Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Brown
Decision Date | 24 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 1D14–4381.,1D14–4381. |
Parties | NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellant, v. Germaine R. BROWN a/k/a Germaine R. Brown; Andrea E. Brown, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale; Celia C. Falzone of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Jared D. Comstock of John F. Hayter, Attorney at Law, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellees.
Appellant challenges a final summary judgment holding that the statute of limitations bars appellant's action to foreclose the subject mortgage. We agree with appellant that the statute of limitations did not bar the action. Thus, we reverse.
It is undisputed that appellees have failed to make any mortgage payments since February 2007, the first month in which they defaulted. In April 2007, appellant's predecessor in interest gave notice of its intent to accelerate the note based on the February 2007 breach, and filed a foreclosure action. However, the trial court dismissed that action without prejudice in October 2007, after counsel for the lender failed to attend a case management conference.
The next relevant event occurred in November 2010, when appellant sent appellees a new notice of intent to accelerate, based on appellees' breach in March 2007 and subsequent breaches. Appellees took no action to cure the default, and appellant filed a new foreclosure action in November 2012. Appellees asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, arguing that the new action and any future foreclosure actions were barred because they were not filed within five years after the original 2007 acceleration of the note. § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012) ( ).
The principles set forth in Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004 (Fla.2004), apply in this case. In Singleton, the Florida Supreme Court recognized “the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship.” 882 So.2d at 1007 (emphasis added). The court sought to avoid both unjust enrichment of a defaulting mortgagor, and inequitable obstacles “prevent[ing] mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.” Id. at 1007–08. Giving effect to those principles in light of the continuing obligations of a mortgage, the court held that “the subsequent and separate alleged default created a new and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.” Id. at 1008. The court found it irrelevant whether acceleration had been sought in earlier foreclosure actions. Id. The court's analysis in Singleton recognizes that a note securing a mortgage creates liability for a total amount of principal and interest, and that the lender's acceptance of payments in installments does not eliminate the borrower's ongoing liability for the entire amount of the indebtedness.
The present case illustrates good grounds for the Singleton court's concern with avoiding both unjust enrichment of borrowers and inequitable infringement on lenders' remedies. Judgments such as that under review run afoul of Singleton because they release defaulting borrowers from their entire indebtedness and preclude mortgagees from collecting the total debt evidenced by the notes securing the mortgages they hold, even though the sum of the installment payments not made during the limitations period represents only a fraction of the total debt. See GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Whiddon, 164 So.3d 97, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ( ). We further observe that both the note and the mortgage at issue here contain typical provisions reflecting the parties' agreement that the mortgagee's forbearance or inaction do not constitute waivers or release appellees from their obligation to pay the note in full. These binding contractual terms refute appellees' arguments and are inconsistent with the judgment under review.
We have held previously that not even a dismissal with prejudice of a foreclosure action precludes a mortgagee “from instituting a new foreclosure action based on a different act or a new date of default not alleged in the dismissed action.” PNC Bank, N.A. v. Neal, 147 So.3d 32, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ; see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So.3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So.3d 892 (Fla.2014) (Case No. SC14–1305) ( ); Evergrene Partners, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 143 So.3d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ( ). The dismissal in this case was without prejudice, so...
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