Orona-Rangal v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-62.,01-62.
• Parties: Marcos ORONA-RANGAL, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

53 P.3d 1080

2002 WY 134

Marcos ORONA-RANGAL, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 01-62.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 11, 2002.

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant.

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,¹ KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Marcos Orona-Rangal drove his vehicle at a high speed through a stop light, killing one person and injuring two others. A jury convicted him on one count of aggravated homicide by vehicle under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) and two counts of reckless endangerment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2001). He appeals, claiming the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the deceased's pregnancy and insufficient evidence existed to convict him on each count. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mr. Orona-Rangal presents these issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court err in allowing irrelevant evidence of the deceased's pregnancy; and in the alternative, if relevant, was such evidence unduly prejudicial to Appellant?

II. Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of the charges of reckless endangerment?

III. Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of the crime of aggravated homicide by vehicle, as the evidence indicated that the proximate cause of death was the action of Mr. Gomez, the individual who pursued Appellant?

The State of Wyoming phrases the issues as:

I. Did the district court err in admitting relevant evidence of the pregnancy of Appellant's victim?

II. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Mr. Orona-Rangal, age twenty-nine, and Christina Gomez, age eighteen, were engaged in a romantic relationship. The record is unclear as to whether Ms. Gomez's parents were aware of the relationship. On February 29, 2000, Ms. Gomez met Mr. Orona-Rangal after school at a nearby convenience store. He then drove her to work where they noticed her father, Rufujio Gomez, waiting in the parking lot. Mr. Orona-Rangal sped out of the parking lot. Mr. Gomez followed, and a high-speed chase ensued. Several witnesses recounted that both Mr. Orona-Rangal and Mr. Gomez traveled at high rates of speed, passed through multiple red lights, and wove through traffic, barely missing other vehicles.

[¶ 4] Two accident reconstruction experts testified that Mr. Orona-Rangal was traveling at a minimum speed of seventy to seventy-two miles per hour in a forty-miles-per-hour zone when he reached the intersection where the accident occurred. Leona Moon was waiting at the intersection for her light to change. When her light turned green, she entered the intersection to make a left-hand turn. Mr. Orona-Rangal drove through his red light, attempted to brake, and crashed into the driver's side of Ms. Moon's vehicle. The vehicle was propelled across the intersection where it collided with Joan Suhr's vehicle. Ms. Suhr and Ms. Gomez were injured, and Ms. Moon died at the scene of the accident.

[¶ 5] After a three-day trial, the jury found Mr. Orona Rangal guilty on one count of aggravated homicide by vehicle and two counts of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to serve two consecutive one-year terms in the Natrona County Detention Center on the reckless endangerment counts plus a consecutive term of twelve to seventeen years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on the aggravated homicide count. Mr. Orona Rangal appeals.

DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Evidence

[¶ 6] Ms. Moon was seven months' pregnant at the time of the fatal accident. Prior to trial, Mr. Orona-Rangal filed a motion, seeking to exclude any reference to her pregnancy. The trial court denied the motion while cautioning the prosecution to refrain from dwelling upon the pregnancy any more than necessary. Mr. Orona-Rangal filed a motion to reconsider the denial and additionally offered to stipulate that Ms. Moon's death was a direct result of the collision with his vehicle. The state rejected the stipulation, and the trial court denied the motion to reconsider but proposed the defense submit a cautionary instruction concerning Ms. Moon's pregnancy. The defense did not submit a cautionary instruction on this issue.

[¶ 7] At trial, evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy arose in four contexts. In the prosecution's opening statement, the prosecutor explained to the jury that Ms. Moon was twenty-one years old, seven months' pregnant, and engaged to be married. The prosecution's first witness was Ms. Moon's fiancé. The prosecutor asked him, "[W]hat was her physical condition at the time that you resided with her," and he responded that she was seven months' pregnant. Next, the prosecution asked James Thorpen, M.D., the Natrona County coroner, to describe Ms. Moon's injuries. In addition to his testimony that the cause of her death was "[m]assive recent chest, abdominal, and pelvic injuries," Dr. Thorpen told the jury the force of the impact caused extensive hemorrhaging of the placenta from the uterus which led to the fetus' death. In closing argument, the prosecutor alluded to the pregnancy stating Ms. Moon was "about to engage in the most important aspect of her life. She was about ready to start a family, and she was about ready to get married."

[¶ 8] Mr. Orona-Rangal argues the evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy was irrelevant and inadmissible or, in the alternative, if the evidence was relevant, it should have been excluded as highly prejudicial because it appealed to the jurors' sympathy for Ms. Moon and created a sense of outrage against him. In response, the state contends the evidence was relevant for three reasons. First, it tended to prove Ms. Moon's identity. Second, it showed she was more likely to exercise caution while driving and, thus, her actions did not contribute to the accident which caused her death. And, finally, evidence of her physical condition at the time of the accident was relevant to determine the cause of her death.

[¶ 9] Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." W.R.E. 401. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible; however, irrelevant evidence is not admissible. W.R.E. 402. In criminal cases, "[e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime charged." Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo.1980); see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 42, 43 P.3d 80,

¶ 42 (Wyo.2002); Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo.1993). Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." W.R.E. 403. For this court to conclude that the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, the appellant must demonstrate "that the evidence had little or no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury." Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1981). The trial court is given broad discretion in ruling on questions concerning the relevancy of evidence, and we will reverse its decision only when there is a clear abuse of discretion.

[¶ 10] We have said:

"Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion." Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999) (citation omitted). We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. "In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination." [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).] The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse.

Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶ 25 (Wyo.2001), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1554, 152 L.Ed.2d 477 (2002) (some citations omitted).

[¶ 11] To determine whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy at the time of the accident, we must inquire as to whether the evidence was relevant to the charges and, if it was relevant, whether its possible prejudicial effect on the jury outweighed its probative value. The state asserts evidence of Ms. Moon's pregnancy was relevant because it tended to prove her identity. Although her identity was not in dispute, in every homicide case the state must establish the identity of the person killed. Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d 975, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2002); State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602, 610-12 (1996); State v. Frederick, 554 So.2d 1288, 1292 (La.Ct.App.1989) ("Defendant's contention that he did not put the identity of the victim in dispute did not relieve the state of the burden of establishing the identity of the victim beyond a reasonable doubt. Identification is a material issue in any criminal case." (Citation omitted.)). "The ultimate test, however, is whether or not the probative value of the description outweighs its probable inflammatory effect." Frederick, 554 So.2d at 1292. This...