Oliveira v. Lombardi

• Decision Date: 03 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2001-27-Appeal, No. 2000-273-Appeal.
• Citation: 794 A.2d 453
• Parties: Judith J. OLIVEIRA v. Steven A. LOMBARDI et al. Michael R. Ayers v. Joseph A. Tiberi et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

794 A.2d 453

Judith J. OLIVEIRA v. Steven A. LOMBARDI et al.

Michael R. Ayers v. Joseph A. Tiberi et al.

Nos. 2001-27-Appeal, 2000-273-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 3, 2002.

Before: LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Raymond Alan LaFazia/Mark J. Faria, Mark Decof/Patrick C. Barry, Providence, for plaintiff. Joseph C. Salvadore, Thomas R. Bender/James T. Murphy, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, J.

By statute, motor vehicle owners in Rhode Island are subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of drivers who operate the owners' vehicles with their consent. But do these laws apply to motor-vehicle owners who are in the business of financing long-term leases of their vehicles? The plain language of the Motor-Vehicle Code, G.L.1956 § 31-1-17(b), as amended by P.L. 1994, ch. 417 § 1, defines an owner as "[a] person who holds the legal title to a vehicle."¹ Long-term lessors of motor vehicles hold legal title to the "for hire" motor vehicles they lease. The Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) within the Department of Administration has promulgated regulations that also require long-term lessors to provide proof of their financial responsibility before they engage in the business of leasing or renting these vehicles. Consequently, we hold that long-termlessors are subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of drivers who were operating the vehicle with their permission.

Before we heard argument on the above-captioned two cases, we reserved judgment on whether we would consolidate them in deciding these appeals. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions, we now consolidate both appeals for the purpose of deciding them, but state the facts of each case separately before explaining our reasoning.

I Oliveira v. Lombardi

No. 2001-27-A. (Oliveira)

The plaintiff, Judith J. Oliveira (Oliveira), appeals to this Court from a Superior Court summary judgment in favor of defendant, Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corporation (Chase or defendant), a long-term lessor of motor vehicles. Oliveira suffered severe injuries in a 1998 automobile accident when a car that Chase owned — and leased to defendant Salvatore Lombardi — collided with the rear end of Oliveira's vehicle. The lessee's son, Steven Lombardi, was driving the car when the accident occurred.

At all times material to this case, Chase was in the business of financing long-term leases of motor vehicles. In exchange for a motor-vehicle dealer's assigning a multiyear lease to it, Chase would buy the vehicle from the dealer, take title to it as the registered owner, step into the dealer's shoes as lessor, and collect the monthly rent payments from the lessee. In granting Chase's motion for summary judgment, the motion justice concluded that the General Assembly did not intend that motor-vehicle financing companies such as Chase would be subject to Rhode Island's vicarious-liability statutes for motor-vehicle owners because these lessors do not take possession and control of the vehicles inquestion. On appeal, Oliveira argues that the motion justice erred as a matter of law when she ruled that Chase was not subject to the vicarious-liability statutes: namely, (1) G.L.1956 § 31-33-6 "Owner's liability for acts of others" (owner-liability statute) and (2) G.L.1956 § 31-34-4, as amended by P.L.1997, ch. 353, § 1 "Liability of owner for negligence of operator" (lessor-liability statute) (collectively, the vicarious-liability statutes).

According to the motion justice, the Legislature did not intend to hold such an owner and lessor liable for the negligence of motor-vehicle operators in the same manner as, for example, the owners of short-term rental vehicles, because the latter would possess the vehicle and could assert control over it. Based upon this rationale, the motion justice announced that §§ 31-33-6 and 31-34-4 were limited in their scope and application and did not subject the owners and lessors of long-term rental vehicles to vicarious liability. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to Chase, dismissed Oliveira's complaint against defendant, and entered judgment in its favor under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

II Ayers v. Tiberi

No. 2000-273-A. (Ayers)

In the second case before us, a motor vehicle driven by defendant, Joseph A. Tiberi (Tiberi) collided on August 11, 1997, with a motorcycle driven by plaintiff Michael R. Ayers (Ayers). The defendant, Joseph Falco (Falco), had leased the car six weeks earlier from defendant Gold Key Lease, Inc. (Gold Key) under a 36 month lease agreement that included an option to purchase the vehicle (the lease agreement). As the lease permitted him to do, Falco then allowed the driver, Tiberi, to operate this leased vehicle. The lease agreement required Falco to maintain insurance on the vehicle and toname Gold Key as an insured and loss payee on the policy. Nevertheless, according to an affidavit of Deborah Avonts, a legal assistant for Gold Key, on July 25, 1997 — one month after the execution of the lease agreement and a few weeks before the accident — Falco's insurance lapsed for lack of payment. At oral argument, Gold Key's lawyer admitted that Gold Key had received notice of this insurance lapse before the accident occurred. The driver, Tiberi, was also uninsured when the accident occurred.

Ayers eventually filed suit in Superior Court against Tiberi and Gold Key, and later added Falco as a defendant. Ayers claimed, inter alia, that Gold Key, as the title holder and registered owner of the vehicle driven by Tiberi and leased to Falco, was subject to vicarious liability for his injuries pursuant to §§ 31-33-6 and 31-34-4. After Ayers and Gold Key each moved for summary judgment on the issue of Gold Key's liability, the court (per the same motion justice as in the Oliveira case) granted summary judgment in favor of Gold Key and entered a Rule 54(b) judgment in its favor. Ayers' case against Falco and Tiberi remains pending in Superior Court, although neither defendant has yet answered plaintiff's complaint.²

Standard of Review

The application and scope of statutory language lies at the heart of this dispute. This appeal, therefore, presents us with questions of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001) (citing Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v.Bowen Court Associates, 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I.2001)). When construing a statute "our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. (citing Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I.1994)). In carrying out our duty as the final arbiter on questions of statutory construction, "[i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996). Moreover, in interpreting a legislative enactment, it is incumbent upon us to "determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes." Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987).

Analysis

The Owner-Liability Statute (§ 31-33-6)

We begin our analysis by considering whether the motion justice in these consolidated cases erred as a matter of law when she ruled that § 31-33-6 did not apply to long-term lessors of motor vehicles such as Chase and Gold Key. The injured plaintiffs argue that because the lessors were the owners of the motor vehicles in question when the accidents occurred, they were subject to vicarious liability under § 31-33-6, the owner-liability statute. The lessors respond that they were not the owners of the leased vehicles, as that term is used in the owner-liability statute — despite the fact that they held legal title to the vehicles — because they did not lawfully possess or control the vehicles they leased.

When these accidents occurred in 1997 and 1998, § 31-33-6, "Owner's liability for acts of others," provided that:

"Whenever any motor vehicle shall be used, operated, or caused to be operated upon any public highway of this state with the consent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof, expressed or implied, the driver thereof, if other than the owner, or lessee, or bailee, shall in the case of an accident be deemed to be the agent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, of the motor vehicle unless the driver shall have furnished proof of financial responsibility in the amount set forth in chapter 32 of this title, prior to the accident; and for the purposes of this section the term `owner' shall include any person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation having the lawful possession or control of a motor vehicle under a written sale agreement."<sup>3</sup> (Emphasis added.) In interpreting this language, the motion justice in Oliveira concluded that the applicable statutory language — "the term `owner' shall include * * *" — was a limiting definition. Therefore, she reasoned, anyone who was not in lawful possession or control of the vehicle could not be deemed an owner for the purposes of this section. We disagree. The General Assembly's use of the word "include" did not limit the definition of "owner;" on the contrary, it expanded the general definition of "owner" to "include" those who lawfully possess or control a vehicle under a written sale agreement — even if they do not otherwise own the vehicle. Avedisian v. Butler Auto Sales, Inc., 93 R.I. 4, 10, 170 A.2d 604, 607 (1961) (giving "owner" an expanded meaning).

The basic definition of "owner" is set forth in another chapter and section of title 31: namely, § 31-1-17(b). That definition is applicable to all of title 31 via § 31-1-2. At all times...