RJL v. State

• Decision Date: 18 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC02-1493.,SC02-1493.
• Parties: R.J.L., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

887 So.2d 1268

R.J.L., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.

No. SC02-1493.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 18, 2004.

Michael S. Drews of the Law Office of Michael S. Drews, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner.

John P. Booth, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement and William L. Camper, General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review R.J.L. v. State, 818 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Doe v. State, 595 So.2d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We originally accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of Randall v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 791 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), on the basis of express and direct conflict with Doe. Unfortunately, the petitioner there, Leonard David Randall, was killed in an automobile accident on or about November 1, 2002, prior to the date upon which oral argument was to occur. This Court subsequently removed Randall from the oral argument calendar and ordered Randall's counsel to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed as moot in light of Mr. Randall's untimely death. The acceptance of jurisdiction in R.J.L., which concerns the identical issue as presented in Randall, had been stayed, pending resolution of Randall. Subsequently, Randall was dismissed as moot and this Court accepted jurisdiction in R.J.L. to ensure resolution of the issue presented.

Although the entirety of the opinion in R.J.L. consists of the following: "PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Randall v. Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement, 791 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001),

rev. granted, No. 01-2135, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2002)," R.J.L., 818 So.2d at 635, jurisdiction is proper under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. R.J.L. explicitly relied upon Randall, which this Court recognized was in express and direct conflict with Doe. Therefore, as Randall was in conflict with Doe, likewise is R.J.L.

The record reflects that in 1953, R.J.L. was convicted of kidnapping without ransom. Subsequently, he was granted a full pardon by Governor Leroy Collins in 1959. The complete text of the pardon read:

[R.J.L.], who was convicted in the Court of Record, Escambia County, Florida, June term 1953, of the offense of Kidnapping Without Ransom, and sentenced to serve three years in the State Prison, should now, upon showing made, be granted a full and complete pardon; it being shown to the Board that since said conviction he has lived a law-abiding life, and that the Florida Parole Commission, after making a thorough investigation, recommended that he be granted a full and complete pardon.

Therefore, Be it Known that the said [R.J.L.] be, and he is hereby granted a full and complete pardon of the above offense, thereby restoring to him full and complete civil rights.

In 2000, R.J.L. applied to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (hereinafter "FDLE") for a certificate of eligibility to have his criminal history record expunged. His application was denied by the FDLE. The FDLE explained that the reason R.J.L.'s application was denied was because "[t]he criminal history record reflects that the applicant has been adjudicated guilty of or adjudicated delinquent for committing one or more of the acts stemming from the arrest or alleged criminal activity to which the application pertains." Having been denied a certificate of eligibility, R.J.L. filed, in the circuit court, a "Petition to Expunge and for Other Relief." R.J.L. sought expungement of all criminal history record information in the custody of any criminal justice agency, a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the FDLE to issue the certificate of eligibility, and a declaration of his rights and an injunction requiring the State and FDLE to issue the certificate of eligibility.

The circuit court issued an order, requiring the FDLE to show cause as to why R.J.L.'s relief should not be granted. See State v. R.J.L., No. 53-9550-CF (Fla.Cir.Ct. Nov. 3, 2000). The FDLE complied, relying primarily upon section 943.0585(2)(e) of the Florida Statutes (1999), which imposes a condition on the issuance of a certificate of eligibility, namely that the individual seeking the certificate not have been adjudicated guilty of the criminal activity he or she wishes to have expunged, as R.J.L. admittedly was. The trial court, ruling in favor of the State, determined that the issuance of the pardon did not remove the historical fact that R.J.L. was convicted of kidnapping without ransom, and therefore, the FDLE properly denied R.J.L. a certificate of eligibility for expungement of his criminal history record.

R.J.L. timely filed a notice of appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. Shortly after R.J.L. filed his notice of appeal, the First District released its opinion in Randall. See Randall, 791 So.2d at 1238

. As detailed more fully below, the district court there held: "[W]hile a full pardon has the effect of removing all legal punishment for the offense and restoring one's civil rights, it does not wipe out either guilt or the fact of conviction." Id. at 1245. Relying upon its decision in Randall, the First District subsequently affirmed the decision of the trial court in the instant case. See R.J.L., 818 So.2d at 635.

Section 943.0585 of the Florida Statutes controls the expunction of nonjudicial criminal history records. See § 943.0585, Fla. Stat. (2000) ("Any court of competent jurisdiction may order a criminal justice agency to expunge the criminal history record of a minor or an adult who complies with the requirements of this section."). The statute creates certain requirements that must be met prior to records expunction, most notably that the person seeking to have his or her records expunged must apply to the FDLE for a certificate of eligibility. See id. ("The court shall not order a criminal justice agency to expunge a criminal history record until the person seeking to expunge a criminal history record has applied for and received a certificate of eligibility for expunction pursuant to subsection (2)."). The FDLE will not grant a certificate of eligibility unless the person seeking expungement can attest to certain facts. Section 943.0585(2) provides:

Certificate of eligibility for expunction. — Prior to petitioning the court to expunge a criminal history record, a person seeking to expunge a criminal history record shall apply to the department for a certificate of eligibility for expunction. The department shall ... establish procedures pertaining to the application for and issuance of certificates of eligibility for expunction. The department shall issue a certificate of eligibility for expunction to a person who is the subject of a criminal history record if that person:

....

(e) Has not been adjudicated guilty of, or adjudicated delinquent for committing, any of the acts stemming from the arrest or alleged criminal activity to which the petition to expunge pertains.

§ 943.0585(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).

We have previously held that section 943.0585 of the Florida Statutes, which mandates the issuance of a certificate of eligibility prior to the sealing of nonjudicial criminal history records, is constitutional and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See State v. D.H.W., 686 So.2d 1331, 1335 (Fla.1996)

. That conclusion was based, in part, on the recognition that "the courts' power to order the sealing of nonjudicial criminal history records not in the custody of the courts derives only from a legislative grant by statute." Id. Therefore, the Legislature can require that certain conditions, namely the issuance of a certificate of eligibility, must be met prior to the grant of a petition to seal a criminal history record. See id.

Based upon the reasoning expressed in D.H.W., we likewise hold that the Legislature can constitutionally require that a certificate of eligibility be issued prior to the expungement of nonjudicial criminal history records. See State v. Plotka, 689 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)

(extending our holding in D.H.W. to cases involving petitions to expunge nonjudicial criminal history records). In the instant case, R.J.L. was denied a certificate of eligibility because his record reflects that he has been adjudicated guilty of kidnapping without ransom, the criminal activity to which the petition to expunge pertains. We must now determine whether R.J.L.'s 1959 pardon acts to eliminate his adjudication of guilt, so as to entitle him to a certificate of eligibility for records expunction. We hold that it does not.

THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE FLORIDA DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

In 1992, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that a pardoned individual is eligible to have his criminal history records expunged. See Doe, 595 So.2d at 213

. Initially, it is important to note that Doe was decided on February 28, 1992, prior to the July 1992 revision of the expunction statute, which added the requirement that the FDLE must issue a certificate of eligibility prior to a person being able to obtain an expunction of nonjudicial criminal history records. See § 943.0585(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). However, both the current statute and the statute construed in Doe contain nearly identical language limiting the eligibility of those who may obtain an expunction. Under the current statute, a person will only qualify for a certificate of eligibility if he "[h]as not been adjudicated guilty of, or adjudicated delinquent for committing, any of the acts stemming from the arrest or alleged criminal activity to which the petition to expunge pertains." § 943.0585(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2002). Similarly, the earlier statute read: "The courts may order the sealing or expunction of any other criminal history record, provided ... [t]he person who is the subject of the record has not been adjudicated guilty of any of the charges stemming from...