Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bogle

• Decision Date: 30 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 86339.,86339.
• Citation: 850 N.E.2d 1281,2006 Ohio 1540,166 Ohio App.3d 449
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Parties: NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant, v. BOGLE et al., Appellees.

Page 1281

850 N.E.2d 1281

166 Ohio App.3d 449

2006-Ohio-1540

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant, v. BOGLE et al., Appellees.

No. 86339.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided March 30, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Kevin C. Alexandersen, Colleen A. Mountcastle, and Holly M. Olarczuk-Smith, Cleveland, for appellant.

Brent Coon & Associates, Christopher J. Hickey, Carolyn K. Ranke, Mary Brigid Sweeney, Cleveland, and Gary J. Maxwell, for appellees.

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, Presiding Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk"), appeals the trial court's decision denying its request for declaratory relief and finding that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292 ("H.B. 292") is preempted by the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), Section 51 et seq., Title 45, U.S.Code, and/or the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act ("LBIA"), as amended, Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.

{¶ 2} Between September 1999 and March 2004, defendants-appellees, Charles Odell Weldon and Eric A. Wiles, individually and in his capacity as executor of the estate of Larry Arnold Wiles, deceased (collectively "appellees"), filed claims against Norfolk alleging injuries caused by occupational exposure to various products, including those containing asbestos, during the course and scope of their employment with Norfolk.¹ Appellees brought these causes of action under the FELA and LBIA.

{¶ 3} On September 13, 2004, Norfolk filed a complaint for declaratory judgment concerning the above pending cases. Norfolk requested a declaratory judgment to declare that (1) the newly enacted H.B. 292, effective September 2, 2004, applied to those pending cases, and (2) that H.B. 292 did not infringe on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

{¶ 4} Following various procedural motions and an oral hearing, the trial court denied the relief sought by Norfolk by declaring that H.B. 292 did not apply to FELA/LBIA cases because it was preempted by federal law.

{¶ 5} Norfolk appeals this decision, raising three assignments of error, which will be addressed together.

Standard of Review

{¶ 6} The issue before us is whether the application of H.B. 292 to asbestos claims arising under the FELA and/or LBIA infringes on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and thus is preempted by federal law. This issue is a question of law. Accordingly, we apply a de novo standard of review without deference to the trial court's decision on this issue. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835; Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 523, 668 N.E.2d 889.

H.B. 292: Applicability to the FELA and/or LBIA

{¶ 7} In its first and second assignments of error, Norfolk argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by declaring that H.B. 292 ("the Act") does not apply to asbestos claims arising under the FELA and/or LBIA because the plain language of the Act demonstrates that it was intended to apply to all asbestos cases filed in the state courts of Ohio. It further argues that the Act is procedural in application, rather than substantive, and, thus, it does not infringe on the Supremacy Clause and is not preempted by federal law.

{¶ 8} In construing a statute, a court's paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 589 N.E.2d 1319. To determine the legislative intent, a court must look to the language of the statute. Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 104, 65 O.O.2d 296, 304 N.E.2d 378. Words used in a statute are to be given their usual, normal, and customary meaning. State ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 661 N.E.2d 1049. Further, unless a statute is ambiguous, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statute. Id.

{¶ 9} The preemption doctrine arises out of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States shall be "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Article VI, United States Constitution. Therefore, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Congress possesses the power to preempt state law. Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 62, 68, 684 N.E.2d 648. Moreover, "`pre-emption may result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation.'" Id., quoting In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 260, 626 N.E.2d 85.

{¶ 10} Federal preemption of state law can occur where Congress has occupied the entire field (field preemption) or where there is an actual conflict between federal and state law (conflict preemption). Carter v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 177, 181, 709 N.E.2d 1235. Field and conflict preemption are both forms of implied preemption. Id., citing Minton, 80 Ohio St.3d at 69, 684 N.E.2d 648.

{¶ 11} Absent express statutory language preempting state law, preemption should be strictly construed in favor of finding against preemption. "In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States * * *, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood (1993), 507 U.S. 658, 663-664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387. The critical question in any preemption analysis is whether Congress intended state law to be superseded by federal law. Minton, 80 Ohio St.3d at 69, 684 N.E.2d 648.

{¶ 12} However, when the federal government completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it, the test of preemption is whether "`the matter on which the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.'" Carter, 126 Ohio App.3d at 182, 709 N.E.2d 1235, quoting Burlington N. RR. Co. v. Connell (E.D.Wash.1993), 811 F.Supp. 1459, 1465. See, also, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm. (1983), 461 U.S. 190, 212-213, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752.

{¶ 13} In the seminal case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 605, 613, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress, through the LBIA, intended the federal government to occupy the field of locomotive safety. The LBIA was enacted to protect employees and the traveling public from defective locomotive equipment. Urie v. Thompson (1949), 337 U.S. 163, 188, 190-191, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282. The LBIA imposes an absolute duty on interstate railroads to provide safe equipment and subjects railroads to FELA suits by their employees for LBIA violations. Id. at 189, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282.

{¶ 14} Addressing the breadth of the federal government's authority under the LBIA, the Supreme Court found it extended "to the design, the construction and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and all appurtenances." Seaman v. A.P. Green Industries (2000), 184 Misc.2d 603, 604, 707 N.Y.S.2d 299, quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432. The field preemption of the LBIA applies not only to state legislative regulation, but also to state tort claims. Id., at 605, 707 N.Y.S.2d 299. The LBIA preempts any state law that regulates locomotive equipment because the LBIA was enacted with the congressional intent to occupy the field of locomotive equipment and safety, particularly as it relates to injuries suffered by railroad workers in the course of their employment. Law v. Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.9, 1997), 114 F.3d 908, 910.

{¶ 15} Ohio and other jurisdictions have held that the LBIA preempts state tort actions brought by railroad employees injured by exposure to asbestos-containing locomotive components against railway companies and manufacturers. Darby v. A-Best Products Co., 102 Ohio St.3d 410, 2004-Ohio-3720, 811 N.E.2d 1117; Seaman, supra; Scheiding v. Gen. Motors Corp. (2000), 22 Cal.4th 471, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 993 P.2d 996; In re West Virginia Asbestos Litigation (2003), 215 W.Va. 39, 592 S.E.2d 818. Therefore, the FELA and/or the LBIA entirely preempts the field of locomotive safety and bars state tort claims, including those related to asbestos injuries.

{¶ 16} When field preemption has been found, there is no need for legislative intent specifically directed at tort law, product-liability claims, or any other particular type of state regulation. Carter, 126 Ohio App.3d at 183, 709 N.E.2d 1235. When state law is preempted, the claims that depend on it are necessarily precluded. Id., citing Napier, 272 U.S. at 613, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432. Therefore, it is not required that the General Assembly expressly exclude or include FELA and/or LBIA claims from the Act, because those claims are necessarily precluded.

{¶ 17} Instead of state tort claims, injured railroad workers asserting injury under the LBIA must bring their claims under the FELA. Seaman, 184 Misc.2d at 605, 707 N.Y.S.2d 299, citing Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes (1914), 234 U.S. 86, 34 S.Ct. 729, 58 L.Ed. 1226. "Whether a locomotive is off-line in a repair shop or moving interstate, the LBIA preempts state tort law, and the FELA replaces it in the railroad workplace environment." Darby v. A-Best Products Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 81270, 2002-Ohio-7070, 2002 WL 31839197, affirmed, 102 Ohio St.3d 410, 2004-Ohio-3720, 811 N.E.2d 1117.

{¶ 18} "One of the purposes of the FELA was to `create uniformity throughout the Union' with respect to railroads' financial responsibility for injuries to their employees." Hess v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 389,...