Newhall v. Assessors of Brookline

• Decision Date: 02 June 1952
• Citation: 329 Mass. 100,106 N.E.2d 432
• Parties: NEWHALL et al. v. ASSESSORS OF BROOKLINE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 432

106 N.E.2d 432

329 Mass. 100

NEWHALL et al. v. ASSESSORS OF BROOKLINE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued May 7, 8, 1952.

Decided June 2, 1952.

A. Lincoln, Boston, for petitioners.

D. G. Rollins, Brookline, D. A. Rollins, Boston, with him, for respondents.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and SPALDING, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

This petition by not less than ten taxable inhabitants of Brookline, purportedly under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40, § 53, assails the constitutionality of St.1951, c. 640, which, effective January 1, 1952, amended G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 5, Twentieth, as amended by St.1947, c. 310, by increasing the exemption from taxation of household furniture and certain other personal effects from $1,000 to $5,000. ¹ An injunction against the enforcement of the act is sought. The respondent board demurred to the petition, and the single justice reserved and reported the case without decision. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 211, § 6.

The petition contains allegations, somewhat in detail, as to the effect of the increased exemption in Brookline and, more generally, as to its effect in other municipalities. In Brookline, it is alleged that, due to the exemption, there will be an approximate loss of $8,500,000 in the valuation of household furniture and effects, which in 1951 were valued by the respondent board at $10,142,400 and in 1952 will be valued at within one per cent of that total; that the percentage of the value exempted by St.1951, c. 640, will be over eighty-three per cent; that the total assessed valuation in 1951 was $159,589,300, real estate being $143,989,800 and personal estate $15,599,500; that the tax rate last year was $38.90; and that at those figures the exemption would result in a loss of revenue amounting to $330,650 and an increase in the tax rate of over $2. As to other municipalities, the allegations are that where household furniture and effects have been assessed in substantial amounts, a similar loss in valuation will result from the increased exemption; that, generally, the value of the property thus exempted is far the larger part of the total value of the class of property to which the exemption applies; and that in municipalities where there are dwelling houses and apartments containing household furniture and effects owned by persons there domiciled and diminution in the amount of taxable personal property will be 'considerable.' In conclusion, it is alleged that the effect of c. 640 'is materially to impair the constitutional principle of proportionate taxation of property and to make the tax on other classes of property, and particularly on real estate, disproportionate.'

One ground of demurrer is that G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40, § 53, is not the proper remedy for testing the constitutionality of the statute. The respondent board expressly asks that the case not be decided on this procedural issue. We, accordingly, shall rest our decision upon the merits of the constitutional question raised.

The Constitution, Part II, c. § 1, art. 4, reads: 'And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said general court, from time to time * * * to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said commonwealth * * *. And while the public charges of government, or any part thereof, shall be assessed on polls and estates, in the manner that has hitherto been practised, in order that such assessments may be made with equality, there shall be a valuation of estates within the commonwealth taken anew once in every ten years at least, and as much oftener as the general court shall order.'

A literal interpretation of the Constitution might lead to the invalidation of all exemptions. See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 730, 85 N.E.2d 222. But it is plain that from the earliest days under the Constitution there have been exemptions of household furniture and other designated personal property. At first, the exemption of household furniture, wearing apparel, farming utensils, and tools of mechanics was total. St.1780, c. 43. Not until 1821 was the household furniture exemption restricted to $1,000. ² St.1821, c. 107, § 2.

In 1897 this court had occasion to consider the household furniture exemption in Day v. City of Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371, 45 N.E. 751. At that time Pub.Sts. c. 11, § 5, Sixth, read: 'The wearing apparel and farming utensils of every person; his household furniture not exceeding one thousand dollars in value; and the necessary tools not exceeding three hundred dollars in value of a mechanic.' The court in that case, 167 Mass. at page 372, 45 N.E. at page 751, said much which is of present application: 'An exemption of this character is constitutional. Such exemptions have long existed, and it is too late to question the power of the legislature to make them. * * * The exemption of the kinds of property dealt with in the clause is a very old...