Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1951
• Docket Number: No. 16497,16497
• Citation: 219 S.C. 272,64 S.E.2d 878
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ORSINI v. TROJAN STEEL CORP.

Page 878

64 S.E.2d 878

219 S.C. 272

ORSINI v. TROJAN STEEL CORP.

No. 16497.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 30, 1951.

Nelson, Mullins & Grier, Lewis Weinberg, Columbia, for appellant.

John E. Edens, Columbia, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County for damages for the breach by appellant of an alleged oral contract of permanent employment.

Respondent, a civil engineer, was for approximately ten years connected with the Corps of Engineers of the War Department. In 1942 he left government service to work with the McCann Steel Company of Nashville, Tennessee, which specializes in steel fabrication, and remained with this company about five years. In 1948 he left the McCann Steel Company and together with others organized a business in Atlanta, Georgia, which lasted something less than two years. Respondent, at the time of his conversation with agents of the appellant, was employed by the Link Belt Company of Atlanta as engineer and left this position to move to Columbia where he took a similar position with appellant on June 16, 1949.

Respondent's being employed by appellant and his moving to Columbia, South Carolina, were the result of an agreement with a Mr. Todd, Manager of appellant company, who, according to respondent's testimony, in a telephone conversation asked him to come to Columbia for an interview, which he did the following Monday, June 6, 1949. On June 8th, he received a telephone call from Mr. Todd, who stated that he would pay respondent $75.00 per week as wages, a commission on monthly sales and an annual bonus, and requested that respondent report for work the following Monday. Respondent demurred, stating that it would be necessary that he work a two weeks' notice for the Link Belt Company, to which Mr. Todd replied, 'What do you give a damn? You have a lifetime job here. * * * Come on down.' Appellant further promised to pay his moving expenses and to take care of hotel expenses until he could make other arrangements with respect to living quarters.

As a result of this agreement, respondent arrived in Columbia June 16, 1949, and commenced work the following day. His furniture had previously been shipped to Columbia and at the time of the trial of this case was still in storage. His wife gave up her employment in Atlanta and brought the family a few days later to Columbia, South Carolina.

According to respondent's testimony, approximately two weeks after beginning work with appellant, he borrowed a pick-up truck from his employer for the purpose of going to Savannah, Georgia, on some personal business. Mr. Todd testified that respondent had borrowed the truck for the purpose of finding a place to live in the city of Columbia and was to report for work and return the truck Saturday morning. Upon respondent's return from Savannah Monday morning, Mr. Todd informed him, 'I am going to have to let you go.' To this remark, respondent replied, 'If that's the way you want it, O. K.' No other reason was ascribed for discharging respondent.

Respondent further testified that, although appellant had promised to reimburse him for moving his furniture to Columbia and for his hotel bills, it had never done so.

Appellant contends that respondent was employed on a weekly basis at a salary of $75.00 per week, which contract was terminable at will by either party and, in accordance therewith, the contract had been terminated as of the date testified to. It is further contended that respondent's services were unsatisfactory and that he was therefore discharged for just cause and was paid in full all sums due him.

The case was heard before the Honorable G. B. Greene, the Presiding Judge, and jury at the March 1950 term of Court of Common Pleas for Richland County and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,250.00.

Appellant now comes to this Court, contending, among other things, that respondent failed to prove a good and sufficient consideration in addition to the services to be rendered by him so as to render the alleged oral contract for permanent employment enforcible by the plaintiff; or stated in another way, the real question in the case is whether it comes within the general rule or whether within the exception as set forth in the case of Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499.

The general rule is that under ordinary circumstances a contract to furnish employment permanently, or so long as the employee's services shall be properly performed, or for a similar indefinite period, is no more than an indefinite hiring, terminable at the will of either party, and is therefore unenforcible as to its duration. But this rule does not apply where the employee has given a good consideration in addition to the services rendered. 35 Am.Jur. 460; Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d...