Nassar v. Chamoun
| Decision Date | 13 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | A11-793 |
| Parties | Jovani Nassar, et al., Appellants, v. Fady Chamoun, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Dakota County District Court
James Scott Andresen, Janine M. Loetscher, Bassford Remele, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Christine Cahill Lake, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Collins, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this surface-water-drainage dispute, appellants Jovani Nassar and Sonia Morales challenge the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of their neighbors, respondents Fady and Sylvana Chamoun. Because we conclude that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment on two of appellants' claims, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In March 2008, respondents entered into a residential purchase agreement with a developer to purchase a newly constructed home in Rosemount's Glendalough Community. In August 2008, appellants entered into a purchase agreement with the same developer to purchase a newly constructed home in a lot directly adjacent to respondents' property.
The purchase agreements each contained a "master disclosure and information addendum" (master plan). Paragraph 13.2 of the master plan provided for drainage and utility easements along the perimeter of every homesite in Glendalough Community. It provided further that, "Nothing may be done in any drainage and utility easement area to impede the drainage of surface water." Accordingly, the master plan prohibited, specifically, "landscaping . . . in the drainage and utility easement areas, because [that] might change the drainage pattern." A survey of the properties owned by appellants and respondents shows that each property has a five-foot-wide drainage and utility easement bordering each other's property. Other surveys and photographs show that, contrary tothe terms of the purchase agreement, respondents installed landscaping within the parties' common-boundary drainage easement.
In or about July 2009, appellants began to landscape their property and discovered a grading problem that caused surface water to drain from respondents' property onto appellants' property. Appellants believed this problem was due to respondents' landscaping within the parties' common-boundary drainage easement. After failing to reach agreement to remedy the problem, appellants filed a complaint against respondents in December 2009, asserting tort claims of negligence, nuisance, and trespass, and a breach-of-contract claim based on respondents' violation of the landscaping restrictions contained in respondents' purchase agreement with the developer.
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) appellants did not suffer damages and (2) appellants could not enforce the terms of respondents' purchase agreement as third-party beneficiaries because appellants were not intended beneficiaries of that contract. Appellants responded in opposition to summary judgment, and also moved for a "mandatory" injunction requiring respondents to remove landscaping from the drainage easement and to re-grade and maintain the area within the easement to conform to their purchase agreement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on all claims. The court found that appellants were not third-party beneficiaries to respondents' purchase agreement and, therefore, could not enforce the terms of that agreement. The court also found that the tort claims, as pleaded, were based on appellants' asserted rights under respondents' purchase agreement and, therefore, because appellants had no suchrights, these claims failed as a matter of law. The district court denied appellants' motion for a mandatory injunction without elaboration. This appeal followed.
The district court shall grant summary judgment if, based on the entire record, there are no genuine issues of material fact and either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. This court conducts a de novo review of the district court's summary judgment to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2002).
Third-party beneficiaries may be either intended beneficiaries or incidental beneficiaries. Cretex Cos. v. Constr. Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 1984) (). A third party can enforce a contract as an intended beneficiary if recognition of third-party beneficiary rights is appropriate and the third party meets either the "duty owed" test or the "intent to benefit" test. Id.
Appellants contend only that they meet the intent-to-benefit test. To satisfy this test, "circumstances [must] indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(1)(b); Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 139. To ascertain the parties' intent, courts look to thesurrounding circumstances at the time of contracting, and generally require the contract to express some objective manifestation of intent to benefit a third party. Hickman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 695 N.W.2d 365, 370, 370 n.7 (Minn. 2005); Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 140. Absent ambiguity, the surrounding circumstances do not include extrinsic evidence. See Hickman, 695 N.W.2d at 371.
Appellants seek to enforce paragraph 13.2 of the master plan contained in respondents' purchase agreement. But nothing in this paragraph expresses an intent to benefit appellants or any other third party. Moreover, nothing in the contract as a whole or the circumstances surrounding the contract shows an express intent to benefit anyone other than the parties to that contract; respondents and the developer.
Relying on Hickman, appellants argue that the contract expressly intends to benefit them as "homeowners" in Glendalough Community. In Hickman, the supreme court held that a borrower was a third-party beneficiary because the pertinent contract, by its own terms, expressly conferred a benefit on a "borrower." Id. at 370-71. Here, however, the terms of respondents' purchase agreement do not purport to confer any benefits on a "neighboring homeowner." Without an express manifestation of intent, or anything else in the contract indicating intent to benefit neighboring homeowners, appellants are, at best, incidental beneficiaries to respondents' purchase agreement. As determined by the district court, appellants "were not intended beneficiaries" and are "preclude[d] . . . from enforcing [the agreement] as third party beneficiaries. See Hickman, 695 N.W.2d at 370-71; Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 138-39.
Appellants make two arguments against the district court's grant of summary judgment on their common-law negligence, nuisance, and trespass claims. First, they argue that the district court erred in sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of respondents based on grounds not raised by respondents. Second, they argue that the district court erroneously applied the law with respect to these claims.
A district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte so long as the adverse party is afforded a meaningful opportunity to oppose such an action. Hebrink v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. App. 2003); Doe v. Brainerd Int'l Raceway, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 811, 822 (Minn. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 533 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1995).
Appellants contend that they did not have a meaningful opportunity to oppose the motion for summary judgment on the basis relied on by the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to respondents based on its conclusion that appellants do not have standing to enforce respondents' purchase agreement. But whether appellants have standing to enforce respondents' purchase agreement is directly encompassed within respondents' argument that appellants are not third-party beneficiaries to the purchase agreement and, therefore, cannot enforce the terms of the purchase agreement. Regardless of whether respondents expressly tied this argument to appellants' tort claims, appellants had a meaningful opportunity to address the basis of the district court's ruling, namely, whether they are intended beneficiaries ofrespondents' purchase agreement. Indeed, appellants devoted over four pages to this very argument in their response in opposition to respondents' motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we find no error in the district court's decision to consider appellants' tort claims for summary judgment on this basis.
Appellants contend that their common-law claims of negligence, nuisance, and trespass, as pleaded in the complaint, do not depend upon a contractual duty and, therefore, their inability to enforce respondents' purchase agreement does not act to defeat these claims.
"Landowners owe a duty to use their property so as not to injure that of others." Anderson v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Minn. 2005). The drainage of surface water onto neighboring land is governed by the reasonable-use doctrine, which balances the benefits of drainage with the harm to the neighboring landowner. See id.; Highview N. Apts. v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 71-72 (Minn. 1982); Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 167-69, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948); Matter v. Nelson, 478 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Minn. App. 1991). Those injured by the drainage of water onto their land can generally allege claims arising...
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