Pace v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 March 1991 |
Citation | 578 So.2d 281 |
Parties | Henry Leon PACE, individually and as personal representative of the heirs and estate of Joseph Pace, deceased v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. 89-391. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Brent M. Rosenthal and Russell W. Budd of Baron & Budd, Dallas, Tex., and S.C. Middlebrooks of Gardner, Middlebrooks & Fleming, Mobile, for appellant.
W. Michael Atchison, E. Martin Bloom and Allan R. Wheeler of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellee The Celotex Corp.
Larry L. Simms and Gary M. Kramer of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C., and C. Paul Cavender of Crosby Saad & Beebe, Mobile, for appellees Fibreboard Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Pittsburgh Corning Corp.
Jerome A. Cooper, Thomas N. Crawford, Jr., Frederick T. Kuykendall III, Joe R. Whatley and Jay Smith of Cooper, Mitch, Crawford, Kuykendall & Whatley, Birmingham, for amici curiae AFL-CIO of Alabama, Alabama Democratic Conference, Central Alabama Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, Dist. 20, United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 36, United Steelworkers of America, Fifth Dist. Intern. Broth. of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Greater Birmingham Ministries, Jefferson County Citizens Coalition, Intern. Union of Brick Layers and Allied Craftsmen No. 1 of Alabama, Laborers' Local 559, Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, Local Union No. 48, Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, Local Union No. 91, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada, Local Union No. 127, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.
Pursuant to Rule 18, A.R.App.P., the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama certified a question to this Court. We consented to answer the question and ordered the parties to submit briefs containing their arguments. The parties having done so, and the matter having been orally argued to this Court, we will set out the pertinent facts and answer the question.
The certificate issued by the United States District Court contained the following statement of facts:
Since these facts present a case of first impression, we consented to answer the following certified question:
"Whether the inability of the decedent to [commence] a personal injury action in the State of Alabama prior to the time of death precludes amendment of his existing personal injury action by the decedent's representative so as to bring an action for wrongful death under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-410?"
Alabama's wrongful death statute, § 6-5-410, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part:
"A personal representative may commence an action and recover such damages as the jury may assess in a court of competent jurisdiction within the state of Alabama, and not elsewhere, for the wrongful act, omission or negligence of any person, persons or corporation, his or their servants or agents, whereby the death of his testator or intestate was caused, provided the testator or intestate could have commenced an action for such wrongful act, omission or negligence if it had not caused death." (Emphasis added.)
This Court has stated, and the parties agree, that the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Clark v. Houston County Commission, 507 So.2d 902 (Ala.1987); Advertiser Co. v. Hobbie, 474 So.2d 93 (Ala.1985); League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 290 So.2d 167 (1974). In construing the statute, this Court should gather the intent of the legislature from the language of the statute itself, if possible. Clark v. Houston County Commission, supra; Advertiser Co. v. Hobbie, supra; Morgan County Board of Education v. Alabama Public School & College Authority, 362 So.2d 850 (Ala.1978). We may also look to the reason and necessity for the statute and the purpose sought to be obtained by enacting the statute. Ex Parte Holladay, 466 So.2d 956 (Ala.1985).
The purpose of Alabama's wrongful death statute is to protect human life and prevent homicides by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of persons or corporations. Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So.2d 120 (Ala.1986); Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, 514 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1986). The reason and necessity for the act was to provide a remedy to the family of a decedent whose death was caused by the wrongful act or omission of another. In Mattison v. Kirk, supra, this Court discussed this reasoning at length:
.
Thus, as we have said, § 6-5-410 created a right of action in the name of the personal representative of the decedent. In this case, we must interpret the scope of the proviso in § 6-5-410 that restricts that right. The proviso requires that, in order for a personal representative to be able to bring an action for wrongful death, the decedent must have been able to "[commence] an action for such wrongful act, omission or negligence if it had not caused death."
In discerning and effectuating the intent of the legislature, we must bear in mind two applicable rules of statutory construction, which we set out in their entirety. The first rule concerns the construction of provisos generally:
Sutherland Stat. Const., § 47.08 (4th ed.) (footnotes omitted).
The second rule concerns a court's supplying words said to be omitted from a statute:
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