Gerdau Ameristeel, Inc. v. Ratliff

• Citation: 368 S.W.3d 503
• Decision Date: 07 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. W2011–00381–SC–R3–WC.,W2011–00381–SC–R3–WC.
• Parties: GERDAU AMERISTEEL, INC. v. Steven RATLIFF.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

368 S.W.3d 503

GERDAU AMERISTEEL, INC.

v.Steven RATLIFF.

No. W2011–00381–SC–R3–WC.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

Dec. 12, 2011 Session.

June 7, 2012.

Jeffrey P. Boyd and Laura Ann E. Bailey, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steven Ratliff.

Michael L. Mansfield and Nathan E. Shelby, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Gerdau Ameristeel, Inc.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., and GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

JANICE M. HOLDER, J.

An employee viewed the bodies of co-workers who had died as a result of work accidents on two separate occasions in February and April 2008. On June 23, 2008, the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the two incidents. On June 23, 2009, the employee requested a benefit review conference. The employer filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers' compensation benefits due. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the second accident and that the claim was therefore barred. The employee contended that the statute did not begin to run until the date of his diagnosis and that his claim was timely. The trial court granted the employer's motion. The employee appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the trial court's alternative findings.

Factual and Procedural Background

Gerdau Ameristeel, Inc. (“Ameristeel”), a metal recycling company, employed Steven Ratliff as a melt shop attendant. In February 2008, a co-worker fell to his death from a platform at Ameristeel's plant. Mr. Ratliff was asked to bring a defibrillator to the accident scene. When Mr. Ratliff arrived, he saw his co-worker's body in a pool of blood. Mr. Ratliff became weak and nauseated for a short time but did not experience any continuing symptoms.

On April 4, 2008, a second co-worker, Jason Blackmon, fell to his death in a different area of the plant. Earlier that day, Mr. Ratliff delivered a cake to Mr. Blackmon, who had purchased it from Mr. Ratliff's daughter for a school fundraiser. Mr. Ratliff learned of the accident near the end of his shift. Mr. Ratliff and several other employees went to the accident scene. Mr. Ratliff saw Mr. Blackmon's body lying on the ground and witnessed emergency medical personnel attempting to revive Mr. Blackmon.

Mr. Ratliff was distraught over what he had seen. He was able, however, to return to work for the next seven or eight days, and he declined grief counseling offered by Ameristeel. Following scheduled surgery on his shoulder, Mr. Ratliff “thought about [Mr. Blackmon] a lot” during his recovery and began to have anxiety about returning to work. His anxiety worsened after he returned to work in June, and he experienced crying spells, shortness of breath, and a rapid heartbeat. On June 23, 2008, Mr. Ratliff experienced a crying spell while coaching his daughter's softball team. His wife took him to a local emergency room where he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). He was treated with medication and referred to his primary care physician, Dr. Keith Kirby.

On June 23, 2009, exactly one year after the date of his emergency room visit, Mr. Ratliff filed a request for a benefit review conference. Ameristeel subsequently filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers' compensation benefits, if any, to which Mr. Ratliff was entitled. Ameristeel also filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations on Mr. Ratliff's claim had expired before he requested a benefit review conference. ¹ A trial was held on November 29, 2010. During the trial, the trial court considered the motion for summary judgment by agreement of the parties.

Dr. Kirby testified by deposition. He opined that Mr. Ratliff suffered from PTSD caused by the events of February and April 2008. Dr. Kirby treated Mr. Ratliff with various medications, and attempts were made to return Mr. Ratliff to work. Eventually, Dr. Kirby recommended that Mr. Ratliff seek other employment. Dr. Kirby opined that Mr. Ratliff retained a 5% permanent impairment as a result of PTSD. He placed no permanent restrictions on Mr. Ratliff's activities.

After resigning from Ameristeel, Mr. Ratliff worked for a short time for Goodyear Tire in Union City, Tennessee, but left that job because of a back injury. He was unemployed at the time of the trial.

The trial court issued its ruling in the form of a letter to counsel. In granting Ameristeel's motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on April 4, 2008, the date of Mr. Blackmon's death, and that Mr. Ratliff's claim was therefore barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–203.

The trial court made alternative findings in anticipation of appellate review. The trial court ruled that in the event the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an employee discovers the injury, Mr. Ratliff could not have reasonably known or discovered that he suffered from PTSD until June 23, 2008, and that his claim was not barred. The trial court further determined that Mr. Ratliff sustained a permanent partial disability of 20% to the body as a whole.

Mr. Ratliff appealed, and the appeal was referred to a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 51 § 1. After oral argument before the Panel, this Court transferred Mr. Ratliff's appeal to the full Court for consideration. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 51 § 2.

Analysis

The issue before us is the construction of the statute of limitations governing workers' compensation claims as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–203(b)(1). Workers' compensation claims are entirely creatures of statute. Martin v. Lear Corp., 90 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Tenn.2002). The General Assembly, therefore, has broad discretion, subject only to constitutional limitations, to define the claims and to prescribe the procedure for recovering workers' compensation benefits. We are directed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–116 (2008) to construe these statutes “equitabl[y] ... to the end that the objects and purposes of this chapter may be realized and attained.” This Court, however, is not at liberty to alter or extend the statutes beyond their obvious meaning. Wausau Ins. Co. v. Dorsett, 172 S.W.3d 538, 542–43 (Tenn.2005). The construction of a statute and its application to the facts of a case are questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn.2010).

Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 50–6–203 and 50–6–224

Prior to January 1, 2005, two statutes of limitations governed Tennessee's workers' compensation law. The statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–203 required the injured employee to file suit within one year of “the accident resulting in injury.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–203(b)(1) (1999). The statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–224(a)(1) (2008) required the injured employee to bring suit within one year “after occurrence of the injury.” The difference in the language of the two provisions resulted in conflicting decisions of this Court.

In Graham v. J.W. Wells Brick Co., we held that the terms “accident” and “injury” were synonymous “because an accident occurs and an injury results.” 150 Tenn. 660, 266 S.W. 770, 771 (1924). In Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., however, this Court held that a workers' compensation injury did not “occur” on the date of the accident but occurred only when the injured employee became aware of his disability. 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909, 911 (1947).

We resolved the conflict between the accrual times in the two statutes of limitations in Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955), reh'g denied, 288 S.W.2d 4 (1956). Recognizing the social purpose of the workers' compensation law and the statutory requirement of liberal construction, we held that section 224(a)(1), referencing the “occurrence of the injury,” rather than section 203(b)(1), referencing the “accident resulting in injury,” commenced the running of the limitation period.²Griffitts, 288 S.W.2d at 4. The cases that have construed sections 203(b)(1) and 224(a)(1) over the years have consistently recognized the difference, or potential difference, between the date of an “accident resulting in injury” and the “occurrence of [an] injury.” Griffitts, 288 S.W.2d at 2;Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 221 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1949); Ogle, 206 S.W.2d at 910;Graham, 266 S.W. at 771.

Limitation of Section 50–6–224

The General Assembly amended sections 203 and 224 in 2004. Act of May 20, 2004, ch. 962, sec. 14–15, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 2346, 2355–57. The 2004 amendment made section 224 applicable “only to injuries that arise on or before December 31, 2004.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–6–224(b). As a result, section 203 is the only statute of limitations governing claims for workers' compensation benefits in Tennessee for injuries arising on or after January 1, 2005.

The General Assembly is presumed to know of the potential difference in accrual times discussed in our Griffitts decision. See Hayes v. Gibson Cnty., 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn.2009). The General Assembly's restriction of section 224(a)(1) to injuries that arise on or before December 31, 2004, clearly indicates its intent to commence the statute of limitations in workers' compensation cases at the time of the “accident resulting in injury” in cases in which the injury arises on or after January 1, 2005, as provided in section 203(b)(1).

Tolling of the Statute of Limitations

We next consider whether the accrual of the cause of action is tolled pending discovery of the injury to an employee. This Court has stated that a statute of limitations does not expire before the plaintiff...