Orlando v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 05 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-2283,84-2283
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,394 Kenneth ORLANDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 209

776 F.2d 209

11 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 197, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,394

Kenneth ORLANDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-2283.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 10, 1985.

Decided Nov. 5, 1985.

As Corrected Nov. 5, 1985.

Deborah Spector, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Rosemary Rodriguez, Health & Human Services, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. ^*

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth Orlando appeals the district court's judgment upholding the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of his application for Social Security benefits. We affirm.

I.

The claimant, a 34 year-old Illinois resident with a twelfth grade education and a vocational background of employment as a janitor and as an assembler of rollaway beds, applied for disability benefits alleging that he was disabled because of scoliosis (abnormal curvature of the spine), mental impairment and hearing problems. Orlando submitted medical records revealing that he has congenital scoliosis and underwent two spinal fusions at the age of 14. Orlando was examined by a Dr. Kuang Chen, a consulting internist, who reported to the Secretary that there was a normal range of motion in Orlando's cervical spine and his lumbosacral spine was convexed to the left side with a limited range of motion. Dr. Chen stated that Orlando's ability to walk on his heels and toes was poor and that, although Orlando had a limping gait, an ambulatory aid was not required. Additionally, Dr. Chen found that Orlando could not hear without his hearing aid but was able to hear ordinary conversation at a six foot distance with his hearing aid. ¹ Dr. Chen concluded that Orlando had "a limited functional incapacity."

Orlando's treating physician, Dr. S. Ali, submitted a Spinal Disorders Report to the Secretary diagnosing Orlando as having, "Scoliosis-the whole spine; vascular and psychogenic headache; and right-sided weakness which resolved." Dr. Ali noted a decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbosacral spine, mild paravertebral muscle spasm with no evidence of root compression.

Two Physical Evaluations were conducted by consultative physicians. One report, stating that Orlando could climb and bend occasionally, could stoop and operate foot controls frequently, and concluded that Orlando had the capacity to perform light work. The second report also found that Orlando could climb and bend occasionally, could stoop and operate foot controls frequently, and concluded that Orlando was capable of medium rather than light work. In addition, Orlando was examined by two psychiatrists and a psychologist. Dr. Waldman, a psychiatrist, observed that Orlando related he had been depressed for the past six months due to the loss of his possessions and cats. Orlando informed Dr. Waldman that since childhood he had heard voices giving him advice and instructions on how to behave. Dr. Waldman reported that Orlando, "presents himself with a flat affect, inappropriate rapport, lack of comprehension of any sophisticated word, oddity of speech and thought, depression for the past six months." Dr. Waldman's diagnosis was: "Axis I: 1. Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood and 2. Borderline Mental Functioning. Axis II: Schizotypal Personality Disorder. Axis III: Headaches, Hearing loss."

Dr. Howard Wolin, the second psychiatrist, reported that Orlando was, "oriented in all spheres with no apparent impairment of his capacity of attention and concentration ... [and that] there was no overt evidence of any psychotic process." Orlando also informed Dr. Wolin that he heard voices in the past, but had not heard them in the last six months. Dr. Wolin diagnosed the claimant as having, "a mild to moderate degree of mental retardation, most probably mild, and/or a learning disability...." Wolin stated that Orlando is a "very withdrawn isolated man who stays within his house to protect himself from what he fears will be responses of a harsh sort from a hostile world." Dr. Wolin concluded, "There is a mild depression in him which goes along with a suicidal affect, but I do not believe he is suicidal at the moment."

Finally, the claimant's I.Q. was tested by a Dr. George Gentry, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Gentry administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and found that Orlando had a Verbal I.Q. of 75, a Performance I.Q. of 90, and a Full Scale I.Q. of 80. Dr. Gentry reported that the "[f]ifteen point difference between Verbal and Performance I.Q.'s is significant and suggests pathology, although just what kind is not clear at this point" and recommended a thorough neuropsychological evaluation to "help pin this down."

After hearing the testimony of Orlando and of his social worker and examining the evidence, the administrative law judge found that Orlando is mildly depressed and has a history of scoliosis and a mild hearing impairment in his left ear. The administrative law judge determined that these impairments prevented him from performing, "jobs requiring heavy lifting or involving above average analytical ability, the performance of complex tasks or contact with the public in highly pressurized situations." The administrative law judge ascertained that the claimant's past relevant work as a janitor did not require lifting in excess of 20 pounds and required only the ability to perform unskilled tasks with minimal contact with the public and co-workers. Noting that Orlando's pain is not severe enough to prevent him from performing light work, the administrative law judge found that Orlando retains the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") ² to perform his prior work as a janitor and concluded that Orlando was not disabled. ³ On appeal, Orlando argues that the administrative law judge's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, Orlando contends that the preliminary injunction granted in Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn. v. Schweiker, 554 F.Supp. 157 (D.Minn.1982) aff'd. in relevant part sub nom. Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.1983) compels us to remand this case to the Secretary for a redetermination of the issue of whether he could return to his past relevant work as a janitor.

II.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Orlando argues that the administrative law judge's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because he failed to include evaluations of Orlando's physical and mental impairments and his complaint of severe, disabling pain in the "Findings" section of the opinion. Orlando contends that if the administrative law judge had addressed his mental impairments in his Findings, he would have been forced to conclude that Orlando was disabled because his mental condition equals the regulatory description of a disabling mental impairment in 20 C.F.R. Subsection P, Appendix 1, Section 12.00. Alternatively, Orlando asserts that the record fails to contain adequate information about his past employment as a janitor to support a determination that he could return to this work. ⁴ Judicial review of final decisions of the Secretary is governed by Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.Sec. 405(g). We must uphold the Secretary's factual determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618, 625 (7th Cir.1979). Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Taylor v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 1240, 1241 (7th Cir.1984). "If the record contains such support, we must affirm unless there has been an error of law." Id. (citations omitted).

Our court has emphasized that the administrative law judge's decision in disability cases must be "based on consideration of all relevant evidence and the reasons for his conclusions must be stated in a manner sufficient to permit an informed review." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1984).

"While it is often impracticable and fruitless for every document to be discussed separately, an administrative law judge may not select only the evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion. His written decision should contain, and his ultimate determination must be based upon, all of the relevant evidence in the record."

Id. at 609 (citations omitted). A written evaluation of every piece of testimony and submitted evidence is not required; however, the administrative law judge must articulate at some minimal level his analysis of the evidence in "cases in which considerable evidence is presented to counter the agency's position." Zblewski v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.1984). See also Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir.1985); Look v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.1985). To reject the claimant's testimony about his or her physical condition, the administrative law judge must specifically conclude that the claimant's testimony is not credible. Zblewski, 732 F.2d at 79. Moreover, to determine that a claimant is unable to return to his former work, the administrative law judge must compare the demands of that work with the claimant's existing physical abilities. Strittmatter v. Schweiker, 729 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir.1984). The purpose of these rules is to ensure that the administrative law judge has, in fact, considered all of the relevant evidence and made the required determinations and, further, to facilitate meaningful appellate review. Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 166 (7th Cir.1985).

Initially we note that none of these cases require the administrative law judge to recite his determinations and supporting reasoning in the Findings rather than the discussion section of his opinion. Moreover, Orlando has not explained, and we fail to understand, why the administrative law judge's reasoning and determination must appear in the Findings...