Odom v. Langston

• Decision Date: 13 September 1948
• Docket Number: 40207
• Parties: A. D. Odom, Ella King, Walter L. Odom, Charles Peel, Mrs. Neva Groves, nee Neva Thompson, Ollie Fogleman, Jess L. Odom, Ruby Williams, Mrs. Linnie Owens, Roy Odom, and Joyce Odom, Appellants, v. Louise W. Langston, Trustee; St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, Trustee; Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, Executors of the Estate of Barsha A. Langston, Deceased; Louise W. Langston, as an Individual, Respondents. State ex rel. Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, as Executors, Relators, v. J. N. Burroughs, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

213 S.W.2d 948

358 Mo. 241

A. D. Odom, Ella King, Walter L. Odom, Charles Peel, Mrs. Neva Groves, nee Neva Thompson, Ollie Fogleman, Jess L. Odom, Ruby Williams, Mrs. Linnie Owens, Roy Odom, and Joyce Odom, Appellants, v. Louise W. Langston, Trustee; St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, Trustee; Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation, Executors of the Estate of Barsha A. Langston, Deceased; Louise W. Langston, as an Individual, Respondents. State ex rel. Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, as Executors, Relators, v. J. N. Burroughs, Respondent

No. 40207

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 13, 1948

Rehearing Denied October 11, 1948.

Contempt Proceeding Dismissed.

A. W Landis and Elliott H. Jones for relators.

(1) It is the almost universal rule that, where contempt is direct in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted without affidavit, pleading, or formal charges. 17 C.J.S., p. 87, par. 71. (2) A proceeding for contempt is sui generis, being neither a civil action, nor a criminal action, within the ordinary meaning of those terms. Further, it is said that there is no fixed formula for contempt proceedings, and that technical accuracy is not required. It has been said that a court may adopt its own procedure provided that the contemnor is afforded due process of law. 17 C.J.S., p. 71, par. 62. (3) In general, unless the time for instituting contempt proceedings is governed by statute, and such statute is seasonably pleaded, mere delay in instituting the proceedings is not a defense, unless the delay is prejudicial to defendant, or unreasonable in its duration. While it has been said that a court should act promptly in punishing direct contempts, delay is also permissible in such case, if it is reasonable, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 17 C.J.S., p. 84, par. 68. (4) Contempt signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute, or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. 17 C.J.S., p. 4, par. 2. (5) Misconduct by an attorney which reflects improperly on the dignity or authority of the court; or which obstructs or tends to obstruct, prevent, or embarrass the due administration of justice, constitutes contempt. 17 C.J.S., p. 35, Sec. 25(b). (6) The statute which authorizes the granting and enforcement of injunctions is merely declaratory of common law equity jurisdiction. Boeckler v. Ry. Co., 10 Mo.App. 448. (7) The injunction proceeding was heard de novo in this court, and this court had power to render any judgment in that proceeding, and to enforce any determination made by it. General Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 140 (c), 140(e). (8) The power to stay a pending proceeding is restricted, by statute, to the court wherein the suit is pending. Not so with respect to an injunction against the institution of future suits. The main purpose there is to prevent the bringing of a suit in another court. 1 C.J., p. 1161, par. 416; 43 C.J.S., p. 491, Sec. 41. (9) The injunction is directed to and operates only upon the parties litigant, who were subject to the complete jurisdiction of the court that granted the injunction, and does not operate upon any other legal tribunal. 32 C.J., p. 84; Wabash W. Ry. v. Siefert, 41 Mo.App. 35; O'Haire v. Burns, 101 P. 755; 43 C.J.S., p. 1012; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 98 S.W.2d 847; Oates v. Morningside College, 252 N.W. 783, 217 Iowa 1059. (10) Respondent will not be heard to set up, as a defense, that he did not think that the injunction served to restrain him from bringing a suit in the federal court. 43 C.J.S., p. 1027. (11) Withdrawing as attorney for plaintiffs in said federal court suit does not permit Mr. Burroughs to escape punishment for contempt heretofore committed. And he may not escape future contempt by merely having further litigation prosecuted in the name of another attorney. No principle is better settled than that expressed in the maxim, "Facit per alium facit per se." Reynolds Admr. v. Black Mt. Corp., 42 S.W.2d 916; 13 C.J., p. 11; 17 C.J.S., pp. 16, 48.

J. N. Burroughs for respondent.

(1) The contention of relators that the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate courts, is against the law of this state. And therefore the holding of Division I, in the instant case, that the circuit judge was bound by the prior decisions in the trust case and in the will case was erroneous and therefore the trial judge erred in admitting the said decisions in evidence. Ralph v. Annulty, 28 S.W.2d 662; Prassee v. Prassee, 115 S.W.2d 887; Wonderly v. Layette County, 150 Mo. 654. (2) That a judgment of court rendered through fraudulent conduct of the judge who decides the case may be attacked and set aside in an equitable proceeding is well settled under the law of this state, in event no appeal lies from that decision. State ex rel. v. Thornhill, 160 S.W. 558; Burkarth v. Stephens, 94 S.W. 720, 117 Mo.App. 425; State ex rel. Baldwin v. Davidson, 40 S.W. 765, 139 Mo. 118; Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 647. (3) It is the rule that language employed by a litigant or his attorney in a court proceeding is absolutely privileged, that no action will lie for use of language, either for damages or in contempt proceedings, if pertinent to the inquiry. Newfield v. Copperman, N.Y. How-Prac. 87-89; Blakeslee v. Carroll, 29 A. 413, 64 Conn. 223, 25 L.R.A. 106. (4) The truth is a complete defense herein and entitles appellants to the judgment of this banc court declaring the prior decisions null and void. Sec. 961, R.S. 1939. (5) This court, in attempting to pass upon the injunction case, merely intended to and did affirm the order of the trial court, without more, for this is all it said, "The judgment of the trial court is affirmed." There was no new judgment given or order of execution. Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to issue the citation or to inflict punishment upon this respondent in this proceeding as for contempt, as it relates to the suit in the federal court.

OPINION

Tipton, J.

Louise W. Langston, individually and as trustee and executrix, and the St. Louis Union Trust Company as trustee and executor of the estate of Barsha A. Langston, deceased, filed a petition in this court requesting that we issue a citation and order to J. N. Burroughs to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of this court. We issued the citation as prayed for by relators-respondents.

J. N. Burroughs, an attorney-at-law, brought a suit on behalf of the appellants to contest the validity of the will of Barsha A. Langston, deceased, which eventually resulted in a verdict of the jury and judgment of the court sustaining the will. In February, 1941, he filed a suit on behalf of the appellants to have the provisions of the trust instrument declared void. The trial judge, Honorable Tom R. Moore, sustained a demurrer to the petition. This court affirmed the action of the trial court. See 351 Mo. 609, 173 S.W. 2d 826. In September 28, 1943, he filed a suit to attack the validity of the trust instrument and the trial judge, Honorable C. H. Jackson, dismissed the suit with prejudice. That judgment was affirmed by this court. 355 Mo. 115, 195 S.W. 2d 466. In April, 1944, he filed a suit on behalf of appellants to have the trust provisions in the will declared void. This action was dismissed by the last mentioned trial judge because it was barred by statute of limitation. This judgment was affirmed by this court. 355 Mo. 109, 195 S.W. 2d 463.

The effect of the foregoing decisions is that the will and the provisions of the trust are valid and that appellants take nothing under either the residuary clause of the will or under the trust instrument.

On August 21, 1946, Burroughs brought this action on behalf of appellants, attacking the validity of the trust as provided in both the will and the trust instrument. They alleged that they were making the same allegations as to the alleged invalidity of the trust as were made in the suits previously filed. Relators-respondents filed a cross-petition recounting the various suits brought by appellants attacking the validity of the Langston will and trust, all of which were adverse to appellants' contentions, and alleging that this suit was brought for the purpose of harassing the relators-respondents and delaying the settlement of the Langston estate. They prayed that appellants and their attorneys be enjoined from prosecuting this suit or any other suit concerning the Langston estate and trust. The trial judge, Honorable Gordon Dorris, granted a permanent injunction as prayed for by relators-respondents. This action was affirmed by this court. 356 Mo. 1140, 205 S.W. 2d 518.

On December 3, 1947, J. N. Burroughs as an attorney for the appellants instituted an action in the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Western District of Missouri, at Springfield, seeking to have adjudged invalid the residuary clause of the Langston will. On December 22, 1947, relators-respondents filed a petition in this court requesting a citation and order to show cause why J. N. Burroughs should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of this court for filing and prosecuting the above mentioned case in the United States District Court. This court issued the order and citation as requested and on February 27, 1948, he filed his answer.

In relators-respondents' reply to J. N. Burroughs' answer filed March 13, 1948, they alleged among other things "that said Federal Court suit was dismissed by that court upon motion of" these relators-respondents and they filed as a...