Paisey v. VITALE, IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., 85-6160-Civ.
Decision Date | 22 April 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-6160-Civ.,85-6160-Civ. |
Citation | 634 F. Supp. 741 |
Parties | Timothy PAISEY, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Linda L. VITALE, a Judge of the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, In and For BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA; and Nova University, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Thomas F. Panza, Panza and Maurer, Raymond O. Holton, Jr., Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for Nova University.
James Peters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for Linda Vitale.
Feldman & Levy, P.A., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff/appellee.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss by Nova University, Inc., (DE 9), and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Paisey, (DE 21).
Interesting points of law are raised regarding the relationship between the federal courts and the state courts, as well as unusually thorny questions of private rights of action and effect of administrative regulations. Given the facts and circumstances, there is very little case law which guides us. Studying the cases provided by the parties and carrying out additional research which we thought could shed light on the issues, we felt like Moses wandering around the desert looking for a burning bush. Not being so fortunate as Moses, this Order represents our best humanly effort.
The facts in a capsulated form are: The plaintiff, Timothy Paisey, was a professor at Nova University. He is currently being sued by Nova in the state court for slander and defamation in connection with his affidavit which was used to support a charge of discrimination by a hispanic graduate student at Nova. The complaint in the case before this Court asks for 1) injunctive relief against the state court judge, Linda Vitale, to enjoin the ongoing state lawsuit, 2) damages against Nova for retaliation against Paisey by pursuing a state defamation action, and 3) damages against Nova for abuse of process in the course prosecuting the state action.
The complaint for injunctive relief against Vitale further asserts that "the action of the Honorable Linda L. Vitale is under color of State Law pursuant to the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is proscribed activity pursuant to that section as read in pari materia with 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (U.S.C. 2000(d))".
It is unclear from the complaint whether the plaintiff names Vitale for her role as a state official acting under color of state law for her unfavorable rulings in the state court defamation suit against Paisey or whether Paisey actually seeks to enjoin Nova from prosecuting its action in the state court. (See, E.E.O.C. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F.Supp. 640 (N.D.Ill.1981) ( ); E.E.O.C. v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F.Supp. 775 (W.D.Va.1980) ( ) If the plaintiff is seeking redress against the Judge herself, the cases say that no civil rights cause of action can be maintained against a judicial officer for actions taken under authority of his or her office. Such actions are barred by judicial immunity, and this principal is not in any way diminished by the Civil Rights Act. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Therefore, we must dismiss the cause of action against Vitale, and the style of the case shall be amended to so reflect.
No matter how the plaintiff has styled his plea for injunctive relief, it is clear that he comes to the federal court for rescue from the expense and hardship (and possible liability) resulting from the defamation action in the state court. Unfortunately, we have no buoy to toss to the plaintiff.
We have read Title VI cases, but have found no citations construing the effect of the anti-retaliation provision, 34 C.F.R. 100.7.1 Therefore, we have had to rely on analogous provisions such as those in employment discrimination cases brought by the E.E.O.C. under Title VII, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) which prohibits retaliation against an employee who has made a charge or participated in any manner in a proceeding or hearing before the E.E.O.C. Also, we have relied on general statements of policy by the Supreme Court in construing other uniquely federally regulated areas such as the National Labor Relations Act. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America Loc. 114, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966) ( ) Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loc. Eng., 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) ( ). See, also, Parsuns Steel Inc., et al v. First Alabama Bank, et al, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986). ("Indeed this case is similar to Atlantic Coast Line, in which we held that the various exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act did not permit a federal court to enjoin state proceedings in circumstances more threatening to federal jurisdiction than the circumstances of this case.")
Our research requires us to part company with the two district court cases that have been cited by the parties, E.E.O.C. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F.Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill.1981) and E.E.O.C. v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F.Supp. 775 (W.D. Va.1980). Those two cases have overlooked the prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 or are distinguishable from this case. We find that we cannot get around § 2283 by addressing the injunction to the defendant Nova in this action, the plaintiff in the state defamation case, and enjoining them from prosecution in the circuit court. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Loc. Eng., 398 U.S. 281, 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1743, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970). Nor can we sit in review of the actions taken in the state court. Atlantic, 90 S.Ct. at 1748 ()
The plaintiff has not cited to us any express authorization by Congress which creates an exception to the Anti Injunction Act. In E.E.O.C. v. Levi Strauss, the district court found that the Anti Injunction Act did not preclude an injunction under the circumstances of that case. 515 F.Supp. at 642. The court relied on an exception which permitted an injunction when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States itself, or a federal agency asserting "superior federal interest." As an alternative theory, the court also found that the facts of the case were beyond the reach of the Act since the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII created a uniquely federal right or remedy which could be given its intended scope only by enjoining the state proceeding. 515 F.Supp. at 642. We cannot apply that analysis here. First, we are not dealing with a government agency, but with a private plaintiff. Second, even the Levi court admitted that the Title VII provision did not preempt all state defamation proceedings. The Levi court stated that in order to get the injunction, the E.E.O.C. had to demonstrate that the state action was filed for a retaliatory purpose. We think that is a question of fact to be determined at a trial whether at the state or federal trial court level, and it is not a question that lends itself to resolution upon assertions of the parties.
The E.E.O.C. v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F.Supp. 775 (W.D.Va.1980) case is not controlling because in that case the Court found that the complaint in the state court was based solely on the allegations made by the defendant-employee to the Department of Labor and to the E.E. O.C. There was no other basis alleged for the state court suit. 495 F.Supp. at 776. Here, the defendants are alleging in their state action that Paisey engaged in malicious defamatory statements apart from his activities in connection with the complaint to the Department of Education. True or not, we think that Nova University is entitled to pursue this claim in the forum of their choice. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). These cases hold that the applicable federal statute was not intended to curtail state libel remedies. We are of the view that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and the regulations promulgated thereunder, specifically, 34 C.F.R. 100.7 must be construed the same way.
Accordingly, because of the prohibition of § 2283, and in view of the Supreme Court's pronouncements against federal district courts enjoining state...
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