Nichols v. Warren

• Decision Date: 15 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13381,13381
• Citation: 550 A.2d 309,209 Conn. 191
• Parties: Ken NICHOLS v. Thomas WARREN, Warden.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 309

550 A.2d 309

209 Conn. 191

Ken NICHOLS v. Thomas WARREN, Warden.

No. 13381.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 4, 1988.

Decided Nov. 15, 1988.

L.D. McCallum, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellant (respondent).

Audrey C. Martinsky, Bridgeport, for appellee (petitioner).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this case is whether General Statutes § 18-7a(c) ¹ authorizes the forfeiture of good time credit that a prisoner has not yet earned, after a prisoner has committed disciplinary offenses while incarcerated.

Under General Statutes § 18-7a(c), the respondent is authorized to reduce an inmate's sentence for good behavior and obedience to the rules of the correctional facility. This sentence reduction is commonly known as "statutory good time." Sentence reductions for inmates sentenced after July 1, 1983, are governed by § 18-7a(c) and are calculated automatically by a computerized system. Pursuant to § 18-7a(c), an inmate is entitled to earn ten days of good time for each month served in obedience to the rules.

On March 28, 1985, the petitioner, Kenneth E. Nichols, was sentenced to four years of incarceration after pleading guilty to burglary charges. Without any sentence credits, the petitioner would have been released from confinement on March 27, 1989. At oral argument, counsel notified the court that the petitioner had been released from confinement and is on probation.

On April 9, 1985, the department of correction credited the petitioner with one day of statutory good time for good behavior during three days in March. On April 24, 1985, while incarcerated at the Enfield correctional facility, the petitioner received a disciplinary report for disobeying a direct order. The petitioner was granted ten days of good time on May 1, 1985, but forfeited thirty days on May 13, 1985, as a result of the April 24 incident. At that time, the number of days forfeited exceeded the number of days for which the petitioner had received good time credit. Therefore, the commissioner of correction prospectively forfeited the excess and the petitioner's computerized time sheet reflected that he "owed" nineteen days of good time.

The commissioner ordered another ninety days forfeited on May 18, 1985, for an incident that had occurred on April 27. During a routine inspection of the Enfield facility on April 27, correction officers found the petitioner in possession of a two-inch piece of brass that was sharpened to a point, and the petitioner shouted obscenities at the inspecting officers. By June 1, 1985, the petitioner had received another ten days of good time. Therefore, as of June 1, 1985, the petitioner had been granted twenty-one days of good time, had forfeited 120 days, and thus "owed" ninety-nine days.

This process of earning and forfeiting good time continued throughout the petitioner's sentence. The respondent's brief indicates that, as of the date of the habeas hearing, the petitioner had forfeited 1305 days and had earned 281 days of good time. ²

While incarcerated in the New Haven correctional center, the petitioner brought a writ of habeas corpus to the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven on March 27, 1987. The petitioner alleged that he was confined illegally because of the forfeiture of unearned good time in violation of the procedure set forth in General Statutes § 18-7a(c). The petitioner sought restoration of forfeited good time that had not yet been earned and any other legal and equitable relief to which he was entitled. The action was tried to the court, Fracasse, J., which held that good time could not be forfeited before it was earned and ordered recalculation of the petitioner's good time credit in accordance with its holding. The respondent filed a petition for certification of the question of law on October 7, 1987, which the court granted on October 8, 1987. The respondent filed the appeal with the Appellate Court on October 28, 1987, and this court transferred the case to itself on March 10, 1988.

Because the petitioner has been released from incarceration, as a preliminary matter we must address the issue of whether this appeal is moot. We conclude that it is not. Counsel for the respondent suggested at argument that if the respondent prevails in this appeal, the commissioner of correction will seek custody of the petitioner and confine him for the period of time that he would have remained incarcerated had the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Furthermore, the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review, it affects an ongoing program of the state's correctional system, and it could affect this petitioner were he again to face incarceration in the future. See Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 437, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981); Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 694-95, 372 A.2d 102 (1976); Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 121-22, 365 A.2d 109 (1976); Winnick v. Reilly, 100 Conn. 291, 296, 123 A. 440 (1924); cf. Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 440 A.2d 310 (1982).

For the purpose of interpreting General Statutes § 18-7a(c), it is helpful to separate the statute into its two sentences. The first sentence provides that an inmate can "earn a reduction of his sentence as such sentence is served" for "good conduct and obedience to the rules." The second sentence provides for forfeiture of good time credit. It states: "Misconduct or refusal to obey the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence shall subject the prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of such reduction by the commissioner or his designee." Id.

The petitioner asserts that the plain language of General Statutes § 18-7a(c) prohibits the forfeiture of good time credit that has not yet been earned. We agree. "We have consistently held that if a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction." Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 33, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987) (interpreting General Statutes § 18-7a); Kilpatrick v. Board of Education, 206 Conn. 25, 28, 535 A.2d 1311 (1988); State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 221, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Lerman v. Levine, 14 Conn.App. 402, 409, 541 A.2d 523 (1988); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) §§ 46.01, 46.04. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is from that source that we deduce the intent of the legislature. Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, 204 Conn. 609, 620, 529 A.2d 692 (1987); Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 93, 513 A.2d 124 (1986); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787, reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 1290, 89 L.Ed.2d 597 (1986); 2A J. Sutherland, supra, § 48.01. In analyzing the plain language, the terms must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning unless their context dictates otherwise. State v. Burney, 189 Conn. 321, 326, 455 A.2d 1335 (1983); Kilpatrick v. Board of Education, supra; 2A J. Sutherland, supra, § 46.01.

The language and structure of General Statutes § 18-7a(c) is not peculiar and, thus, the terms must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning. The statute provides that the inmate will receive a sentence reduction "as such sentence is served." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the good time credits are calculated into the sentence as a sentence reduction when the inmate earns the credit for good behavior from month to month. ³ If the inmate engages in misconduct, the second sentence of the statute provides that the person can lose "all or any portion of such reduction." (Emphasis added.) The logical interpretation of the two sentences in the statute is that the term "such" in the second sentence, as it modifies the term "reduction," refers to the good time sentence "reduction" provided for by the first sentence in the statute. "The word 'such' has been construed as a related adjective referring back to and identifying something previously spoken of and that it naturally, by grammatical usage, refers to the last precedent." Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 556, 295 A.2d 547 (1972), citing Estate of Hill, 214 Cal.App.2d 812, 820, 29 Cal.Rptr. 814 (1963); Joseph L. Pohl, Contractor, Inc. v. State Highway Commission, 431 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Mo.1968); Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatre, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 721, 167 S.E.2d 334 (1969). See Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 221 n. 7, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982). In addition, rules of construction require that the term "such" be interpreted in the context in which it appears and not solely by its dictionary definition. Verrastro v. Sivertsen, supra, 221, 448 A.2d 1344; Bahre v. Hogbloom, supra, 162 Conn. at 556, 295 A.2d 547.

General Statutes § 18-7a(c) is a self-contained, two sentence provision. The legislature's use of the term "such reduction" in the second sentence logically must refer back to the "reduction" provided for in the first sentence of the subsection. ⁴ Therefore, according to the plain language of the statute, the commissioner of correction cannot diminish an inmate's good time sentence reduction for improper behavior until the inmate earns the reduction as the sentence is served. Prospective forfeiture of unearned good time credit is not permitted under the present statute.

The respondent maintains, as the habeas court held, that the language of General Statutes § 18-7a(c) is ambiguous and he insists that this court must resort to the legislative history to determine the purpose of the statute. As the preceding discussion makes clear, we disagree. ⁵ The habeas court, however, did discuss the legislative history in its memorandum of decision, so it is instructive for this court to address the issue....