Pacheco v. Clifton

• Decision Date: 21 September 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 47531
• Citation: 311 N.W.2d 801,43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1150,109 Mich.App. 563
• Parties: Frederick PACHECO, Jr. and Cynthia Pacheco, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clayton CLIFTON, Bruce Jellison, and General Motors Corporation, a foreigncorporation, Defendants-Appellants. 109 Mich.App. 563, 311 N.W.2d 801, 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1150, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,814
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 801

311 N.W.2d 801

Frederick PACHECO, Jr. and Cynthia Pacheco Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clayton CLIFTON, Bruce Jellison, and General Motors Corporation, a foreigncorporation Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 47531.

109 Mich.App. 563, 311 N.W.2d 801,

43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1150,

29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,814

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 21, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1981.

Released for Publication Nov. 4, 1981.

[109 MICHAPP 565] Gary A. Colbert, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Daniel G. Galant and Nicholas J. Wittner, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Clark, Klein & Beaumont by Dwight H. Vincent, J. Walker Henry and Dennis G. Bonucchi, Detroit, for amicus curiae Michigan Mfrs. Ass'n.

McLellan, Schlaybaugh & Witbeck by Richard D. McLellan and William J. Perrone, Lansing, for amicus curiae Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.

Sheldon J. Stark, Detroit, for amicus curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Before RILEY, P. J., and BASHARA and MacKENZIE, JJ.

RILEY, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin under the now-repealed Michigan fair employment practices act (hereinafter, FEPA), M.C.L. § 423.301 et seq., M.S.A. § 17.458(1) et seq. The plaintiff husband, a security guard at General Motors Corporation, alleged that he suffered serious psychological and emotional injuries, neurosis, loss of former job pleasure, loss of consortium and great [109 MICHAPP 566] pain and suffering as a result of employment discrimination based upon his Spanish-American origin. The plaintiff wife alleged that, as a result of defendants' discriminatory actions against her husband, she suffered mental anguish, emotional distress, disruption of the family and marital relationship, loss of consortium and traumatic anxiety neurosis.

The individual defendants in this case are security supervisors at the plant where defendant works. The parties have stipulated that from November 29, 1974, through April 11, 1975, Mr. Pacheco was on approved medical disability leave of absence from his employment. Plaintiffs claim that he was disabled as a result of hypertension and anxiety caused by the discriminatory acts of the defendants. Further, it is stipulated that Mr. Pacheco was discharged from his employment on April 29, 1975, and reinstated on June 2, of the same year. Again, plaintiffs allege that the discharge was the result of discrimination on the basis of national origin.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter in light of the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (hereinafter, WDCA), M.C.L. § 418.131; M.S.A. § 17.237(131), and the plaintiff wife's standing to sue under FEPA. In denying defendants' motion, the trial court certified the two questions raised on appeal as controlling issues of law. By order of March 3, 1980, this Court granted defendants' application for leave to appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for summary judgment. The two questions certified for our review, which we shall consider seriatim, are as follow:

[109 MICHAPP 567] I. Does the exclusive remedy provision of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act deprive the circuit court of Michigan of jurisdiction over an employee's claims of mental and physical injuries resulting from alleged unlawful employment discrimination, where such injuries are disabling, but not permanently disabling, and where various mental injuries continue after the employee returns to work?

II. Does the spouse of an employee have standing to sue the latter's employer under Article I, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and the Michigan Civil Rights Statutes for damages which the spouse allegedly suffered as a result of alleged unlawful employment discrimination by the employer against the employee?

I.

Defendants first argue that the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction over the plaintiff husband's claim that he suffered disabling injuries and continues to suffer nondisabling injuries as a result of alleged employment discrimination.

M.C.L. § 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301) provides:

"(1) An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is subject to the provisions of this act, at the time of such injury, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent provided in this act * * *."

M.C.L. § 418.131; M.S.A. § 17.237(131) provides, in pertinent part:

"The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in [109 MICHAPP 568] this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer * * *."

At the outset we note several well-established principles, as stated recently by another panel of this Court in Sewell v. Bathey Manufacturing Co., 103 Mich.App. 732, 736-737, 303 N.W.2d 876 (1981):

"It is beyond question that, when an injury is sustained which is compensable under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, the exclusive-remedy provision of the act bars any common-law tort cause of action by an employee against his employer arising therefrom. Milton v. Oakland County, 50 Mich.App. 279, 283, 213 N.W.2d 250 (1973); Broaddus v. Ferndale Fastener Division, Ring Screw Works, 84 Mich.App. 593, 597-598, 269 N.W.2d 689 (1978), lv. den. 403 Mich. 850 (1978). An injury which is 'a personal injury arising out of and in the course of (an injured party's) employment' is compensable under the act. MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301); Kissinger v. Mannor, 92 Mich.App. 572, 575, 285 N.W.2d 214 (1979). Personal injuries for which the act provides a remedy include both physical and mental injuries suffered on account of employment. Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., (After Remand ), 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978); Kissinger, supra, 575 (285 N.W.2d 214).

"It is also beyond peradventure that the question of whether the act applies to a particular injury, i. e., whether an injury arose out of and in the course of a worker's employment (and thus is compensable under the act), is a question to be resolved in the first instance exclusively by the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation. Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mich. 356, 358-359, 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Littky, 60 Mich.App. 375, 377-378, 230 N.W.2d 440 (1975); MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841)." (Footnotes omitted.)

Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 77 Mich.App. 361, 258 [109 MICHAPP 569] N.W.2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their motion.

In Stimson, plaintiff filed suit under the FEPA, charging defendant with discriminating against her on the basis of sex with regard to grade and wage promotions and her eventual discharge. Plaintiff alleged that, because of the discrimination she encountered, she suffered an acute nervous breakdown, required hospitalization, was unable to secure employment and experienced embarrassment, humiliation and a loss of esteem among her peers. Concurrently, plaintiff filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation (hereinafter, bureau). Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims of nervous breakdown, embarrassment, humiliation and loss of esteem were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. The trial court denied defendant's motion and this Court granted defendant leave to appeal.

Relying heavily upon Professor Larson's workmen's compensation treatise, the Court said that not only must the elements of the tort be examined in order to determine whether the suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provision but that the damages claimed must also be reviewed. The Court also said that a civil action against an employer is not barred completely because several of the injuries alleged are those within the coverage of the compensation act. Recovery is, however, precluded for injuries covered under the compensation act. With respect to the facts before it, the Court concluded as follows:

[109 MICHAPP 570] "Plaintiffs' complaint in the present case alleges a cause of action which generally concerns a type of injury outside the scope of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act. The mental injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff, however, are not merely incidental to the violation of her civil rights. They culminated in a disabling condition for which compensation was available. Plaintiffs' ability to recover for Mrs. Stimson's nervous breakdown, embarrassment, humiliation and loss of esteem among her peers, therefore, is barred by MCLA 418.131; MSA 17.237(131). Plaintiff's discharge and her inability to obtain grade and wage promotions, however, if proven to have resulted from sexual discrimination, are injuries for which the act provides no remedy. With regard to these injuries, plaintiff is entitled to a trial on the merits." Stimson, supra, 369, 258 N.W.2d 227. (Footnotes omitted.)

Another decision of significance to our inquiry is Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F.Supp. 999 (E.D.Mich., 1979). Freeman involved a class action suit by employees against their employer for alleged race discrimination. Before the court was a defense motion to deny a proposed amendment to the complaint to include therein a prayer for relief under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.548(101) et seq. Defendant contended that the damages sought by plaintiffs for the indignity of discrimination, humiliation and the invasion of their right not to be discriminated against were barred by the exclusivity bar of the WDCA.

In an exhaustive and well-reasoned analysis of Michigan law on the...