New York State Inspection, Sec. and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Cuomo

• Decision Date: 21 September 1984
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Citation: 480 N.Y.S.2d 1,103 A.D.2d 312
• Parties: NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,, etc., et al., Respondents, v. Mario M. CUOMO, as Governor and Chief Executive Officer of the State of New York, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 1

480 N.Y.S.2d 1

103 A.D.2d 312

NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, American

Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, etc., et al., Respondents, v. Mario M. CUOMO, as Governor and Chief Executive Officer of

the State of New York, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Sept. 21, 1984.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Hauppauge (Ann Horowitz, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for appellants.

Rowley, Forrest & O'Donnell, P.C., Albany (Mark T. Walsh, Jr., Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and GIBBONS, BRACKEN and NIEHOFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These appeals concern the scheduled October 1, 1984 closing of the Long Island Correctional Facility (hereinafter LICF) which has been in operation since July, 1982 and which is located in the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center. The facility was opened as part of the conversion plan announced by former Governor Carey to meet the immediate and long term population needs of the correction system. When the decision to partially convert the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center for correctional use was originally announced, the County of Suffolk and others commenced a proceeding seeking to set aside that decision on the ground, inter alia, that the appellants therein acted in violation of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA, ECL art. 8) by failing to properly consider the potential impact of the proposed action on the surrounding community and the immediate patient community. Special Term granted the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of the facility. However, on appeal, this court reversed and denied the motion (Matter of Cohalan v. Carey, 88 A.D.2d 77, 452 N.Y.S.2d 639). This court concluded that the appellants therein had complied with the requirements of SEQRA and that the appellants' determination that the partial conversion of the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center for correctional use would not have a significant impact on the environment of the surrounding community was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly this court held that the petitioners failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and were not entitled to injunctive relief. The petitioners' subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed (Matter of Cohalan v. Carey, 57 N.Y.2d 672, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77, 439 N.E.2d 886). Shortly thereafter, the LICF was opened.

In January, 1984, in his annual message to the Legislature, Governor Cuomo announced that the LICF would be closed as part of the overall capital expansion plan of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (hereinafter DOCS). In a subsequent press release dated February 16, 1984, Governor Cuomo announced that the facility would be closed on October 1, 1984. The Governor stated further that "the opening of 3,500 new prison spaces over the next year under the State's prison expansion program and a current reading of prison population growth projections, the State will be able to absorb the 700 Brentwood inmates by October 1".

Petitioners instituted the instant proceeding by service of a notice of petition, dated April 27, 1984, seeking to enjoin the scheduled closing of the LICF. There are two classes of petitioners. Class I includes those correction officers, sergeants, lieutenants and civilian employees of the DOCS currently employed at the LICF. Class II includes all those correction officers, sergeants and lieutenants employed at the Sing Sing Correctional Facility at Ossining, New York and other correctional facilities maintained and operated by the DOCS. In the petition, petitioners assert the following seven causes of action: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that the closing of the LICF will violate their statutory rights under section 27-a of the Labor Law;

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that the decision to close the LICF does not rest upon any legitimate State purpose and is thus illegal, arbitrary and capricious;

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that Governor Cuomo is acting in excess of his constitutional and statutory authority by ordering the closing of the LICF;

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that Governor Cuomo is usurping the powers, rights and duties of the Commissioner of Correctional Services, by ordering the closing of the LICF Petitioners allege that the Commissioner of Correctional Services is proceeding in excess of his jurisdiction in allowing the LICF to close by order of Governor Cuomo;

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that by closing the LICF, the appellants have failed to perform a duty which is enjoined upon them by law to use the resources of the DOCS to provide the maximum services and facilities provided by law;

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioners allege that the appellants are equitably estopped from closing the LICF and interfering with the employment status of the Class I petitioners.

Petitioners moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the closing of the LICF pending a determination on the merits. On June 5, 1984, Special Term granted petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On that date the appellants moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to subdivision (f) of CPLR 7804 and CPLR 3211 (subd. pars. 2, 7) upon the grounds (a) that the decision to close the LICF involves the exercise of executive discretion and therefore presents a controversy that is nonjusticiable, (b) that petitioners have failed to exhaust their contractual remedies, (c) that the petition fails to state a cause of action, and (d) that petitioners lack standing. Special Term denied the appellants' motion to dismiss, finding, inter alia, that the claim advanced by petitioners under section 27-a of the Labor Law was justiciable in light of the recent Court of Appeals decision in the cases of Klostermann v. Cuomo and Joanne S. v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588. We disagree.

It is fundamental that the judiciary is loath to interfere with the executive branch of government with respect to the administration and management of its affairs, the allocation of its resources and the implementation and management of its various programs. This general principle was discussed by the Court of Appeals in its joint opinion in the cases of Jones v. Beame and Bowen v. State Bd. of Social Welfare of State of N.Y., 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277, which, while arising from different facts and different programs, raised the same issue of justiciability. In Jones (supra), the plaintiffs, who were private persons and organizations concerned with the inadequate and therefore cruel treatment of animals in the New York City zoos as a result of the City's fiscal crisis, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the municipal officials charged with the ultimate responsibility for operation of the zoos. In Bowen (supra) the plaintiffs, the City of Long Beach and its city manager, were concerned with the premature placement in private homes and hotels of mental patients discharged into the community. The plaintiffs accordingly sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the State departments charged with the ultimate responsibility for the care and treatment of the mentally ill.

With respect to the Jones case, the Court of Appeals noted that: "it is untenable that the judicial process, at the instance of particular persons and groups affected by or concerned with the inevitable consequences of the city's fiscal condition should intervene and reorder priorities, allocate the limited resources available, and in effect direct how the vast municipal enterprise should conduct its affairs" (45 N.Y.2d 402, 407, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277, supra). Similarly with respect to Bowen, the court stated, "the complexities relate not to fiscal measures alone, but to theories and programs for deinstitutionalizing, for the sake of the patients, the inmates of the crowded and evermore crowding mental hospitals" (45 N.Y.2d 402, 407, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277, supra). In conclusion the Court of Appeals noted that "resolution of the ultimate issues rests on policy, and reference to violations of applicable statutes is irrelevant except in recognized separately litigable matters brought to enforce them" (45 N.Y.2d 402, 409, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277, supra).

The instant proceeding is similar to the Jones and Bowen cases (supra) in that the relief sought by petitioners herein, i.e., the enjoining of the closing of the LICF, necessarily requires the judiciary to become involved in the operation and administration of the executive department and the DOCS. The primary responsibility for administering the State correctional system is vested in the Commissioner of Correctional Services (Correction Law, § 112) who is appointed by and holds office at the pleasure of the Governor (Correction Law, § 5). The commissioner is also specifically vested with the responsibility, to be discharged within his discretion, of maintaining, establishing, adding to or closing any correctional facility operated by the DOCS in accordance with the needs of the department (Correction Law, § 70, subd. 3, par. ). In this case, Commissioner Coughlin, in agreement with Governor Cuomo, has determined that the closing of the LICF is appropriate in light of the fact that it was opened without adequate opportunity for community participation in the planning process. Commissioner Coughlin has also indicated that the decision to close the LICF is part of an overall capital expansion program which includes the addition of new correctional facility space to the system and the phasing out of specifically identified facility space as new space becomes available. Clearly it is not within the scope of the judicial power to question the wisdom of this administrative decision. As the Court...