Nelson v. State
| Citation | 578 So.2d 694,16 Fla. L. Weekly 225 |
| Decision Date | 28 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 74421,74421 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
| Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 225 Vincent NELSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Patricia G. Lampert, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We review Nelson v. State, 546 So.2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), based on conflict with State v. Scott, 481 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1335 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 402, 93 L.Ed.2d 355 (1986), and Wulff v. State, 533 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Vincent Nelson was stopped on April 1, 1987, as he was driving a car out of the driveway of a residence onto the street. A police officer effectuated the stop by placing his police car in front of the exiting car, and petitioner was arrested when a subsequent license tag check disclosed that the car was stolen. Petitioner entered a "no contest" plea, reserving the right to appeal the trial judge's ruling, affirmed by the district court, that he lacked standing to challenge the legality of his stop.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), teaches us that there is a seizure whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (stopping an automobile and detaining its occupant, even briefly, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla.1986) (same). The constitution forbids unreasonable seizures. 1 Therefore, under normal circumstances, petitioner would be free to challenge the reasonableness of his seizure. The issue, as posed by the ruling below, 2 is whether petitioner can be denied the right to challenge the reasonableness of his seizure because he was stopped while driving a stolen car. We hold that he cannot, and join our sister court, which, when faced with this identical issue, held:
Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining the occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, even though the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. As such the stop must comport with objective standards of reasonableness, whether that amounts to probable cause or a less stringent test. Rakas v. Illinois, [439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ], does not teach otherwise, 3 for in that case the defendants did not question the constitutionality of the initial stop of their car. The defendant, as an occupant of the truck, has an interest in continuing his travels without government intrusion. Thus his fourth amendment rights could have been violated by the stopping of the truck even though the truck was stolen.
State v. Conger, 183 Conn. 386, 390-91, 439 A.2d 381, 384 (1981) (citations omitted).
The cases relied upon by the state, United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Hensel, 672 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107, 102 S.Ct. 2907, 73 L.Ed.2d 1316 (1982); and United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411 (4th Cir.1981), involve the search and seizure of property in which the defendant had no ownership or possessory interest, therefore the defendant lacked standing to assert a fourth amendment right to privacy in the property. The instant case, by contrast, involves the seizure of Nelson himself. This obvious distinction was recognized in Lanford, where the court, while holding that Lanford lacked standing to challenge the search of property not his own, noted that: "Lanford does, of course, have standing to challenge the search of his person." Lanford, 838 F.2d at 1353.
The state also contends that Nelson should be denied standing because there is no valuable social purpose served by extending the fourth amendment's protection to a criminal. We disagree. The valuable social purpose served by extending the constitution's protection to all persons, even a criminal, aptly was stated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), limited on other grounds, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984): "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
We conclude that the driver of a stolen vehicle has standing to challenge his stop. We emphasize that we are addressing only the issue of standing, the dispositive issue below. We approve Wulff and Scott, 4 quash Nelson, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I am constrained to concur in this opinion because otherwise there would be nothing to prevent the police from stopping any car under any circumstances in the hope of occasionally finding a stolen one.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hilton v. State
...and detaining the driver . . . are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391; see also Nelson v. State, 578 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla.1991) ("Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining the occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendme......
-
Hitchcock v. State
...first trial is unclear.15 Chief Justice Shaw also dissented in the affirmance of the death sentence for unstated reasons. Hitchcock, 578 So.2d at 694 (Shaw, C.J.,...
-
Williams v. State
...although Williams had standing to contest the stop of the car, Wulff v. State, 533 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), approved, Nelson v. State, 578 So.2d 694 (Fla.1991), he had no right to complain of its search since he was a mere passenger, State v. Deen, 625 So.2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), a......
-
Woods v. State, 5D03-183.
...initial stop of Woods was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Nelson v. State, 578 So.2d 694, 694-95 (Fla.1991) (stopping an automobile and detaining its occupant, even briefly, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Am......