Oliver v. State
| Decision Date | 07 July 1971 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 40458,40459,s. 40458 |
| Citation | 250 So.2d 888 |
| Parties | Billy Ray OLIVER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. James COLBERT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Johnson & Marshall, Jacksonville, and Alvin J. Bronstein, Cambridge, Mass., for petitioners.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioners seek certiorari review of the decisions rendered in their respective cases by the District Court of Appeal, First District: Oliver v. State of Florida, 239 So.2d 637 (1971); Colbert v. State of Florida, 239 So.2d 642 (1971). We have consolidated these causes because they both arise out of the same general factual situation.
On April 5, 1968, during a period of racial unrest in Tallahassee, Florida, following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, a local grocery store was burned by arsonists. Travis Earl Crow, III, who was sleeping in the rear of the building at the time, died of burns and smoke inhalation. Petitioners were ultimately indicted, tried separately, and convicted of first degree murder for the death of Mr. Crow. In each case, the jury recommended mercy.
Petitioner Oliver, then fifteen years of age, was confined in the Leon County jail on a charge unrelated to this case, when local law enforcement officers began to interrogate him as a prime suspect in the arson incident. The interrogations were conducted for varying lengths of time during six nights between May 21 and May 28, 1968. Oliver was not brought before a magistrate until June 26, 1968, long after self-incriminating statements had been elicited from him.
Petitioner Colbert, then 17 years of age, was picked up at his home sometime after 2:00 a.m. on May 24, 1968, purportedly on the suspicion that he was involved in a forged check incident. Testimony given by officers indicates that at the time of the pickup, he was already being considered as a suspect for the arson incident. He was taken into custody without a warrant, and interrogated until he produced an incriminating statement. On May 30, a County Judge's warrant was issued against both petitioners. It is uncontroverted that the first time either petitioner was brought before a judicial officer in accord with Fla.Stat. §§ 901.06 and 901.23, F.S.A., was on June 26, 1968; this was more than a month after the initiation of the interrogations.
This Court has intimated that a failure to bring a defendant before a magistrate would likely result in strong action by this Court. Milton v. Cochran, 147 So.2d 137, at 141 (Fla.1962); State ex rel. Carty v. Purdy, 240 So.2d 480, at 481 (Fla.1970), (in which the views of the late Mr. Justice Thornal as given in Dawson v. State, 139 So.2d 408, at 422 (Fla.1962), were adopted). We find that the totality of circumstances in these cases manifestly requires nullification of these convictions on account of the failure of local law enforcement officials to comply with Fla.Stat. §§ 901.06 and 901.23, F.S.A. The rationale supporting our decision may be found in the cases of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, at 343--344, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1942), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), since Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (then in effect) was analogous to our statutes. See Jacobs v. State, 248 So.2d 515 (Fla.1971), wherein the District Court of Appeal, First District, required a new trial for a defendant who was not brought before a magistrate until long after his arrest.
In the case of both petitioners, Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)) were given at the time of the interrogations, but the petitioners maintain that these warnings were not understood. Considering the coercive atmosphere suggested by the record, the questionable mental ability of Oliver (I.Q. in the middle 70's range), the dispute over whether the warnings were properly given and whether they were properly understood, we find that the failure of the law enforcement officers to bring the petitioners before committing magistrates rendered any incriminating responses involuntary as a matter of law. It...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Johnson v. State
...v. State, 9 Storey 35, 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (1965); Larkin v. United States, 144 A.2d 100, 103 (D.C.App.1958); Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla.1971); (but see State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262, 264 (Fla.App.), rev'd on other grounds, 285 So.2d 385 (Fla.1973)); State v. Benbo......
-
Straight v. State, 52460
...1968). Appellant argues that the news media coverage of his codefendant's confession brings this case within the rule of Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla.1971), in which this Court said that in general, "when a 'confession' is featured in news media coverage of a prosecution, ... a ......
-
Holsworth v. State
...Herald subsequently was seated on the jury. Appellant contends that under these facts, automatic reversal is required under Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla.1971). We disagree and take this opportunity to clarify Oliver. Generally, the test to determine whether a change of venue is requi......
-
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Lewis
...printing or reporting of a transcript of a confession is "featured" prior to trial. As the Florida Supreme Court said in Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla.1971) such featuring amounts to a "trial by newspaper" which is incapable of cure by the voir dire process. This same principle was re......