Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Voigt, Case No. 2D06-4650 (Fla. App. 10/24/2007)
| Decision Date | 24 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D06-4650. |
| Parties | NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MAIDA SOLANO VOIGT, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County, Robert L. Doyel, Judge.
Steven M. Brady of Swartz Campbell LLC, Orlando, for Appellant.
Jeffrey M. Byrd of Jeffrey M. Byrd, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company appeals a final judgment in the amount of $440,915.49 entered in favor of its insured, Maida Solano Voigt, awarding underinsured motorist benefits on a policy of automobile insurance with uninsured and underinsured motorist limits of only $50,000. This court held in Dixie Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 484 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), based on established case law from other districts, that a judgment entered against an insurance carrier for benefits provided by its policy must be limited to the policy limits. Despite this longstanding, well-established law, Ms. Voigt's counsel convinced the trial court to enter a judgment for the entire amount of the jury's verdict without any allegation in the pleadings, much less a factual determination, that Nationwide had committed bad faith. We reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment in accordance with the policy limits.
This case arises from an automobile accident on June 2, 2004, in Polk County, Florida. Ms. Voigt sustained injuries when her car was hit by a car driven by Audrey Rigney. It appears undisputed that Ms. Rigney was at fault for the accident. Ms. Rigney had a policy of automobile liability insurance with limits of $25,000. Ms. Voigt claimed that her injuries exceeded this amount and made an underinsured motorist claim against her own insurance company, Nationwide.
Ms. Voigt sued both Ms. Rigney and Nationwide. Ms. Voigt alleged that the claim invoked Nationwide's underinsured motorist coverage and attached a copy of the declarations page of the insurance policy showing coverage in the amount of $50,000. Nationwide answered the complaint admitting the coverage but disputing the claim and specifically the amount of damages sustained by Ms. Voigt. Prior to trial, Ms. Voigt settled with Ms. Rigney. The trial then proceeded with Nationwide as the sole defendant.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Voigt for $465,650.29. A few days later, in conjunction with its motion for new trial, Nationwide filed a motion to limit the judgment to the limits of its coverage. At approximately the same time, Ms. Voigt's counsel submitted a proposed judgment offsetting
only the amount of the settlement with Ms. Rigney. The letter submitting the judgment made no reference to the policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage or the established law on this subject. A few weeks later, Ms. Voigt's counsel filed a motion for entry of final judgment that made no reference to Nationwide's motion to limit the judgment to the undisputed policy limits of the underinsured motorist coverage and again asked for entry of judgment in the amount of $440,915.49. On September 15, without a hearing, the trial court denied Nationwide's motion for new trial and motion to limit the judgment to the policy limits. The court entered the judgment requested by Ms. Voigt's counsel.
On appeal, Nationwide argues that it was entitled to a new trial because the trial court refused to strike two jurors for cause. We reject this argument without further discussion. On the other hand, Nationwide argues that the judgment against it must be restricted to the limits of its coverage. Its argument is squarely supported by this court's holding in Dixie Insurance, 484 So. 2d 89.
In Dixie Insurance, this court held that the trial court erred in denying a motion to modify the final judgment to limit the liability of the insurance company to the amount of its policy limits. 484 So. 2d at 89. This court expressly relied upon established case law from the Third and Fourth Districts, including Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shilling, 374 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) abrogated on other grounds recognized by Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 934, 938 n.5 (Fla. 1996); Soler v. Kukula, 297 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); and Stella v. Craine, 281 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 289 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1974). Although Dixie Insurance and the cases cited therein each involved
a third-party claim for coverage and not a first-party claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the same principles clearly apply to an insured's claim against its insurer for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits, at least in the absence of a judicial finding of bad faith. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. St. Godard, 936 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (). Collectively, these cases hold that when no dispute exists as to the policy limits or available coverage and such limits are made known to all parties during pretrial discovery, the trial court should upon proper verification grant an insurer's motion to limit the judgment to the policy limits. Dixie Insurance, 484 So. 2d at 89; Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d at 1071; Shilling, 374 So. 2d at 614; Quinn, 358 So. 2d at 1381; Soler, 297 So. 2d at 601; Stella, 281 So. 2d at 585-86. We are unaware of any case in Florida that has ever held to the contrary. Indeed, Ms. Voigt has cited no case from any jurisdiction so holding.
Ms. Voigt argues that Nationwide waived or did not preserve this issue because it first sought to limit the judgment in its posttrial motion. She suggests that Nationwide had some duty to preserve this issue by defense or special pleading at an earlier stage in the proceedings. There are two problems with this argument. First, as well established as the law is regarding the trial court's duty to limit the judgment to the extent of the undisputed policy limits, it is equally well established that equitable principles such as estoppel may not generally be used affirmatively against an insurer to
create or extend coverage otherwise lacking in the policy. See St. Godard, 936 So. 2d at 9 (citing Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1995); AIU Ins. Co. v. Block Marina Inv., Inc., 544 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. 1989); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1987); Six L's Packing Co. v. Fla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 560, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), adopted, 276 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1973)). Second, no waiver or estoppel is established by this record. Ms. Voigt expressly alleged a claim on a policy with limits of $50,000. Nationwide admitted these allegations. There was no issue or dispute between the parties about the amount of coverage until Ms. Voigt submitted her proposed judgment to the trial court for an amount in excess of the limits shown in her own pleadings.
We emphasize that Ms. Voigt did not allege a claim against Nationwide for bad faith in this proceeding....
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