Palk, Matter of
| Decision Date | 12 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 5576,5576 |
| Citation | 542 P.2d 361,56 Haw. 492 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Tax Appeal of Robert PALK, Taxpayer. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.
2. The plain and obvious meaning of HRS § 246-12 is that, upon dedication of land pursuant thereto, the landowner forfeits his right to use that land for any use, save and except the agricultural use under HRS § 246 -12(b), for the period stated in HRS § 246-12(c).
3. Technically, dedication (under HRS § 246-12) of a portion of the land upon which one lives, by operation of law, constricts one's home to the undedicated portion of that land for home exemption purposes (under HRS § 246-26).
Stanley E. Levin, Honolulu (Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, of counsel), for taxpayer-appellant.
Richard Y. Wade, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for Director of Taxation, appellee.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ.
Robert Palk (appellant) appeals from a judgment of the tax appeal court. The question on this appeal is whether land dedicated under HRS § 246-12, for 'specific ranching or other agricultural (purposes)', can be used concurrently as one's home and thus qualify for the property tax home exemption provided by HRS § 246-26. The tax appeal court concluded that the benefit of taxpayer's home exemption does not extend to land that has been dedicated. We affirm.
On August 21, 1967, the appellant filed a petition with the Director of Taxation (director) for dedication of a 2.5 acre parcel of land (parcel or land) for 'private, noncommercial agricultural use' pursuant to HRS § 246-12. Appellant lived on the parcel and had been using most of it to produce agricultural products for personal consumption.
The director approved the dedication of 2.386 acres of appellant's land but would not accept the remaining .114 acre which the director designated as appellant's 'homesite'.
Subsequently, appellant's parcel was assessed on two different bases for real property tax purposes. In tax year 1972, for example, the portion of appellant's land designated by the director as 'homesite' was assessed as such at $6652 per acre, and the remaining 2.386 acres were assessed as agricultural land at $1750 per acre. More importantly, the director limited the application of appellant's § 246-26 home exemption only to the portion of the parcel designated as appellant's 'homesite'; the dedicated portion was deemed unqualified for the exemption.
In 1972 the appellant was 77 years of age.
In the instant case, the appellant's home exemption exceeded the total assessed value of his 2.5 acre parcel of land. 1 However, appellant was able to apply the home exemption only to the undedicated portion of his parcel of land. The director refused to allow application of appellant's home exemption to the dedicated portion of the parcel of land.
On September 12, 1972, appellant filed a Notice of Real Property Tax Appeal with the Board of Review for the First Taxation District. His principal objection was that the director denied him application of his multiple home exemption to the dedicated portion of his land. While the case was pending, the director increased the 'Homesite' from .114 acre to .250 acre. This increase in 'homesite' reduced appellant's tax by including more of his land under the multiple exemption but still left him with some tax liability.
The Board of Review rendered a decision on May 7, 1973, affirming the director's position that appellant's multiple home exemption did not apply to the dedicated portion of his land. On appeal, the tax appeal court sustained the decision of the Board of Review.
Appellant appeals to this court. His principal contentions are that:
1. The tax appeal court's decision conflicts with the legislative intent to make § 246-12 complementary to the existing real property tax structure so as to encourage dedication of land;
2. The term 'entire homestead' in HRS § 246-27 includes land dedicated for agricultural purposes and used as taxpayer's home, and so, dedicated land is still subject to the taxpayer's home exemption if it so qualified prior to dedication.
§ 246-12 Dedicated lands. (a) A special land reserve is established to enable the owner of any parcel of land within an agricultural district, a rural district, a conservation district, or an urban district to dedicate his land for a specific ranching or other agricultural use and to have his land assessed at its value in such use . . .
(b) If any owner desires to use his land for a specific ranching or other agricultural use and to have his land assessed at its value in this use, he shall so petition the director of taxation and declare in his petition that his land can best be used for the purpose for which he requests permission to dedicate his land and that if his petition is approved he will use his land for this purpose.
(c) The approval by the director of taxation of the petition to dedicate shall constitute a forfeiture on the part of the owner of any right to change the use of his land for a minimum period of ten years, automatically renewable indefinitely, subject to cancellation by either the owner or the director of taxation upon five years' notice at any time after the end of the fifth year. In case of a change in major land use classification by a state agency, such that the owner's land is placed within an urban district, the dedication may be cancelled within sixty days of the change, without the five years' notice, by mutual agreement of the owner and the director of taxation.
(d) Failure of the owner to observe the restrictions on the use of his land shall cancel the special tax assessment privilege retroactive to the date of the petition, and all differences in the amount of taxes that were paid and those that would have been due from assessment in the higher use shall be payable with a five per cent a year penalty from the respective dates that these payments would have been due. . . . (Emphasis added.)
§ 246-26 Homes. (a) Real property owned and occupied only as his or their home by any individual or individuals, shall be exempt only to the following extent from property taxes:
(1) Totally exempt where the value of the property is not in excess of $8,000;
(2) Where the value of such property is in excess of $8,000, the exemption shall be the amount of $8,000.
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(b) The use of a portion of any building or structure for the purpose of drying coffee and the use of a portion of real property, including structures, in connection with the planting and growing for commercial purposes, or the packing and processing for such purposes, of flowers, plants, or foliage, shall not affect the exemptions provided for by this section.
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(d) A taxpayer who is sixty years of age or over and who qualifies under subsection 246-26(a) shall be entitled to one of the following multiples of home exemption:
Multiple to be Used in
Age of Taxpayer Computing Home Exemption
----------------------- ------------------------
60 years of age or
over but not 70 years
of age or over 2.0
70 years of age or over 2.5
For the purpose of this subsection, a husband and wife who own property jointly on which a home exemption under the provisions of subsection (a) has been granted shall be entitled to the applicable multiple of home exemption set forth above when at least one of the spouses qualifies each year for the applicable multiple of home exemption.
C. HRS § 246-27 Home, lease, lessees defined (Supp.1974), states in part: 'For the purpose of section 246-26, the word 'home' includes: (1) The entire homestead when it is occupied by the taxpayer as such.'
OPINIONIt is well established that 'where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.' State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610, 614, 525 P.2d 586, 590 (1974); Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Hasegawa, 54 Haw. 563, 512 P.2d 1 (1973); Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 52 Haw. 577, 482 P.2d 151 (1971).
In our opinion that relevant provisions of HRS §§ 246-12, 246-26, and 246-27 are plain, clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, though we sympathize with appellant's dilemma, we fail to see, upon the literal application of the provisions of the statutes, any absurd or unjust result, which is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statutes. 2
Part of the relevant provisions of HRS § 246-12 provides as follows: Subsection (c), 'The approval by the director of taxation of the petition to dedicate shall constitute a forfeiture on the part of the owner of any right to change the use of his land . . .'; Subsection (d), 'Failure of the owner to observe the restrictions on the use of his land shall cancel the special tax assessment privilege retroactive to the date of the petition . . ..' Together these provisions make clear the legal effect of dedication upon appellant's rights concerning use of his dedicated land.
Accordingly, appellant in his attempt to take advantage of...
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