint because Mercy was owned or operated by a religious or sectarian group, which the Commission found exempted Mercy from the definition of "employer" under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The notice stated that the Commission was administratively closing Najib's case with respect to allegations occurring on and after August 28, 2017 due to a lack of jurisdiction. The notice further provided that an aggrieved party could appeal the decision pursuant to section 536.150.
On May 4, 2020, Najib filed a "Petition for Judicial Review, Prohibition and Mandamus Pursuant to §213.085 R.S.MO. And/Or §536.150 R.S.MO."[4] The petition contained three counts. In Count I, Najib sought judicial review of the Commission order dismissing Najib's complaint and requested that the Commission's order be reversed. In Count II, Najib sought a preliminary and permanent writ of prohibition. In Count III, Najib sought a preliminary and permanent writ of mandamus requesting that the Commission's notice of dismissal be vacated and the Commission be ordered to issue a right-to-sue letter.
On May 5, 2020, the circuit court denied Najib's request for a preliminary writ of prohibition and issued a preliminary writ in mandamus.[5] The circuit court then issued preliminary orders in mandamus to the Commission, Warren, and Mercy, which directed each of the respondents to file a responsive pleading to the petition in mandamus on or before July 1, 2020. Respondents filed their respective answers on July 1, 2020.
On September 24, 2020, Najib moved for summary judgment on his petition for writ of mandamus on the ground that the Commission was required to issue a right-to-sue letter pursuant to section 213.111.1 because Najib had requested a letter in writing and the Commission had failed to complete its administrative processing of his complaint within 180 days from the complaint's filing. The Commission and Mercy argued, inter alia, that section 213.075.1 required the Commission to withhold issuance of the right-to-sue letter until after it had made a determination as to its jurisdiction. Mercy argued further that, pursuant to section 213.111.1, Najib was required to wait 180 days from filing before submitting a request for a right-to-sue letter, which he had not established in the summary judgment record.
On December 10, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on Najib's motion for summary judgment. On February 17, 2021, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Najib. On April 5, 2021, the circuit court issued an amended judgment, [6] which (1) granted Najib's motion for summary judgment on Najib's request for a permanent writ of mandamus; (2) directed the Missouri Commission on Human Rights to rescind and set aside the portion of its April 16, 2020 determination that denied Najib a right-to-sue letter; and (3) directed the Missouri Commission on Human Rights to issue Najib a "Notice of Right to Sue" on his allegations occurring on and after August 28, 2017.
The Commission and Mercy now appeal to this court.
"Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo." Seaton v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 574 S.W.3d 245, 246 (Mo. banc 2019) (citing ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993)). "Summary judgment is proper when the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law." Sofia v. Dodson, 601 S.W.3d 205, 208-09 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotations omitted).
"The purpose of the extraordinary writ of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty that one charged with the duty has refused to perform." Furlong Cos. v. City of Kansas City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Mo. banc 2006).
"A writ of mandamus is not appropriate to establish a legal right, but only to compel performance of a right that already exists." State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. banc 1994). Because a writ of mandamus is a discretionary writ, we review the grant of a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Missouri Clean Energy Dist. v. McEvoy, 557 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). In this matter, the circuit court's grant of Najib's request for a writ of mandamus was based on the circuit court's interpretation of the relevant statutes under the Act. "Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo." Id. (quoting Burnett v. Kansas City Sch. Bd., 237 S.W.3d 237, 239 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).
In this matter, the Commission and Mercy seek review of the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Najib on Najib's request for a writ of mandamus. This procedural posture is unusual, and there are different standards for reviewing the grant of summary judgment and the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Nevertheless, because the facts material to the circuit court's issuance of the writ of mandamus are not in dispute, and because the issuance of the writ was based on the circuit court's interpretation of the relevant statutes under the Act, our review is de novo. See id.
Our "primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of America, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009). "When interpreting a statute, no portion of it is read in isolation, but rather is read in context to the entire statute, harmonizing all provisions." Antioch Cmty. Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of City of Kansas City, 543 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotations, brackets, and citation omitted). "In determining the intent and meaning of statutory language, the words must be considered in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words." R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 429 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Mo. banc 2008)). With respect to the Missouri Human Rights Act (Chapter 213, RSMo), the General Assembly has expressly instructed: "The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof[.]" § 213.101.1.
The Commission raises two points on appeal. In its...
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