Sr Condominiums, LLC v. K.C. Const., Inc.
Decision Date | 27 December 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06CA0396.,06CA0396. |
Citation | 176 P.3d 866 |
Parties | SR CONDOMINIUMS, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, Petitioner-Appellee, v. K.C. CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Frascona, Joiner, Goodman and Greenstein, P.C., Cinthia M. Manzano, Boulder, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee.
Samuel J. Stoorman & Associates, P.C., Samuel J. Stoorman, Amy H. Rubright, Sonja K. Spitzer, Nicole Hanson, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge GRAHAM.
Respondent, K.C. Construction, Inc., appeals the district court's orders denying its C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment releasing its mechanic's lien against property owned in part by petitioner, SR Condominiums, LLC, and awarding SR Condominiums its attorney fees and costs. We affirm the district court's order denying K.C. Construction's C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion but vacate the order awarding SR Condominiums its attorney fees and costs.
On April 15, 2005, K.C. Construction filed a mechanic's lien pursuant to section 38-22-101, C.R.S.2007, in the amount of $86,000.00 against property owned in part by SR Condominiums.
On June 3, 2005, SR Condominiums petitioned the district court under the Spurious Liens and Documents statute (SLD statute), sections 38-35-201 through-204, C.R.S.2007, to invalidate the mechanic's lien, arguing that it was a spurious lien or a spurious document.
On August 18, 2005, after a hearing, the district court found that the mechanic's lien was not valid because K.C. Construction had no reasonable basis to file a blanket lien— that is, a lien that encumbered the entire property—because it had only performed work on a portion of that property for which a narrower description was available. The court also found that K.C. Construction failed to comply with the provisions of section 38-22-109(3), C.R.S.2007, because it did not serve a notice of intent to file a lien statement on all owners of the property. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the mechanic's lien was a spurious lien under section 38-35-201(4), C.R.S.2007, and a spurious document under section 38-35-201(3), C.R.S.2007, and released the lien. The court also concluded that SR Condominiums was entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 38-35-204.
On January 12, 2006, after the time for filing an appeal had expired, K.C. Construction filed its C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. There, it argued that the court's order was void because the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine the validity of the mechanic's lien in a summary proceeding under the SLD statute, citing Tuscany, LLC v. Western States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo.App.2005), which had been announced six days before the hearing. Tuscany held that, because mechanic's liens are excluded from the SLD statute, a court may not adjudicate the validity of a mechanic's lien under the SLD statute. See id. at 279.
K.C. Construction argued that Tuscany represented a change in relevant case law that constituted an extraordinary circumstance or, alternatively, that the court's ruling was a mistake of law. K.C. Construction contended that the court should not award SR Condominiums its attorney fees and costs under section 38-35-204 in light of Tuscany.
The district court denied K.C. Construction's C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion on February 13, 2006. The same day, the district court awarded SR Condominiums $14,303.98 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 38-35-204.
We note that our consideration of this appeal is limited to the court's orders denying K.C. Construction's C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and awarding attorney fees and costs to SR Condominiums. We will not consider the court's order invalidating K.C. Construction's mechanic's lien because the appeal of that order was not timely.
Because we reject K.C. Construction's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction and the new case law, we conclude that the district court properly denied the C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.
We review the district court's denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 238 (Colo.2001); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 P.2d 785, 790 (Colo.1996). The court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See Lakeside Ventures, LLC v. Lakeside Dev. Co., 68 P.3d 516, 518 (Colo.App.2002). We review the court's ruling in light of the importance to be accorded the principle of finality and the purposes of C.R.C.P. 60(b). Davidson, 16 P.3d at 239.
The principle of finality dictates that "[i]t is essential, for practical reasons as well as for fundamental fairness, that there be a point at which litigation reaches a conclusion and that parties be permitted to rely on the outcome." Id. at 236.
If judgments could easily be set aside, public confidence in the courts would be undermined. As judges and legal scholars have long recognized, protecting the finality of judgments promotes stability, certainty, and consistency in the law, and enhances the credibility of the judicial system....
People in Interest of J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 330 (Colo.2002).
C.R.C.P. 60(b) "`attempts to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done.'" Canton Oil Corp. v. Dist. Court, 731 P.2d 687, 694 (Colo. 1987) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2851, at 140 (1973)); see also Davidson, 16 P.3d at 237; McMillan, 925 P.2d at 790. Therefore, while final judgments are generally conclusive between the parties, see J.A.U., 47 P.3d at 330, C.R.C.P. 60(b) permits a court to grant a party relief from a final judgment in certain circumstances.
Although K.C. Construction cites to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), (3), (4), and (5) on appeal, its arguments rely solely on subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Therefore, our review is limited to whether K.C. Construction is entitled to relief under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). See People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551, 555 (Colo.App.2003) ( ); Westrac, Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo.App. 1991) ().
K.C. Construction first contends it was entitled to relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) because the court's order was void as the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to invalidate its mechanic's lien in a summary proceeding under the SLD statute. We disagree.
A court may grant a party relief from a void judgment or order. See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Generally, if a court lacks subject matter, jurisdiction, any judgment it renders is void. See In re Water Rights of Columbine Assocs., 993 P.2d 483, 488 (Colo.2000); Olson v. Hillside Cmty. Church SBC, 124 P.3d 874, 878 (Colo.App.2005); In re Marriage of Mallon, 956 P.2d 642, 645 (Colo.App. 1998). We conclude that the court had subject matter jurisdiction.
The Colorado Constitution vests district courts with general subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9. "As courts of general jurisdiction, the district courts in Colorado have the authority to consider questions of law and of equity and to award legal and equitable remedies." Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo.1986); see also Colo. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Menor, 166 P.3d 205, 209 (Colo.App.2007); Brown v. Silvern, 141 P.3d 871, 873-74 (Colo.App.2005). This constitutional grant of jurisdiction may be limited by the legislature when that limitation is explicit. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 373-74 (Colo.1981); Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572, 575 (Colo.App.1993) ( ).
"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction concerns the court's authority to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment, not its authority to enter a particular judgment in that class." Minto, 870 P.2d at 575; see also Paine, 718 P.2d at 513 ) ).
Thus, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, it is important to distinguish between cases in which a court is devoid of power and those in which a court may have inappropriately exercised its power. See Minto, 870 P.2d at 575 ().
Whether a court possesses jurisdiction over a claim is dependent upon the nature of the claim and the relief sought. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 58 P.3d 47, 50 (Colo.2002); Columbine Assocs., 993 P.2d at 488. In our analysis, we consider the substance of the claim, including the facts alleged and the relief requested. Trans Shuttle, 58 P.3d at 50. If a court does not have power to resolve a dispute, then it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain W. Enter., LLC, ___ P.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 1704177 (Colo.App. No. 04CA2605, June 14, 2007); Brown, 141 P.3d at 873.
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