Newburyport Soc. for Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes

• Decision Date: 14 September 1934
• Citation: 192 N.E. 54,287 Mass. 530
• Parties: NEWBURYPORT SOC. FOR RELIEF OF AGED WOMEN v. NOYES et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

287 Mass. 530

192 N.E. 54

NEWBURYPORT SOC. FOR RELIEF OF AGED WOMEN

v.NOYES et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Sept. 14, 1934.

Appeal from Superior Court, Essex County; J. M. Gibbs, Judge.

Suit in equity by Newburyport Society for the Relief of Aged Women against Philip E. Noyes, administrator, and others. From a decree dismissing plaintiff's bill, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed, and decree to be entered for plaintiff upon terms fixed by superior court.

P. I. Lawton, of Newburyport, for appellant.

E. E. Crawshaw, of Newburyport, for appellee.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff is a charitable corporation maintaining in Newburyport a home for women not under sixty years of age in reduced circumstances who have no relatives responsible for their support. Florence A. Noyes became an inmate of that home in May 1926, when she was about sixty-six years old. She had little or no property. On her admission she executed an agreement under seal whereby she acknowledged having been received as a beneficiary in the home of the plaintiff, agreed to its by-laws and promised to promote the harmony of the household, ‘and in consideration of the care and expense of my maintenance and support in the Home, all my real and personal estate now or hereafter acquired, I hereby agree to, and do, convey, transfer and deliver to the Home for Aged Women in Newburyport. I also agree to give the said Home any further instruments necessary to make good title.’ She continued to be an inmate of the home from her admission until her death intestate in May 1930. She was furnished by the plaintiff with board, room and nursing. During her last illness of about three months she was provided also with a special nurse. On April 11, 1930, Francis A. Noyes, her cousin, died intestate. Florence A. Noyes was one of his heirs and entitled to one-third of his estate. There was no evidence that he had any knowledge of the agreement between the plaintiff and his cousin. He had been friendly with this cousin and frequently visited her at the home. Those in charge of the home thought best in her interests not to inform her of his death because she was and continued to be seriously sick. He left an estate consisting of both real estate and personal property valued at about $12,000 and her share in it was worth in the vicinity of $4,000. Florence A. Noyes died without making any transfer of her interest in this estate. This suit is brought against her administrator and her heirs at law to compel a transfer to the plaintiff of her interest in the estate of this cousin by way of specific performance of the sealed agreement already recited so far as material.

The trial judge granted some requests for rulings and denied others, filled a brief finding of facts and ordered the entry of a decree dismissing the bill. The plaintiff appealed. All the evidence is reported. There is little if any conflict in the testimony. It was not questioned that the plaintiff maintained a good home and that Florence A. Noyes while an inmate was well cared for. The decision of the issues raised depends not upon the credibility of witnesses but upon proper inferences from testimony not in substantial controversy and upon the governing principles of law. In these circumstances no deference is due to the decision of the trial judge. It is the duty of this court to draw its own inferences, and to decide the case according to its own judgment as to facts and law. Poland v. Beal, 192 Mass. 559, 561, 78 N. E. 728;Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, 194 Mass. 101, 106, 80 N. E. 228,120 Am. St. Rep. 532;Mansfield v. Wiles, 221 Mass. 75, 84, 108 N. E. 901.

It is plain that the contract here sought to be enforced was entered into fairly and openly. It was not obtained by oppression or by taking any advantage of the necessities of Florence A. Noyes. Presumably she fully understood its terms and executed it freely. It thereby assured to her valuable privileges for the rest of her life. It was reasonable in purpose. There was no element of wager about it. She entered at once into the enjoyment of the fruits of the contract by becoming an inmate of the home with all accompanying benefits. The nature of the contract was in direct promotion of the charitable purposes for which the plaintiff was organized. To afford support for the aged poor of deserving habits of life is in the interest of the public weal. The promise of the plaintiff to provide suitable support and care implied from the acceptance of the agreement signed by Florence A. Noyes followed by its actual performance for several years constituted sufficient consideration for the agreement. The instrument was under seal which of itself imports consideration. The consideration appears to have been adequate. According to testimony the actual commercial value of that which was furnished by the plaintiff to her does not fall far short of the amount likely to be received from the enforcement of the contract. It appears to have been fair in its terms in the light of subsequent events. The service rendered by the plaintiff seemingly is nearly commensurate with the amount here sought. In these particulars, it partakes of the nature of contracts which commonly would be enforced. Mills v. Smith, 193 Mass. 11, 17, 78 N. E. 765,6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 865;Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 185, 150 N. E. 9, 42 A. L. R. 1142;Sullivan v. Roche, 257 Mass. 166, 153 N. E. 549;Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 165, 176 N. E. 791. The fairness of the contract is not affected by the circumstance that under the rules of the plaintiff any inmate might be asked to leave if not conforming to the requirements established for the orderly administration of the home. Gooch v. Association for Relief of Aged Indigent Females, 109 Mass. 558;Grosvenor v. United Society of Believers, 118 Mass. 78. Failure to co-operate for the general welfare would be a reasonable ground for refusal further to entertain an inmate.

Upon the strict principles of the common law an assignment of this nature might not be regarded as valid. The subject of the assignment might be treated as a mere possibility not coupled with a present interest and therefore not ground for an action at law. Commonly one cannot sell that which he does not own. Citizens' Loan Association v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 196 Mass. 528, 531, 82 N. E. 696,14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025, 124 Am. St. Rep. 584,13 Ann. Cas. 365;Taylor v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 129, 130, 117 N. E. 43, L. R. A. 1918A, 124, and cases reviewed. Parsons v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 280 Mass. 424, 182 N. E. 863.

The interest of Florence A. Noyes in the estate of her cousin was not so intangible as to be incapable of equitable assignment. This is shown by numerous cases holding that an assignment by an heir upon terms fair and reasonable with the knowledge and assent of the kinsman from whom the property is inherited is of such nature as to be valid. Fitch v. Fitch, 8 Pick. 480, 483;Trull v. Eastman, 3 Metc. 121, 123,37 Am. Dec. 126;Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128, 132. To the same effect in substance is Gadsby v. Gadsby, 275 Mass. 159, 165, 175 N. E. 495, 74 A. L. R. 434. It is not so shadowy and...