New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele
Decision Date | 21 November 1899 |
Citation | 161 N.Y. 11,55 N.E. 311 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE & TRUST CO. v. VIELE et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.
Action by the New York Life Insurance & Trust Company, trustee under the will of Mary Griffin, deceased, against Terese Viele and others. From a judgment on a decision of the court construing the will, affirmed by the appellate division (47 N. Y. Supp. 841), Anna Maria Louisa Natalia Reichelt and others appeal. Affirmed.
Charles E. Hughes, for appellants.
Severyn B. Sharpe, for respondents.
This appeal involves the construction of the third clause of the will of Mary Griffin, who died on the 9th day of March, 1888, at Dresden, in the kingdom of Saxony, one of the states of the German empire. She was the widow of Francis Griffin, of the city of New York, who died there in the year 1852, and the bulk of the property which the testatrix disposed of by the will in question came to her from her deceased husband. This will bears date July 6, 1878, and a codicil thereto July 28, 1882. Both instruments were executed at Dresden, where the testatrix had resided for over 30 years prior to her death, and relate to both real and personal property. The real estate is situated within this state, and the personal, consisting of bonds, stocks, and other securities, was all substantially under the control and management of the plaintiff, the testatrix receiving the rents and income thereof. The will was executed according to the laws of this state, and has been proved here, and the executors appointed resided here. The execution of the trusts and the management of the estate have devolved on the plaintiff, under certain provisions of the will framed for that purpose. The testatrix, after making certain specific bequests, disposed of the residuary estate in trust for the benefit of her children and grandchildren. The true meaning and construction of the trust provision for her daughter Emily has given rise to the present controversy, and that is the only question involved in the appeal. This provision is found in the third item of the will, and is in the following language: The record shows that Emily was married in the year 1857 to Carl Emil Lengnick, an officer in the Saxon army, with whom she lived until her death, on August 3, 1893. These were but two children of this marriage, both of whom predeceased the testatrix, dying in the year 1872. It will be seen by the clause of the will above quoted that a remainder was limited upon the life estate of Emily in favor of her ‘lawful issue,’ if any survived her, but, if not, then over to the other grandchildren of the testatrix for whose benefit trusts were created by other clauses of the will.
The courts below have determined that, since Emily died without descendants, the remainders limited upon her life estate devolve upon the other grandchildren in the proportions specified in the provision quoted. The correctness of this determination could hardly be questioned but for a peculiar state of facts existing when the will was made, and at the time of the death of the testatrix. It appears that in the year 1876 the defendant Olga Felicitas Heinicke, a niece of Emily's husband, was legally adopted by them in accordance with the law of the kingdom of Saxony, and taken into their family with all the rights conferred by such relation under the law of that country. The legal status conferred upon this adopted child by the law of the place will sufficiently appear from the following provisions of the Saxon Code, which, it is admitted, are based largely upon the doctrines of the civil law:
The articles of adoption and the royal decree approving the same appear in the record, and they contain nothing limiting or restricting in any way the rights conferred by the Code upon the children by adoption. Subsequently, Emily and her husband took into their family two other nieces of the husband, who were cared for and treated as children, but were never legally adopted. They have been brought in as defendants in this action, but we do not understand that any serious claim to share in the estate in question has been or can be made in their behalf. But the learned counsel who has appeared for Olga has presented to the court her claim to the remainder, limited on the life estate of her parent by adoption, in a very learned and elaborate argument. It is not too much to say that his industry has explored practically every source of knowledge on the subject. The reasoning in support of his contention, and the collection of authorities to sustain it, has given to the question involved an interest beyond what it would seem to merit from first impressions. The proposition sought to be established is that Olga is the lawful issue of Emily, though not related to her by blood, and so entitled to take the remainder, under the terms of the will, in the trust share of her parent by adoption. The main postulate in support of this contention is that the legal status of an adopted child, acquired by the law of adoption, is by the law of comity recognized in every other jurisdiction where such status becomes material in determining the right to take property by will or inheritance. The authorities cited seem to give much support to this proposition, and, so far as it is involved in or material to this case, we need not question it. Miller v. Miller, 91 N. Y. 315;Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243;Burrage v. Briggs, 120 Mass. 103;Buckley v. Frasier, 153 Mass. 525, 27 N. E. 768;Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262;Tirrell v. Bacon (C. C.) 3 Fed. 62;Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R. I. 644, 35 Atl. 882;Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948,17 L. R. A. 435;Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993;Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N. E. 1047,17 L. R. A. 806;Atchinson v. Atchinson's Ex'rs, 89 Ky. 488, 12 S. W. 942;In re Rowan's Estate, 132 Pa. St. 299, 19 Atl. 82;Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274;Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S. W. 683;Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kan. 217, 45 Pac. 596;Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628,23 L. R. A. 665.
It is said that the status of Olga must be determined by the statutes of Saxony, construed with reference to the doctrines of the civil law upon which they are based, and, thus construed, she has all the rights of a child born in wedlock. In the language of...
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