Novaton v. State, 91-1248
Decision Date | 29 December 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-1248,91-1248 |
Citation | 610 So.2d 726 |
Parties | 18 Fla. L. Weekly D119 Juan NOVATON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Louis Campbell, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Randall Sutton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and LEVY, JJ.
We hold here for the first time that a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea and sentence bargain with the prosecution thereby waives an otherwise viable double jeopardy objection to sentences which form a part of the agreement.
Novaton was accused in two informations of multiple violent offenses which occurred during separate incidents in 1990. As a part of a broad agreement with the state, in which it agreed, among other things, to forgo the possibility of securing a life-without-parole habitual-violent-offender sentence, Novaton agreed to plead guilty to all of the charges and to concurrent sentences totaling fifty years, subject to a fifteen year minimum-mandatory requirement. The specific sentences to be imposed as to each of the counts were accepted by the defendant as a part of a detailed plea colloquy conducted by the trial judge prior to his acceptance and implementation of the agreement. The resulting adjudications and sentences included several for the enhanced felonies of burglary, robbery, and aggravated battery with a firearm and two for the separate crimes of possessing a firearm in the commission of those same felonies. The defendant correctly points out that, as an original matter, the latter two sets of convictions and sentences are barred by the double jeopardy principles enunciated in Cleveland v. State, 587 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1991). Benedit v. State, 610 So.2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and cases cited. The state counters with the argument that the defendant's bargain effected a waiver of the double jeopardy claim. We agree with that position and therefore affirm both the convictions and sentences on the possession counts.
Challenge To Convictions Waived. There is no question either that (a) as a general proposition, a right to double jeopardy protection against multiple adjudications is susceptible to a knowing waiver by the defendant, 1 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla.1986); Guardado v. State, 562 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 287 (Fla.1990); Rodriguez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 451 So.2d 850 (Fla.1984), and that (b) in this district, a waiver of a Cleveland -type violation with respect to multiple convictions takes place when the defendant voluntarily pleads guilty to the allegedly duplicitous charges in question. Guardado, 562 So.2d at 696; Anderson v. State, 392 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Contra Arnold v. State, 578 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Kurtz v. State, 564 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990). We reiterate that holding here.
Challenge To Sentences Waived. The defendant, however, argues that a mere plea does not waive a challenge to dual or multiple sentences which are also precluded by the Cleveland rule. Guardado, 562 So.2d at 696; Taylor v. State, 401 So.2d 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hines v. State, 401 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Anderson, 392 So.2d at 328; Davis v. State, 392 So.2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). While this observation is correct, the cases cited do not involve 2 and therefore do not apply to the present situation, in which the defendant agreed not only to plead to the offenses themselves, but also to the imposition of specified sentences tendered by the state in partial consideration of its own agreement for leniency in other respects. In these circumstances, by the same token that a voluntary plea to the charge waives the double jeopardy guarantee against multiple adjudications of the "same offense," an agreement to the sentences waives the protection from multiple punishments. We have already explicitly so stated:
Prestridge now claims that double jeopardy safeguards preclude imposition of an increased sentence after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. This principle does not pertain to Prestridge's sentence because it was the product of a plea agreement with the state. [e.s.]
Prestridge v. State, 519 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 1, 107 S.Ct. at 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d at 1; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.1990) (, )cert. denied, 498 U.S. 837, 111 S.Ct. 107, 112 L.Ed.2d 78 (1990); Rodriguez, 441 So.2d at 1129 ( ).
In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state. 3 See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (, )review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ( ), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (, )cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) ( ). See generally Madrigal v. State, 545 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and cases collected. Having accepted its benefits by avoiding a life sentence without parole, Novaton cannot, any more than any other contracting party, be relieved of the burden of his contract. 4 See Madrigal, 545 So.2d at 395.
Novaton also claims that a minimum mandatory term may not be required in a habitual offender sentence imposed for a first degree felony punishable by life. This contention is wholly without merit. See Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla.1992); Young v. State, 600 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Affirmed.
1 The rule is otherwise as to the separate double jeopardy right to protection against a...
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