Owens v. Clemons

• Decision Date: 21 October 1966
• Citation: 408 S.W.2d 642
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
• Parties: Ruth OWENS et al., Appellants, v. C. E. CLEMONS, Appellee.

Page 642

408 S.W.2d 642

Ruth OWENS et al., Appellants, v. C. E. CLEMONS, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 21, 1966.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 16, 1966.

Charles T. Walters, Winchester, for appellant.

Beverly White, White, McCann & Stewart, Winchester, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

Appellant plaintiffs, employed by appellee as waitresses, filed this suit to recover wages due under a mandatory wage order issued by the Commissioner of Labor, effective October 1, 1962. The trial court allowed plaintiffs the difference between the lower wages paid and the minimum prescribed, but credited the appellee employer with (1) the value of meals eaten at appellee's establishment, (2) the time consumed in eating those meals, and (3) vacation pay. The court declined to allow plaintiffs a reasonable attorney's fee. They and their attorney appeal.

Under the employment arrangement entered into prior to the effective date of the minimum wage order, appellee furnished certain meals to his employees without making a charge therefor. In this proceeding the parties stipulated the value of the meals. The trial court was of the opinion that since they constituted a part of the employees' compensation, their value should be added to the actual wages paid in determining the extent of underpayment.

The employees contend this is an obvious violation of the wage order, which provides in part in paragraph 14 the following:

'No employer shall make deductions for meals and/or lodging against the minimum wage due employees. The employer and employee may voluntarily reach an agreement as to the consumption of meals and/or lodging by an employee and the price of same, but in no case shall the employee be charged more than the amounts stipulated by Administrative Regulations as filed with the Legislative Research Commission.'

It seems clear the objective of the first sentence is to fix a legal obligation on the employer to pay at least the minimum wage in dollars. Thus when the minimum wage prescribed is 70 cents an hour (as in this case), the order would be violated if the employer undertook to pay 60 cents an hour and furnish meals free. On the other hand, paragraph 14 recognizes the validity of a specific agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the employee obligates himself to pay a fixed price for meals taken. In practical application this would authorize the employer to offset the wages due by the amount owed for meals.

A valid agreement under this section of the order must necessarily create an indebtedness to the employer based upon a fixed price for meals furnished. While admittedly the meals given the employees in this case constituted a form of compensation to them there was no agreement establishing either their price (or value) or creating an obligation to pay for them. ¹ The judgment, in giving the employer credit for meals consumed by his employees, in effect deducted the value of the meals from the minimum wage he was obligated to pay. This was exactly what paragraph 14 of the Minimum Wage Order expressly prohibited, and the judgment was erroneous in this respect.

Since the employees in their brief present no substantial reason why the time taken to eat meals should not be deducted from their working time, or why the vacation pay should not be credited to the employer, we consider these grounds for reversal abandoned.

The final contention is that the court should have allowed plaintiffs a reasonable attorney's fee. This is specifically required by KRS 337.360, which provides in part:

'If any woman or minor worker is paid by his employer less than the minimum fair wage to which he is entitled under a mandatory minimum fair-wage order he may recover in a civil action the full amount of the minimum wage less any amount actually paid to him by the employer together with costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as are allowed by the court.' (Emphasis added)

This statute was upheld as constitutional in W. W. Mac Co. v. Teague, 297 Ky. 475 180 S.W.2d 387, 389, upon the following ground:

'The general assembly, as have those of many other states, has seen fit to make a special class of women and minor employees and to enact legislation in their behalf. The provisions of the statute apply to all workers so classified. That the general assembly was justified in prescribing special working conditions and protective provisions for this class of workers seems beyond question. We believe, therefore, for the reasons given, that the attack upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the act allowing an attorney's fee in the case is without foundation'.

In spite of this specific decision on the point, the employer contends the statute violates the public policy of this state. This is a rather unusual argument in view of the fact that the legislature, when it acts upon a particular subject matter, establishes such policy. It is true the courts may, in the absence of legislative decree, adopt and apply public policy principles. Such was done in Cloud v. Hug, Ky., 281 S.W.2d 911, where no statute was involved.

It is beyond the province of a court to vitiate an act of the legislature on the ground that the public policy therein promulgated is contrary to what the court considers to be in the public interest. It is the prerogative of the legislature to declare what acts constitute a violation of public policy and the consequences of such violation. Re Peterson's Estate, 230 Minn. 478, 42 N.W.2d 59, 18 A.L.R.2d 910. The propriety, wisdom and expediency of statutory enactments are exclusively legislative matters. Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 726, 97 A.L.R.2d 215. As so aptly stated in Collison v. State ex rel. Green, 9 W. W. Harr., Del., 460, 2 A.2d 97, 108, 119 A.L.R. 1422, 1437:

'* * * it is the province of the legislature and not of the courts to pass upon...