National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com'n

• Citation: 607 F.2d 311
• Decision Date: 29 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-2695,78-2695
• Parties: 7 O.S.H. Cas.(BNA) 1837, 1979 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 23,986 NATIONAL STEEL AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 311

607 F.2d 311

7 O.S.H. Cas.(BNA) 1837, 1979 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 23,986

NATIONAL STEEL AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 78-2695.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Oct. 29, 1979.

William F. Terheyden, San Francisco, Cal., argued for petitioner; William C. Wright, Littler, Mendelson, Fasttiff & Tichy, P. C., San Francisco, Cal., on the brief.

Eric W. Cloud, Thomas L. Holzman, Washington, D. C., argued for respondent.

On Petition to Review a Decision of The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

Before CHOY and TANG, Circuit Judges, and RENFREW, ^* District Judge.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. (National) petitions for review of an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or Commission) finding that it "willfully" violated a safety standard contrary to § 5(a)(2) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA or Act), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). ¹ We affirm.

I. Statement of the Case

National is engaged in building commercial and military oil tankers. During construction of a ship, a scaffolding is set up alongside the ship. The scaffolding is usually protected with top and midrails. When construction and inspection of the ship's tanks are completed, the scaffolding is dismantled.

Although the tanks are painted before installation in the ship, there often remain "holidays" or blemishes where the paint has been knocked off the tank by scaffolding or burned off by welding. As the scaffolding is being dismantled, a painter stands ready to touch up the holidays.

During a routine inspection of National's facility on October 10, 1974, an OSHA Compliance Officer observed an employee painting inside a tank "45 feet above the bottom of the tank which was lined with heating coils." The painter was standing on planking approximately two feet wide. There were no top or midrails remaining on the scaffolding. The touching up of each holiday took about a minute. The Commission found that the painter had to lean over the scaffolding with the top and midrails removed in order to paint the holidays. Nonetheless, the painter was not equipped with a safety belt or tied-off life line or any other type of fall protection.

The Secretary of Labor issued a citation to National for willfully violating 29 C.F.R. § 1916.41(i)(1) in violation of § 5(a)(2) of OSHA. Section 1916.41(i)(1) provides:

Scaffolding, staging, runways, or working platforms which are supported or suspended more than 5 feet above a solid surface, or at any distance above the water, shall be provided with a railing which has a top rail whose upper surface is from 42 to 45 inches above the upper surface of the staging, platform, or runway and a midrail located halfway between the upper rail and the staging, platform, or runway.

The Secretary's citation read in relevant part:

Employer permitted his employee to paint while standing on scaffold which was supported 45' above a solid surface and not provided with a top rail and midrail, although the employer knew this condition was extremely dangerous and violated (§ 1916.41(i)(1)).

This constitutes a willful violation within the meaning of the Act.

The Secretary imposed a $5000 penalty.

National then filed a notice of contest. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the Secretary's complaint, though reducing the penalty to $2000. The OSHRC affirmed the ALJ's decision.

II. "Willfully" Violates

Section 17(a) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), provides:

Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation.

We recently noted in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978):

Section 17 . . . provides that the maximum civil penalty for each violation of OSHA standards is generally $1,000. Section 17(a), however, provides that civil penalties up to $10,000 for each violation may be imposed on an employer who "willfully or repeatedly violates" OSHA standards.

Id. at 685.

In finding a "willful" violation here, the Commission referred to the First Circuit's definition of "willfully" for § 17(a) as enunciated in F. X. Messina Construction Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 505 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1974). ² The First Circuit defined willfulness as "a conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision" even if there is no bad motive. Id. at 702. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have embraced similar definitions which do not require a showing of a bad motive. See, e. g., Intercounty Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 522 F.2d 777, 779-81 (4th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1072, 96 S.Ct. 854, 47 L.Ed.2d 82 (1976); Georgia Electric Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 317-19 (5th Cir. 1979); Empire-Detroit Steel Division v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 579 F.2d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 1978); Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, 439 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 452, 58 L.Ed.2d 423 (1979); United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78, 81-82 (10th Cir. 1975). The majority has also approved the precise verbal formula urged by the Secretary, defining "a willful violation as one involving voluntary action, done either with an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, the requirements of the statute." Georgia Electric Co., 595 F.2d at 319; See Western Waterproofing Co., 576 F.2d at 142-43; Intercounty Construction Co., 522 F.2d at 780; Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d at 81-82. This formula is based upon a Supreme Court decision defining willfulness in the context of a different statute providing for a civil penalty. United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 303 U.S. 239, 243, 58 S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773 (1938).

The Third Circuit, the only other Court of Appeals to have addressed this question, has adopted a different definition. It has written:

It is obvious from the size of the penalty which can be imposed for a "willful" infraction ten times that of a "serious" one that Congress meant to deal with a more flagrant type of conduct than that of a "serious" violation. Willfulness connotes defiance or such reckless disregard of consequences as to be equivalent to a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting (Sic ) of the Act. Willful means more than merely voluntary action or omission it involves an element of obstinate refusal to comply.

Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1974), Aff'd en banc, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), Aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). ³ The Third Circuit has subsequently applied this "flaunting" standard in the context of "repeated" violations under § 17(a). Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 540 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1976).

We believe that the majority rule which does not require a bad motive for willfulness better serves the congressional objectives in enacting OSHA and better reflects the statute. In Todd Shipyards Corp. we rejected the "flaunting" test in the context of "repeated" violations, noting that such a requirement would frustrate the purposes of OSHA by placing too great a burden on the Secretary. ⁴ 586 F.2d at 686. The same criticism may be made of the Third Circuit's "flaunting" standard in the context of "willful" violations. See Georgia Electric Co., 595 F.2d at 319; Intercounty Construction Co., 522 F.2d at 780. Additionally, we find persuasive the other arguments advanced in support of the majority definition of "willfully."

In Intercounty Construction Co., the Fourth Circuit wrote:

We agree with the position adopted by the Commission in interpreting the statute that "willful" means action taken knowledgeably by one subject to the statutory provisions in disregard of the action's legality. No showing of malicious intent is necessary. A conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision properly is described as willful, "regardless of venial motive." F. X. Messina Construction Corp. . . . .

522 F.2d at 779-80. In thus adopting the First Circuit test upon which the Commission relied in the instant case, the Fourth Circuit explained:

In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the holding of the Third Circuit which found willfulness, in this statute, as connoting the element of "obstinate refusal to comply." Irey . . . . However, we decline to require the Commission to find such a bad purpose before it sustains a citation for a willful violation. To require bad intent would place a severe restriction on the statutory authority of OSHA to apply the stronger sanctions in enforcing the law, a result we do not feel was intended by Congress. Rather, we agree with the Commission that willfulness is used in the mere cognitive sense in civil statutes, and connotes bad purpose only when an element of a criminal act.

Id. at 780. The court also indicated that its definition "follows logically from the requirements of the" OSHA. Id. It also is consistent with the definition of "willfulness" given in other instances of civil penalties, including that provided by the Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad. Id. Finally it gives appropriate deference to the Commission's interpretation. Id. at 779; See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965).

Appellants retort that the Third Circuit's rule is preferable because it better distinguishes between "serious" violations and "willful" violations as those terms are used in § 17 of OSHA. ⁵ However, as...