Niehaus v. Delaware Valley Medical Center

• Decision Date: 05 November 1993
• Citation: 429 Pa.Super. 119,631 A.2d 1314
• Parties: , 8 IER Cases 1318 Patricia NIEHAUS, Appellant, v. DELAWARE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1314

631 A.2d 1314

429 Pa.Super. 119, 8 IER Cases 1318

Patricia NIEHAUS, Appellant, v. DELAWARE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 27, 1993.

Filed Aug. 27, 1993.

Reargument Denied Nov. 5, 1993.

Jonathan B. Sprague, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and HOFFMAN, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

After an approved nine months' leave of absence without pay, Patricia Niehaus sought to resume her employment at the Delaware Valley Medical Center. The employer refused to rehire her, and Niehaus sued. In an amended complaint she alleged that the medical center had breached an express or implied contract to rehire her. The trial court, in response to preliminary objections, dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. Niehaus appealed. ¹

In reviewing an appeal from an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to a complaint, we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom. Hornung v. Schauseil Insurance Associates, Inc., 422 Pa.Super. 472, 478, 619 A.2d 775, 778 (1993). The amended complaint in this case alleged that Niehaus, an employee of Delaware Valley Medical Center, had made a written request for a leave of absence of nine months duration and had obtained her employer's approval therefor. This was in agreement with a provision in an employee handbook which stated that if an employee were granted an approved leave of absence, that employee, at the end thereof, would be guaranteed the same or similar position to that occupied prior to the leave of absence. The handbook also stated, however, that the provisions in the handbook were not to be interpreted as a contract of employment and that either party could terminate the employment relationship at any time. At the conclusion of Niehaus's leave of absence, the medical center refused to rehire her for any position. Niehaus sued. She contended that she had either an express contract, or an implied contract based on promissory estoppel, that she would be rehired following an approved leave of absence.

The presumption under Pennsylvania law is that all employment is at will and, therefore, an employee may be discharged for any reason or no reason. Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 376 Pa.Super. 90, 94, 545 A.2d 334, 336 (1988). "[A]s a general rule, there is no common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an at-will employment relationship." Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 89, 559 A.2d 917, 918 (1989). "The sine qua non of the presumption is that except in rare instances, discharges will not be reviewed in a judicial forum." Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., supra 376 Pa.Super. at 95, 545 A.2d at 336. The burden of overcoming the presumption and proving that one is not employed at-will "rests squarely" with the employee. Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-University Hospital, 417 Pa.Super. 316, 323, 612 A.2d 500, 503 (1992). In order to rebut the presumption of at will employment, a party must establish the existence of: (1) an agreement for a definite duration; (2) an agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged only for just cause; (3) sufficient additional consideration; or (4) an applicable recognized public policy exception. Robertson v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum, 371 Pa.Super. 49, 58, 537 A.2d 814, 819 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 590, 551 A.2d 216 (1988). ²

In Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial, 320 Pa.Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983), an employee handbook issued to the plaintiff contained a statement that the employer's policy was to offer "continuous employment to all employees whose work proves satisfactory." The plaintiff, who had been hired under a contract of indefinite duration, alleged in her complaint for wrongful discharge that the provisions of the employee handbook had created an employment contract which had been breached by the employer. The Superior Court rejected this argument, explaining that the "[employer's] unilateral act of publishing its policies did not amount to the 'meeting of the minds' required for a contract." Id. at 108, 466 A.2d at 1085. See also: Darlington v. General Electric, 350 Pa.Super. 183, 204, 504 A.2d 306, 316 (1986) (court questioned binding nature of employee handbooks on employers). Similarly, in Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986), allocatur denied, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987), the plaintiff had been hired as an at will employee. She was given an employee handbook which contained a provision listing various acts deemed violative of the employer's standard of conduct and which represented cause for disciplinary action. The handbook provided, however, that it could be modified by the employer at any time. When the plaintiff was terminated for reasons other than those listed in the handbook, she sued her employer, alleging a breach of contract. She contended that the provisions of the handbook had transformed her status from an at will employee to one who could only be terminated for cause. The Court disagreed explaining:

This would be a modification of immense proportions. For such an extreme modification of a preexisting contract, we would require a clear statement of an intent to so modify. We do not believe a reasonable person in the [plaintiff's] position would have read this handbook provision as converting her from an at-will employee to an employee with an indefinite contract who could never be discharged without objective just cause.... The vagueness and the generalities [of the handbook's language] coupled with the employer's reservation of power to unilaterally alter the handbook's terms would lead a reasonable at-will employee to interpret its distribution as an informational guideline, and not as the exclusive enumeration of the entire panoply of rights and duties existing between employer and employee which served to displace the at-will contract that already existed between employee and employer.

Id. 354 Pa.Super. at 215-216, 511 A.2d at 838-839. See also: Reilly v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 367 Pa.Super. 411, 416, 532 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1987), allocatur granted, 520 Pa. 577, 549 A.2d 137 (1988) (contract formed between employer and employee via employee handbook only if it "contain[s] unequivocal provisions that the employer intended to be bound by it and, in fact, renounced the principle of at-will employment.").

In a slightly different context, in Morosetti v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, 522 Pa. 492, 564 A.2d 151 (1989), the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to severance pay from their employer because there existed a policy in a manual used by the employer's personnel manager. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the employees on the basis that the employer had made a handbook offer for severance pay which had been accepted by the employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a definitive offer for the severance pay was never made. The Court stated:

It is not sufficient to show they had a policy. It must be shown they offered it as binding terms of employment. A company may indeed have a policy upon which they intend to act, given certain circumstances or events, but unless they communicate that policy as part of a definite offer of employment they are free to change as events may require.

Id. at 496, 564 A.2d at 153. See also: Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-University Hospital, supra; Vincent v. Fuller Co., 400 Pa.Super. 108, 582 A.2d 1367 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 532 Pa. 547, 616 A.2d 969 (1992).

The appellee-medical center contends in this case that because appellant was an employee at will, she could be terminated for any reason or for no reason, and that it would be absurd to require a rehiring of appellant when she could thereafter be discharged immediately. Because she could be discharged at any time and for any reason, the argument goes, her employer could refuse to reinstate her even following an approved leave of absence. Any contrary provision in the employee handbook, it is suggested, was not a definite part of appellant's contract of employment but merely an informal guideline which could be changed at will by the employer. Moreover and in any event, suggests the employer, there was no consideration for an agreement to rehire appellant following an approved leave of absence. It is argued, therefore, that the provision in the handbook is unenforceable.

After careful review, we reject appellee's arguments. Although they have superficial appeal, they do not withstand the light of closer examination. If appellant was initially an employee at will, she nevertheless took a leave of absence only with her employer's approval and upon its promised guarantee that she would be reinstated at the end thereof in the same or a similar position. This, if the averments of her complaint are correct, created a contract. To hold otherwise would be to condone blatant deception.

Courts have found "additional consideration" to support employment contracts for a definite duration "when an employee affords his [or her] employer a substantial benefit other than the services which the employee is hired to perform, or when the employee undergoes a substantial hardship other than the services which he [or she] is hired to perform." Darlington v. General Electric, supra 350 Pa.Super. at 201, 504 A.2d at 315. In Scullion v. EMECO Industries, Inc., 398 Pa.Super. 294, 580 A.2d 1356 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45 (1991), the employee had been discharged after three months of employment. He had been promised by his employer that "[this] was the last job he would ever have" and he had turned down an incentive to remain with his former employer, had sold his home in California, had moved his family to Pennsylvania and had purchased real estate in Pennsylvania. Under these circumstances, the...