Ney v. Ney, 16-1323

• Decision Date: 10 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1323,16-1323
• Citation: 891 N.W.2d 446
• Parties: Patrick Alan NEY, Appellant, v. John Glenn NEY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

891 N.W.2d 446

Patrick Alan NEY, Appellant,

v.John Glenn NEY, Appellee.

No. 16-1323

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed March 10, 2017

Christopher R. Kemp of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, and John M. Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Joseph L. Fitzgibbons and Matthew T.E. Early of Fitzgibbons Law Firm, L.L.C., Estherville, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

Two brothers stipulated to the entry of an order enjoining them from having contact with each other. When one of them subsequently sought a contempt order against the other for violation of the injunction, the district court dismissed the action on the ground it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter or enforce a consent order barring contact between parties. On our review, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. We therefore reverse the dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Patrick Alan Ney and John Glenn Ney are brothers with an acrimonious relationship. In April 2012, Patrick filed a "Petition for Injunctive Relief" seeking a temporary injunction against John. The petition alleged that John had a history of assaulting Patrick, trespassing on his property, and harassing him and his family. Patrick alleged he had requested law enforcement's help multiple times to no avail. The petition further alleged John had recently broken into Patrick's house while drunk but fled before law enforcement arrived.¹ In support of his claim for a temporary injunction, Patrick alleged the ongoing harassment by John caused irreparable damage that law enforcement officers had not been able to prevent. The prayer for relief requested John be prohibited from entering Patrick's property or threatening, assaulting, stalking, molesting, attacking, harassing, or communicating with Patrick and his family.

On June 25, 2012, the parties entered into a "Stipulation and Agreement" asking the court to incorporate the terms of their agreement in an order for injunctive relief. The parties agreed they would,

a. Not threaten, assault, stalk, molest, attack, harass, or otherwise abuse one another;

b. Stay away from each other's residences and not be in each other[']s presence except in a courtroom during court hearings;

c. Not communicate with each other in person or through any means including third persons [except].... through legal counsel;

d. Not communicate with any member of each other[']s family [,] ... [including] spouses, children, grandchildren, and in-laws.

The district court approved the terms of the agreement and issued an order (2012 order) on the same day incorporating the terms of the stipulated agreement and directing that "[t]he parties shall have no further communication with one another."

On March 30, 2016, Patrick filed an "Application for Contempt of Court" alleging John had intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly violated the court's 2012 order. In an attached affidavit, Patrick urged the court to find John in contempt of the order because on four separate occasions, John engaged in "abusive contact" against Patrick and his family, including one instance in which John "threatened to pull his firearm out."

The district court found it had personal and subject matter jurisdiction and issued an order to show cause on March 31, 2016. John filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, asserting the 2012 order was void and unenforceable because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the injunction.

In July 2016, after conducting an unrecorded telephonic hearing and reviewing the briefs, the district court granted John's motion to dismiss. The court concluded the injunction Patrick sought to enforce was void because the issuing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief. In reaching its decision, the district court reasoned that Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) (2011) prescribes the only circumstances in which a district court has jurisdiction to issue a protective order in a civil proceeding.² Concluding the 2012 order purported to issue a protective order in a civil proceeding, the court reasoned that the order was void because the conduct it restrained was not among the grounds for which protective orders are specifically authorized under Iowa Code section 664A.2(2). The court therefore determined the 2012 order was void and could not be enforced through contempt proceedings.

Patrick filed a notice of appeal on August 4, 2016. We retained the appeal to decide whether the district court erred in concluding the 2012 order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Standards of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on subject matter jurisdiction for correction of errors at law. Schaefer v. Putnam , 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013) ; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Similarly, we review a ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Hedlund v. State , 875 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2016). When reviewing the propriety of an injunction, we give weight to the district court's findings of fact. Matlock v. Weets , 531 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1995).

III. Analysis.

A. The Court's Equitable Jurisdiction. We first consider whether the district court had equitable jurisdiction under the Iowa Constitution to grant injunctive relief under the circumstances presented here. The first clause of article V, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution vests district courts with legal and equitable jurisdiction and provides that those jurisdictions "shall be distinct and separate." Iowa Const. art. V, § 6. That clause gives district courts jurisdiction over equitable and common law actions. The second clause of article V, section 6 vests district courts with "jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their respective district, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law." Id. Under that clause, the constitution confers upon district courts jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases—jurisdiction that is further delineated by statute.

The court's equitable jurisdiction is recognized and implemented by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1501 –1.1511. Our rules recognize that injunctive relief is available as an independent remedy in equitable proceedings and authorize injunctive relief as an auxiliary remedy in any action. Id. r. 1.1501. A party may request an injunction by filing a petition for injunctive relief and a supporting affidavit demonstrating the party is entitled to injunctive relief. Id. r. 1.1502.

Petitions for injunctive relief generally invoke the court's equitable jurisdiction. See Sear v. Clayton Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment , 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 1999). They may invoke the court's statutory jurisdiction, however, if the general assembly has "impose[d] a duty to grant an injunction by specifying conditions in a statute." Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co. , 621 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2001). "When this is done, the conditions specified in the statute supersede the traditional equitable requirements." Id.

A court exercising equitable jurisdiction generally has the power to identify the relevant equities and fashion an appropriate remedy. See In re Marriage of Gallagher , 539 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1995). Yet courts of equity are cautious in granting injunctive relief. See Matlock , 531 N.W.2d at 122. Generally, a party seeking an injunction must prove "(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is [not another] adequate [means of protection] available." Sear , 590 N.W.2d at 515.

Under the first prong, a party seeking an injunction must prove intervention is necessary to protect rights cognizable in equity that have been invaded or threatened with invasion. In re Langholz , 887 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 2016) ; Matlock , 531 N.W.2d at 123. We have previously recognized personal interests such as freedom from harassment and stalking as rights cognizable in equity and eligible for protection through injunctive relief upon proper proof. See Opat v. Ludeking , 666 N.W.2d 597, 605 (Iowa 2003) (affirming injunctive relief restraining former friend from harassing the plaintiff); see also Matlock , 531 N.W.2d at 123 (affirming permanent injunction enjoining former boyfriend from stalking and harassing the plaintiff).³

It is also well-established that "a court of equity might properly intervene and grant a remedy by way of injunction to prevent repetition of [a] trespass, and to stop the unwarranted interference of plaintiff's right to the use and possession of his own property" rather than continually "require the plaintiff to continue to institute an action of forcible entry and detainer to remove the defendant from the premises." Usailis v. Jasper , 222 Iowa 1360, 1363, 271 N.W. 524, 526 (1937) ; see also Hall v. Henninger , 145 Iowa 230, 237–38, 121 N.W. 6, 8–9 (1909).

Under the second prong, a district court generally may not issue an injunction unless substantial injury will result from the invasion of the right or if substantial injury is to be reasonably apprehended to result from a threatened invasion of the right. Matlock , 531 N.W.2d at 122. "Before granting an injunction, the court should carefully weigh the relative hardship which would be suffered by the enjoined party upon awarding injunctive relief." Id. ; see also Sear , 590 N.W.2d at 515.

The third prong requires a party seeking an injunction to prove there is not another adequate means of protection available. See Sear , 590 N.W.2d at 515. This limiting principle teaches that an injunction can only issue if the available legal remedies are inadequate to avoid the substantial injury. Berry Seed Co. v. Hutchings , 247 Iowa 417, 422, 74 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1956) ; see alsoMartin v. Beaver , 238 Iowa 1143, 1148, 29 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1947) ("[C]hancery will not intervene merely to better such remedy as the Legislature has deemed sufficient."). We...