Palethorpe v. Thomson, 33474
| Decision Date | 26 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 33474,33474 |
| Citation | 171 So.2d 526 |
| Parties | Percy PALETHORPE, as Tax Assessor, et al., Appellants, v. Leta THOMSON et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles D. McClure, Gen. Counsel for the Comptroller, and Willard Howatt, St. Augustine, for appellants.
Austin, Basford & Millar, and Albert S. C. Millar, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellees.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Johns Councy. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court under Article V, Section 4, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., because the chancellor in his final decree passed directly upon the validity of certain statutes and construed controlling provisions of the Florida Constitution.
The appellants, defendants below, are Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Percy Palethorpe, as Assessor of Taxes for St. Johns County, Florida, and R. D. Hill, as Tax Collector for St. Johns County.
Appellees, Leta Thomson, et al., plaintiffs below, instituted proceedings for declaratory decree, individually and as representatives for numerous owners of trailers which are variously referred to as trailer coaches, house trailers, or automobile trailers, used for housing accommodations in St. Johns County, to determine the validity of ad valorem tangible personal property tax assessments imposed by said Assessor upon the several trailer coaches or house trailers owned by the appellees, under and pursuant to Chapter 200, Florida Statutes, for the tax year 1963, and allege said Tax Assessor has threatened to impose the same taxes on said trailers for the tax year 1964, notwithstanding the exemption provisions of Sections 200.45 and 320.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and Section 13, Article IX, Florida Constitution. Section 200.45 reads as follows:
'200.45 Personal property tax; automobile trailers
'(1) There is hereby levied and assessed upon each automobile trailer that does not have a current year's Florida license tag thereupon the same amount that it assessed upon all other personal property within the county where such trailer is found to be.
'(2) The county tax assessor of the county wherein said trailer is found to be shall issue a certificate of valuation which shall be immediately conveyed to the tax collector of the county and the tax collector of such county shall collect the same within fifteen days from the date of such certificate of valuation and if same is not paid said automobile trailer is hereby made subject to levy and sale the same as any other delinquent personal property in the state, provided, however, that the owner of such trailer may purchase a Florida license tag for such trailer at any time prior to the issuance of such certificate of valuation, and the same shall operate to exempt such trailer from said ad valorem tax assessment.
'(3) If such certificate is issued before November first the tax rate thereupon shall be based upon the same as the previous year's rate.'
Section 320.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:
'320.081 License fees for trailer coaches and trailers used for housing accommodations
'(1) This section shall apply only to trailers and vehicles not self-propelled used for housing accommodations and known as trailer coaches.
'(3) It shall be permissible in this state to operate a trailer coach, licensed hereunder without a corresponding state license on the vehicle towing same.'
The appellants by their motions for summary decree and answer to the complaint admitted the material allegations of fact contained in the complaint of the appellees, but contended that the automobile house trailers (trailer coaches) described in the complaint are not 'motor vehicles' within the purview and contemplation of Section 13, Article IX, Florida Constitution, and that Sections 200.45 and 320.081, Florida Statutes, are violative of Sections 1 and 13, Article IX, Florida Constitution.
By his final decree the chancellor upheld the position of appellees and held Sections 200.45 and 320.081, Florida Statutes, valid and constitutional. The chancellor also imposed and taxed the costs incurred in this litigation against the appellants, which they contend is error.
Appellants argue that Section 1, Article IX, Florida Constitution, standing alone, would render Sections 200.45 and 320.081, Florida Statutes, invalid. Section 1, Article IX, requires that the Florida Legislature 'shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation * * * and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, exempting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.' Sections 200.45 and 320.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., are intended to exempt automobile trailers (trailer coaches) used for housing accommodations from the ad valorem taxes imposed under Chapter 200, Florida Statutes, if motor vehicle license tags have been purchased for said trailers by their owners. The Florida Constitution is a limitation on power and not a grant of power. Consequently, the Legislature cannot exempt from taxation any class of real or personal property which the Constitution itself makes no provision for exempting. See L. Maxcy, Inc., v. Federal Land Bank, 111 Fla. 116, 150 So. 248, 151 So. 276; State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131; State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 752, 2 So.2d 303.
Sections 200.45 and 320.081, F.S., can only be held constitutional--if at all--under Section 13, Article IX, Florida Constitution. Said Section 13, Article IX, provides that 'Motor Vehicles, as property, shall be subject to only one form of taxation which shall be a license tax for the operation of such motor vehicles, which license tax shall be in such amount and levied for such purpose as the Legislature may, by law, provide, and shall be in lieu of all ad valorem taxes assessable against motor vehicles as personal property.'
Appellees argue that their coach or house trailers are 'motor vehicles' within the purview of Section 13, Article IX. Appellants contend to the contrary and that F.S. Sections 200.45 and 320.081, F.S.A., are unconstitutional.
Historically, the long adhered to definitions of a motor vehicle appearing in the statutes and enunciated in the court decisions of our state and as understood by the public connote something other than a house trailer which is not self-propelled and is used primarily for housing accommodations. This can best be visualized by briefly outling the statutory definitions of motor vehicles and automobile trailers employed in our state from earliest to latest enactments along with pertinent judicial interpretations thereof.
We recognized the vagueness of statutory definitions of a motor vehicle in Gibbs v. Mayo, Fla., 81 So.2d 739. There, we stated that a 'motor vehicle is such a vehicle which is self-propelled.'
In Section 1280, Complied General Laws, 1927, the term 'motor vehicles' was defined as including 'motorcycles, automobiles, motor trucks, and all other vehicles operated over the public streets and highways of this State, and propelled by power other than muscular power, except traction engines, road rollers, and such vehicles as run only upon a track.' Without material change, this definition obtains today in F.S. Section 320.01(1), F.S.A. The same connotation appears in the definition of trailers in Section 320.01(5): '* * * vehicles coupled to, or drawn by, a motor vehicle.' In F.S. Section 317.011(57), F.S.A., a trailer is defined:
In F.S. Section 186.03(22), F.S.A., the Legislature defines a motor vehicle as follows:
F.S. Section 186.03(56), F.S.A., defines trailers as follows:
The exemption of F.S. Section 320.081, F.S.A., 'shall apply only to trailers and vehicles which are not self-propelled used for housing accommodations and known as trailer coaches.'
The substance of the foregoing definitions of 'motor vehicles' and 'trailers' obtained in 1930 when Section 13, Article IX became a part of the Florida Constitution. We cannot seriously entertain the view that the people of Florida when they adopted Section 13, Article IX, understood or intended to mean that coach or house trailers primarily devoted to housing accommodations were per se 'motor vehicles' under said constitutional provision.
Appellees rely upon our decisions in L. B. Smith Aircraft v. Green, Fla., 94 So.2d 832, and Wood v. Club Transportation Service, Inc., 143 Fla. 449, 196 So. 843, in support of their contentions.
In L. B. Smith Aircraft v. Green, supra, it is stated: 'The laws of this State treat aircraft...
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