Olson v. Hillside Community Church Sbc

• Decision Date: 05 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03CA2152.,No. 03CA2000.,03CA2000.,03CA2152.
• Citation: 124 P.3d 874
• Parties: Marian OLSON and Ida Mae Brueske, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. HILLSIDE COMMUNITY CHURCH SBC, a Colorado non-profit corporation; the City of Golden, a Colorado municipal corporation; and the City Council of the City of Golden, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

124 P.3d 874

Marian OLSON and Ida Mae Brueske, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. HILLSIDE COMMUNITY CHURCH SBC, a Colorado non-profit corporation; the City of Golden, a Colorado municipal corporation; and the City Council of the City of Golden, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

No. 03CA2000.

No. 03CA2152.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division I.

June 2, 2005.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 2005.

Certiorari Denied December 5, 2005.^*

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Claire B. Levy, LLC, Claire B. Levy, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.

Overton Law Firm, Thomas J. Overton, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellee

and Cross-Appellant Hillside Community Church SBC.

Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti, P.C., J. Thomas MacDonald, James T. Johnson, Denver, Colorado; Light, Harrington & Dawes, P.C., Steven J. Dawes, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant City of Golden and the City Council of the City of Golden.

Opinion by Judge HAWTHORNE.

In this action for enforcement of municipal zoning ordinances and creation of a prescriptive easement, plaintiffs, Marian Olson and Ida Mae Brueske, appeal the trial court's orders discharging an order to show cause and finding that they failed to prove the existence of a prescriptive easement. Defendants, Hillside Community Church SBC and the City of Golden, cross-appeal a trial court order finding that an addition to Hillside's church was built in violation of the Golden Municipal Code and ordering that it be removed. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

The underlying facts in this case are largely undisputed. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to a church in Golden. After Hillside began construction of an addition without complying with portions of the Golden Municipal Code (GMC) and the Uniform Building Code (UBC), plaintiffs complained to Golden. Golden permitted Hillside to continue construction and granted Hillside a building permit, a height variance, and a certificate of occupancy. After the addition was substantially completed, plaintiffs filed suit in the Jefferson County District Court, asserting a claim for a prescriptive easement; seeking injunctive and mandatory relief under C.R.C.P. 65 and 106 and GMC 18.08.050; and claiming Golden had violated the Establishment and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.

The trial court entered findings in favor of plaintiffs on their claims under the GMC and the Due Process Clause and in favor of defendants on the prescriptive easement claim, and ordered that Hillside's certificate of occupancy be vacated pending approval of a special use permit (the 1999 order). Plaintiffs appealed, and a division of this court affirmed the trial court order in part and reversed in part in Olson v. Hillside Community Church, 42 P.3d 52 (Colo.App.2001). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division's ruling on the due process issue in Hillside Community Church v. Olson, 58 P.3d 1021 (Colo.2002), and remanded the case.

During the pendency of that appeal, Golden granted Hillside's requests for a special use permit, rezoning as a planned unit development, and a new certificate of occupancy. Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting an order to show cause why Golden should not be held in contempt of the 1999 order. Because the trial judge was unavailable at the time of the hearing, plaintiffs' show cause motion was heard by a different judge.

The contempt judge apparently found that although Golden had not literally complied with the 1999 order, its failure to do so was excusable as an exercise of Golden's discretion. On appeal, a division of this court reversed the contempt judge's order and remanded the case for further findings. Olson v. Hillside Cmty. Church, 2003 WL 21100723 (Colo.App. No. 02CA0743, May 15, 2003)(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

The contempt order and the 1999 order were both remanded to the Jefferson County District Court. The judges who had issued the orders each reconsidered the matter on remand and arrived at contradictory conclusions. The contempt court found that Hillside had brought the addition into compliance with the GMC and the UBC and discharged its order to show cause, while the trial court found that Hillside had failed to bring the addition into compliance with the same ordinances and ordered the addition removed. This consolidated appeal followed.

I.

Golden contends that, to the extent that plaintiffs' claims arise under the GMC, they must be dismissed because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. We agree.

A.

A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void, and defects in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. In re Water Rights of Columbine Ass'n, 993 P.2d 483, 488 (Colo.2000); In re Marriage of Mallon, 956 P.2d 642, 645 (Colo.App.1998); see also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo.1986) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time before the Colorado Supreme Court).

Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by consent, estoppel, or laches, prior to the resolution of all issues including any subsequent appeals. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Colo.2000); see also In re Marriage of Mallon, supra, 956 P.2d at 645-646 (noting that subject matter jurisdiction may not be raised to attack collaterally a final judgment); Don J. Best Trust v. Cherry Creek Nat'l Bank, 792 P.2d 302, 304 (Colo.App.1990) (noting that the doctrine of laches cannot preclude an attack upon a void judgment).

During the pendency of this litigation, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its opinion in Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845 (Colo.2004). In Baum, the supreme court addressed the issue whether a home rule city possessed authority under the Colorado Constitution to grant its municipal court "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters arising under [the town's] Charter, the ordinances, and other enactments of the Town." Harmonizing provisions of articles VI and XX of the Colorado Constitution relating to the jurisdiction of the district courts and the powers of home rule cities to establish municipal courts, the supreme court held that "[w]hen a municipality exercises jurisdiction to address local and municipal matters in its municipal court, the district court will consequently be denied original jurisdiction over those matters." Town of Frisco v. Baum, supra, 90 P.3d at 846, 849.

B.

Plaintiffs argue that relief in the nature of mandamus and mandatory injunctive relief are not available under the GMC or the Colorado Municipal Court Rules of Procedure and that therefore, cases filed by private parties seeking relief under C.R.C.P. 65 and 106 must necessarily be filed in a district court. We disagree.

In Baum, the plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) in the district court, challenging the approval of a conditional land use development application. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the supreme court affirmed the district court's action. Town of Frisco v. Baum, supra, 90 P.3d at 846.

As in Baum, plaintiffs here seek relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106 by review of a home rule city's application of a land use ordinance. Golden is a home rule city, and § 9.2 of its charter provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be a municipal court vested with exclusive original jurisdiction of all causes arising under the ordinances of the city and as may be conferred by law."

By the plain terms of the Golden City Charter, the municipal court has exclusive jurisdiction over all causes of action arising under the GMC. Plaintiffs' second, third, and fourth claims for relief all assert that Golden and Hillside have failed to comply with various provisions of the GMC. Because those claims arise under the GMC, the district court cannot hear them in the first instance.

Plaintiffs also argue that municipal courts lack the power to grant relief in the nature of remedial or original writs based on an opinion of a division of this court. In City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626, 628 (Colo.App.1985), a division of this court held that because municipal courts are creatures of statute, "the Englewood municipal court is without authority to engage in proceedings in the nature of original or remedial writs and is without authority to decide civil claims for money."

The division in Parkinson reached its conclusion in reliance upon Denver County Court v. Lee, 165 Colo. 455, 439 P.2d 737 (1968), which held that a superior court lacked the authority to grant relief in the nature of an original or remedial writ. Superior courts, unlike municipal courts, are purely creatures of statute. The municipal courts of home rule cities, however, are authorized by the Colorado Constitution, which specifically grants home rule cities the authority to define their municipal courts' jurisdiction over local and municipal matters. See Town of Frisco v. Baum, supra, 90 P.3d at 846-47. To the extent that the Parkinson division relied on Lee in reaching its conclusion that municipal courts lack authority to provide relief in the nature of an original or remedial writ, we are bound by the supreme court's opinion in Baum.

C.

Further, to the extent plaintiffs argue that various GMC ordinances required them to bring their claim in the district court, we conclude that those ordinances were without effect, because the charter of a home rule city is effectively its constitution and its ordinances may not conflict with its charter. Glenwood Post v. City of Glenwood Springs, 731 P.2d 761, 762 (Colo.App.1986).

D.

Relying on the supreme court's statement that "[w]here a municipality has not exercised jurisdiction [over local and municipal matters in its municipal court], however, the district...