Nevitt v. Langfelder

• Decision Date: 23 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 74405,74405
• Citation: 157 Ill.2d 116,191 Ill.Dec. 36,623 N.E.2d 281
• Parties: , 191 Ill.Dec. 36 Douglas J. NEVITT, Appellant, v. Ossie LANGFELDER, Mayor of the City of Springfield, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 281

623 N.E.2d 281

157 Ill.2d 116, 191 Ill.Dec. 36

Douglas J. NEVITT, Appellant, v. Ossie LANGFELDER, Mayor of the City of Springfield, et al., Appellees.

No. 74405.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 1993.

Thomas W. Duda, Buffalo Grove, for appellant.

James K. Zerkle, Corporation Counsel, and Robert M. Rogers, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Springfield, for appellees. Elena Marcheschi, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for amicus curiae.

Kelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Mardell Nereim, of counsel), for amicus curiae City of Chicago.

Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney, Chicago (Karen A. Covy, Jeanette Sublett and Kathleen J. McKee, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for amicus curiae County of Cook.

Beth Anne Janicki, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

Richard N. Williams, Hoffman Estates, for amicus curiae Northwest Mun. Conference, Inc.

Richard D. Frazier, Metnick, Barewin, Wise & Cherry, Springfield, for amicus curiae Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Assn. Illinois. Gilbert Feldman, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for amicus curiae American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees.

Chief Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

After a hearing, the circuit court of Sangamon County declared unconstitutional, as a violation of equal protection, an amendment to section 1 of the Public Employee Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 1992)). The amendment had made the provisions of the statute applicable to home rule units of government containing fewer than 1 million persons while excluding from coverage home rule units having a greater population. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the cause for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, Douglas J. Nevitt, was employed as a fire fighter by the City of Springfield, a home rule unit of government. According to the complaint, the plaintiff was injured on March 30, 1991, while fighting a fire. At the time of the plaintiff's injury, the Public Employee Disability Act required home rule units of government with populations smaller than 1 million to continue paying, for a period of one year, wages and benefits to fire fighters who, like the plaintiff, sustain injury in the line of duty. The city refused the plaintiff's request for continued payment of those items. The plaintiff then brought the present action on March 27, 1992, seeking a declaratory judgment of his rights under the Act and a writ of mandamus to compel the city to comply with the obligations imposed by the Act. Named as defendants in the action were the City of Springfield, its mayor, and several other municipal officers and employees.

At the time of its enactment, in 1973, the Public Employee Disability Act did not apply to any home rule unit of government. In 1988, the Act was amended to extend its coverage to home rule units having populations of less than 1 million; home rule units larger than that remained outside its scope. It is the validity of the 1988 amendment that is at issue here. Section 1 of the Public Employee Disability Act now provides, in pertinent part:

"Whenever any law enforcement officer, correctional officer, fireman, or any other employee of the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities working within a penal institution or State facility operated by the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities who is employed on a full time basis by the State of Illinois, any unit of local government (including any home rule unit), any State supported college or university, or any other public entity granted the power to employ persons for such purposes by law suffers any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same injury, * * *.

* * * * * *

Pursuant to paragraphs (h) and (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, this Act specifically denies and limits the exercise by home rule units of any power which is inconsistent herewith, and all existing laws and ordinances which are inconsistent herewith are hereby superseded. This Act does not preempt the concurrent exercise by home rule units of powers consistent herewith.

This Act does not apply to any home rule unit with population of over 1,000,000." (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 1992).)

As can be seen, the Act applies not only to certain home rule units, but to all other units of local government, and to various divisions of State government as well.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to benefits under the Act as a result of his 1991 injury. The plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under the Act and the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the municipal authorities to comply with the provisions of the Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that the classification of home rule units found in the Act violated the equal protection guarantees of the Federal and State constitutions and was invalid special legislation prohibited by the State constitution. The defendants also argued that the legislature, if it wished to preempt home rule authority, could not choose to preempt the authority of fewer than all home rule units of government. In addition, the defendants contended that the preemption clause of the Act was invalid because it failed to cite the correct preemption provision of the constitution, as required by statute. Finally, the defendants contended that the present action was premature because the plaintiff had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies before the Industrial Commission. Following a hearing, the trial judge granted the defendant's dismissal motion, concluding that the classification of home rule units in the Act was a denial of equal protection. The trial judge believed that the distinction recognized in the statute was arbitrary and failed to reflect any genuine difference between injured fire fighters employed by a home rule unit to which the Act applied. The judge did not address the defendants' other challenges to the provision. Because the statute was found unconstitutional, the plaintiff's appeal from that ruling lies directly to this court. (134 Ill.2d R. 302(a).) We granted leave to a number of amici curiae to submit briefs in support of the parties' respective positions. See 134 Ill.2d R. 345.

I

We consider first the defendants' argument that the Act, as amended, impermissibly classifies home rule units on the basis of population. The defendants contend that the classification scheme used in the 1988 amendment to the Act violates the equal protection guarantee and the special legislation prohibition of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 13). In the proceedings below, the trial judge invalidated the statute solely on equal protection grounds. The defendants may, however, sustain the trial court's favorable ruling on other grounds not specifically addressed by the judge, and therefore we will consider the defendants' special legislation challenge as well. (See Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill.2d 382, 387, 75 Ill.Dec. 219, 457 N.E.2d 9.) We note also that the defendants do not renew here their contention that the Act violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. As will be evident, however, the Federal and State equal protection guarantees are determined by the same standards, and our result in this case would be no different under Federal law.

Legislation is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. (DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital (1992), 147 Ill.2d 57, 67, 167 Ill.Dec. 1009, 588 N.E.2d 1139; Bernier v. Burris (1986), 113 Ill.2d 219, 227, 100 Ill.Dec. 585, 497 N.E.2d 763; People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill.2d 482, 499, 59 Ill.Dec. 59, 431 N.E.2d 344.) The defendants challenge the Act as violative of the equal protection and special legislation provisions of the State constitution; the standards by which those arguments are to be assessed are familiar and well settled.

Article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution provides, "No person shall * * * be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2.) In resolving challenges brought under that provision of the Illinois Constitution, we apply the same standards that govern equal protection claims made under the Federal Constitution. (People v. Reed (1992), 148 Ill.2d 1, 7, 169 Ill.Dec. 282, 591 N.E.2d 455; Jenkins v. Wu (1984), 102 Ill.2d 468, 477, 82 Ill.Dec. 382, 468 N.E.2d 1162; S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin (1975), 61 Ill.2d 70, 76-77, 329 N.E.2d 213.) In general the guarantee of equal protection "does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways"; it does, however, "deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Reed v. Reed (1971), 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229.

The special legislation proscription of the Illinois Constitution provides, "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." (Ill....