Page v. Watson

• Decision Date: 13 June 1938
• Citation: 140 Fla. 536,192 So. 205
• Parties: PAGE v. WATSON et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

192 So. 205

140 Fla. 536

PAGE v. WATSON et al.

Florida Supreme Court

June 13, 1938

Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1938.

Extraordinary Petition for Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1939.

En Banc.

Original prohibition proceeding by Charles W. Page against F. M Watson and the State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida involving the question of whether a pardon granted to the petitioner, who had been convicted of a felony, was a defense to a proceeding to revoke his license.

Demurrer to petition for writ of prohibition sustained.

BUFORD J., dissenting

On Petition for Rehearing.

COUNSEL

J. Velma Keen and A. Frank O'Kelley, Jr., both of Tallahassee, for petitioner.

John W. Prunty, of Miami, and James No. Daniel, of Chipley, for respondents.

OPINION

CHAPMAN Justice.

This is a case of original jurisdiction. On petition for a writ of prohibition, it was made to appear that Charles W. Page was a regularly licensed and practicing physician of the State of Florida prior to November 13, 1929. On November 13, 1929, he was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Florida, for perjury, possession of stolen goods, and grand larceny, and was by the Circuit Court of said County sentenced therefor to the State Penitentiary of Florida for a period of five years. On March 22, 1933, Charles W. Page was by the Board of Pardons of Florida granted a full and complete pardon of said offenses, supra.

The State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida, under Section 3415, C.G.L., took the necessary steps as therein provided to revoke, suspend or annul the license previously granted to Charles W. Page on the ground or grounds that he had been convicted of a felony within the State of Florida and in a Court of competent jurisdiction therof, to-wit; the Circuit Court of Washington County, Florida. It is the contention of counsel for petitioner that the full and complete pardon granted under date of March 22, 1933, by the Board of Pardons of Florida is a full and complete defense to the proceedings before the State Board of Medical Examiners to revoke or annul the petitioner's license. That the legal effect of the pardon is to deprive the State Board of Medical Examiners of all jurisdiction to further hear and determine the case.

The State Board of Medical Examiners filed a demurrer to the said petition and the ground thereof was that the petition for a writ of prohibition failed to set forth a cause of action. The demurrer admits as true the facts set out in the petition. Section 7105, C.G.L., defines a felony as any crime punishable by death, or imprisonment in the State prison, and no other crime shall be so considered. Every other offense is a misdemeanor. Either of the offenses of which Charles W. Page was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County was a felony within the meaning of Section 3415, C.G.L., and for which the State Board of Medical Examiners had a legal right to revoke or annul the license previously granted to petitioner. This case was before this Court and reported in State ex rel. Page v. Hollingsworth, 117 Fla. 288, 157 So. 887. In the case of State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, text pages 608, 609, 146 So. 660, this Court had before it the Section of law, supra, under which the Board of Medical Examiners was proceeding against the petitioner, and said:

'Section 3415, Comp.Gen.Laws of 1927, provides a full, complete, and adequate procedure for suspending or annulling the license of a practitioner of medicine for the reasons stated. In fine, it requires that charges be preferred against the practitioner, and that the time and place of hearing them by the state board of Medical Examiners be determined and announced. It is also required that the accused be served with copy of the charges against him, together with the time and place of hearing at least ten days prior thereto, at which time and place he shall have the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, to introduce witnesses in his defense, and to appear personally or by counsel. Upon satisfactory proof of the charges the board may by a two-thirds vote suspend him from the practice of medicine and revoke his license. The accused may on certiorari have the action of the board reviewed by the circuit court of the circuit in which his license is recorded or he may demand a trial de novo in the circuit court and have his guilt or innocence determined according to the law applicable to the charge produced against him. Unless the guilt of the accused shall be made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt, the court shall render its decision in his favor and restore him to full right to practice medicine under the law. Appeal lies from the circuit court to the Supreme Court under like restrictions as those applicable to chancery appeals.

'In this state of the law it cannot be controverted that section 3415, supra, requires that the accused be given reasonable opportunity to be heard before the board of medical examiners in his own defense, to confront the witnesses against him, to have witnesses in his own behalf, to be represented by counsel, and to have his cause reviewed by both the circuit court and the Supreme Court, if he can show grounds for so doing.'

Counsel for petitioner in support of their contention that the pardon granted petitioner under date of March 22, 1933, is a complete defense to the revocation or annulment of petitioner's license, cite and emphasize the rule enumerated in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366. That suit involved the validity of an Act of Congress requiring, among other things, a certain oath to be taken as a condition of the right of one to appear and be heard as an attorney at law by virtue of any previous admission to the bar, that court, referring to certain clauses of the act relating to past conduct, said (page 377): 'The statute is directed against parties who have offended in any of the particulars embraced by these clauses. And its object is to exclude them from the profession of the law, or at least from its practice in the courts of the United States. As the oath prescribed cannot be taken by these parties, the act, as against them, operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion. And exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary vocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct. The exaction of the oath is the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the act is intended to operate, and instead of lessening increases its objectionable character. All enactments of this kind partake of the nature of bills of pains and penalties, and are subject to the constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder, under which general designation they are included. * * *'

This court in an Advisory Opinion to the Governor of Florida under date of September 27, 1872, as reported in Opinion of Justices, 14 Fla. 318, at page 319, said:

'* * * I would respectfully state that 'a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence, and the guilt of the offender. When the pardon is full, it remits the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him as it were a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.' (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. [333] 380 ).' (Italics supplied).

In the case of Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, text 302, 21 So. 21, 34 L.R.A. 251, 56 Am.St.Rep. 177, this Court said (page 22):

'* * * In this case it is said, in reference to the effect of a pardon, that it 'reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense, and the guilt of the offender. When the pardon is full, it remits the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that, in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.' This has been approved in an opinion of the justices of this court. Advisory Opinion to Governor, 14 Fla. 318. It is settled law that the pardon of an offense not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. 'Imprisonment and hard labor are not the only punishments which the law inflicts upon those who violate its commands. Besides these are disabilities which are the consequences of conviction, and which remain after incarcertion has ceased. A pardon is supposed to be granted to one who has been improperly convicted, or who has sufficiently expiated his offense. If it was only efficacious when the party was in duress, its effect would only be a halfway relief. The doctrine, now well recognized, upon this subject, is that a pardon gives to the person in whose favor it is granted a new character and makes of him a new man. When extended to him in prison, it relieves him, and removes his disabilities. When given to him after his time of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction,--his disabilities.' State v. Baptiste, 26 La.Ann. 134.'

The modern trend of authorities generally accepted by the courts is that a pardon restores one to the customary civil rights which ordinarily belong to a citizen of the State, which are generally conceded or recognized to be the right to hold office, to vote, to serve...