North Royalton Ed. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 12 September 1974
• Parties: , 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2057, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,691, 70 O.O.2d 434, 70 O.O.2d 458 NORTH ROYALTON EDUCATION ASSN. et al., Appellants, v. NORTH ROYALTON BD. OF EDUCATION, Appellee. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 209

41 Ohio App.2d 209

325 N.E.2d 901, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2057, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,691,

70 O.O.2d 434, 70 O.O.2d 458

NORTH ROYALTON EDUCATION ASSN. et al., Appellants, v. NORTH ROYALTON BD. OF EDUCATION, Appellee. ^*

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Sept. 12, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Civ.R. 50(B)) and for a new trial (Civ.R. 59) will suspend the running of time under App.R. 4(A). A motion for reconsideration will not toll the time for appeal under the rule unless its substance, in contrast to form, brings it within Civ.R. 50(B) or Civ.R. 59.

2. Where the substance of a motion captioned as a motion for reconsideration alleges a judgment is contrary to law (Civ.R. 59(A)(7) or (9)), such motion will be treated as a motion for new trial for the purpose of tolling the time for appeal under App.R. 4(A).

3. A school board empowered by statute to enter into individual contracts of employment with teachers may, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, conclude a collective bargaining contract with a teachers association representing the teachers. The terms of the collective agreement become part of the individual contract between the board and each teacher employed by the board.

4. A compulsory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement between a school board and the teachers association representing its teachers, which provides for final and binding awards does not unlawfully delegate the power of the board when the arbitration requirement is confined to grievances involving only the interpretation and application of the contract. Although such awards are final and binding, they are subject to judicial review if corruptly made, contrary to law, or beyond the scope of the issue submitted to the arbitrator.

Gerald A. Messerman, Cleveland, for appellants.

Robert C. Maynard, Cleveland, for appellee.

DAY, Judge.

Initially, North Royalton Education Association, et al. (appellants), filed a suit for an order compelling the North Royalton Board of Education (appellee) to arbitrate a grievance pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint and appellants amended the original pleading to add a cause of action for declaratory judgment.

Appellee's motion was granted in the court below on December 27, 1972. Appellants applied for reconsideration on January 8, 1973. Reconsideration was denied on May 4, 1973, accompanied by the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants filed notice of appeal on May 31, 1973, assigning three errors:

'First Assignment of Error:

'The trial court erroneously concluded that a board of education is barred from entering into a collective bargaining contract with a voluntary association of certificated teachers.

'A. The Power to Enter Into Collective Bargaining Agreements is Necessarily Implied in Those Powers Expressly Conferred Upon Boards of Education By Statute.

'B. There is No Legal Barrier in the State of Ohio Preventing Boards of Education From Engaging in Collective Bargaining and From Entering into Collective Bargaining Agreements with Voluntary Teachers Associations.

'Second Assignment of Error:

'The trial court erred in refusing to enforce the collective bargaining agreement between the board and the association despite the fact that the agreement had been incorporated in the contracts of each individual member of the association.

'Third Assignment of Error:

'The trial court erred in concluding that a contract provision in an agreement between a board of education and a teachers association authorizing submission of grievances to final and binding arbitration was void as an unlawful delegation of the board's authority.'

We reverse.

I.

There is a threshold procedural issue raised by appellee's to dismiss made after the argument on the merits in this court and after Kauder v. Kauder (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797, was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio. That case establishes the principle that a motion for reconsideration is not the equivalent of a motion for new trial (Civ.R. 59) or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Civ.R. 50(B)) and does not, therefore, toll the thirty-day requirement for filing a notice of appeal after entry of an appealable judgment or order in the trial court (App.R. 4(A)).

We are bound, of course, by the rules and by Kauder. However, we do not read either the rules or Kauder as requiring the elevation of form over substance. Consequently, it is necessary to examine appellants' post-trial motion to determine whether its substance requires that it be treated as a motion for reconsideration or as a motion for new trial. If the substance of appellants' motion establishes its nature to be that of a motion for reconsideration, the appeal is clearly out of rule. If the substance of the motion establishes its essence to be a request for a new trial, the substantive issues remain for disposition.

In our view appellants' 'Application for Reconsideration' must be treated as a motion for new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(7). The whole tenor of the application's parts (1) and (3) suggests, when not explicit, that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it apparently agreed that the action to compel arbitration was premature in the light of appellee's willingness to participate in an adversary arbitration. The absence of prematurity seems especially clear because of a letter from appellee to the American Arbitration Association (see appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit A) indicating that appellants' request for arbitration should be dismissed following the ruling of the trial court sustaining appellee's position. This pattern of facts rebuts willingness and supports the claimed error of law. Therefore, the appellee's motion to dismiss is overruled and we reach the substantive issues.

II.

The operative facts are clear.

The appellant is a voluntary association which represents a majority of the certificated cated teachers in the North Royalton City School District (FFI). ¹ Appellee is the school board for the district responsible by law for the management and control of the district's affairs (FF4: Ohio Rev.Code 3313.20). Individual appellants are certificated teachers, officers of the association, employed by the district under individual contracts (FF2). The board and the association executed a contract in July of 1971 (FF5) which was adopted as board policy, effective September 1, 1971 (FF2), and by virtue of an 'understanding' signed by the board and association, prior to July 1, 1971, the contract was to become part of the individual contract of each teacher employed in the district (FF8). The contract contained a grievance procedure ² including a final step providing for final and binding arbitration.

During the 1971-1972 school year a dispute arose over the interpretation of the contract. That dispute involved the formula for application of state funds during the 1972-1973 school year (FF9). The appellants took the position that the dispute was subject to the grievance procedure's arbitration clause. The appellee refused arbitration contending the entire contract is unenforceable (FF10). Appellants brought suit. ³

III.

All the assigned errors turn on the question whether the contract is valid and entorceable. In lower terms that issue poses two fundamental questions-whether the appellee school board has the authority to negotiate and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees and, if it has, whether that authority includes the power to agree to the final and binding arbitration of grievances.

No decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio has been found nor brought to our attention which decides these precise issues. However, it is clear that school boards, as agencies of the state for the 'organization, administration, and control of the public school system of the state,' Cline v. Martin (1916), 94 Ohio St. 420, 426, 115 N.E. 37, 38, are authorized to exercise the powers expressly given by statute, Schwing v. McClure (1929), 120 Ohio St. 335, 340-341, 166 N.E. 230. It has been held in Ohio that such powers include the right to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with an association of teachers, Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education, et al. (1973), p. 7 of the unreported opinion; ⁴ cf. Foltz v. Dayton (1970), 27 Ohio App.2d 35, 42, 272 N.E.2d 169, but it has been held also that a provision for compulsory arbitration is an invalid and unenforceable delegation of power and violates the duty 'to make, declare and interpret policy and administer the school system.' Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education, id. The cae of Goldman v. Bd. of Edn. (1965), 5 Ohio App.2d 49, 51, 213 N.E.2d 826, takes a different view of arbitration upholding an award to which a school board was party but not involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. We are persuaded by Goldman and see no reason for treating differently a school board's authority to agree to abide by an arbitration clause in a labor relations contract. We decline to do so.

Sections IV-VII set out our reasons for upholding the right and power of a school board to conclude a collective bargaining agreement and to agree to final and binding arbitration for the interpretation and applications of contract terms only within limits imposed by law.

IV.

If appellee were a private corporation rather than a political subdivision of the State of Ohio, there would be no question of its right, perhaps even its duty, to bargain with the majority representative of its employees. ⁵ In medieval England there were occasions when statutes forbade employees from taking or demanding wages in excess of statutory limits and punished masters for enticing away the employees of others or retaining any employee who had...