Pankey v. Webster
| Decision Date | 02 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-5071-CV-SW-8.,92-5071-CV-SW-8. |
| Citation | 816 F. Supp. 553 |
| Parties | V. Marvalene PANKEY, as an Individual and Power of Attorney for Stacy M. Simpson, Plaintiff, v. William L. WEBSTER, Attorney General of the State of Missouri; State of Missouri; William Roberts, The Honorable Circuit Judge of Bates County, Missouri; William Crawford, The Honorable Circuit Judge of Jasper County; Hugh Jenkins, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
V. Marvalene Pankey, pro se.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Missouri Atty. Gen.'s Office, Jefferson City, MO, pro se and for State of Mo.
Defendants Roberts, Crawford & Jenkins not represented and made no answer.
On behalf of herself and as "power of attorney" sic for Stacy M. Simpson,1 Plaintiff V. Marvalene Pankey brings this action against Missouri Attorney General William L. Webster, Missouri Circuit Court Judges William Roberts and William Crawford, and Bates County Prosecutor Hugh Jenkins. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the case is now before the court on plaintiff's application to proceed informa pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
While plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis was pending in the instant case, the court learned that a nearly identical case was dismissed as frivolous by the Honorable Elmo B. Hunter. See Pankey v. Webster, et al., No. 92-1019-CV-W-8 ().2 That case also was filed by plaintiff Pankey. A comparison of the two files, and a review of Judge Hunter's order and the relevant legal principles, convinced this court that the present case also should be dismissed. Accordingly, in an order dated December 29, 1992, the court ordered plaintiff either to dismiss this case voluntarily or appear and show cause why this case should not be dismissed. In addition, the court notified plaintiff that her conduct might warrant the imposition of sanctions. Stacy Simpson Moran and her retained counsel, John P. O'Connor, were invited to appear at the hearing, and all parties were authorized to make relevant filings in connection with this matter.
The show cause hearing was held on January 15, 1993. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that this case is frivolous, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), ordered the case to be dismissed, and permanently enjoined plaintiff V. Marvalene Pankey from filing any complaint, pleading, or motion on behalf of Stacy Simpson Moran.
This order follows the court's oral ruling at the January 15, 1993 hearing.
The following facts are provided for context. On September 5, 1985, the Missouri courts certified Stacy Simpson to stand trial as an adult for the shooting death of her mother, Gail Simpson. Simpson v. Camper, 743 F.Supp. 1342, 1343-44 (W.D.Mo.1990) (Hunter, J.), appeal held in abeyance, 927 F.2d 392 (8th Cir.1991), vacated, 974 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.1992) (). At that time, Stacy Simpson was fourteen years old. Id. at 1344. A year later, at age fifteen, Stacy Simpson filed an Alford plea to manslaughter charges pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. Id. The Missouri courts subsequently denied Stacy Simpson's motion to withdraw her plea, and sentenced her to eleven years incarceration on November 3, 1986. Id.
In 1990, Judge Hunter, presiding over Division 3 of this court, conditionally granted Stacy Simpson's petition for habeas corpus, set aside her conviction, ordered the State of Missouri to allow her to withdraw her Alford plea, and granted the state sixty days to bring Stacy Simpson to trial on the original charges. Id. at 1353. At the time of January 15, 1993 hearing in the present case, the state had allowed Stacy Simpson Moran to withdraw her plea and was preparing to try her for first-degree murder. On February 3, 1993, Stacy Simpson Moran was acquitted of that charge by a jury in the Circuit Court for Jasper, Missouri. Donald Bradley, Acquittal Resolves '85 Slaying Case, K.C. Star, Feb. 4, 1993, at A1.
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff V. Marvalene Pankey brings this action on behalf of herself and as "power of attorney" for Stacy Simpson Moran. The named defendants are William L. Webster "as Mo. Atty General and czar of Mo.'s fourth branch of government," Compl. at 1, Missouri Circuit Court Judges William Crawford and William Roberts, and Bates County Prosecutor Hugh Jenkins. Plaintiff claims the defendants have deliberately refused to indict the actual killers of Gail Simpson, imprisoned Stacy Simpson Moran for her mother's murder, and have continued to insist that Stacy Simpson Moran "must prove her innocence or forever take the wrap sic for her father's crime." Id. at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that the purpose of the present action is to protect plaintiff's own life and property; to protect Stacy Simpson Moran from her father and from the defendants; to avoid further criminal prosecution of Stacy Simpson Moran; and to "protect the lives of others, unknown, harmed by the possible continued violence and/or drug supplying of Frank Lee Simpson who is Stacy Simpson Moran's father and his associates." Id. at 4.
Plaintiff seeks a variety of relief, including a preliminary injunction ordering the state and Bates County Prosecutor Hugh Jenkins to stay all further action in the criminal case against Stacy Simpson Moran. Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction ordering the defendants to: (1) assign a special prosecutor to the Gail Simpson murder case; (2) indict and prosecute Frank Lee Simpson and others named by Stacy Simpson Moran as her mother's murderer(s); (3) complete "all investigation, indictment, and prosecution of the killer(s) of Gail Simpson within 180 days" of the issuance of the injunction; and (4) assemble a grand jury to investigate "possible coverups of crimes, denial of full due process, and drug related activities" in Bates and Jasper Counties. Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for costs connected with this lawsuit and other litigation. Id. at 4-5.
Before discussing the court's substantive rulings, it is necessary to record the court's disposition of a number of matters during the January 15, 1992 hearing.
First, the court denied plaintiff's "Application to Disqualify Biased/Prejudiced Judge." The court also denied plaintiff's accompanying request that this case be assigned to a federal district judge from a state other than Missouri, who was appointed by a Democratic president, who is not a member of the Missouri Bar Association or the Free Masons, and who is fundamentally fair.
Second, the court denied plaintiff's second motion for a continuance. It should be noted that the court granted plaintiff's first motion for a continuance in an order dated January 8, 1992.
Third, the court held in abeyance, and ultimately denied, plaintiff's request for the issuance of a number of subpoenas.
Fourth, the court notes that it "grants" plaintiff's "Demand for Consideration of Letters and Motions, Etc. Submitted By Members of the Public in Regards to this Matter." The court did not rule on plaintiff's "demand" during the January 15, 1993 hearing. However, the court has reviewed the materials submitted by various citizens in connection with this case, including the "Petition that this Court Listen Seriously to Marvalene Pankey and Her Call for Truth and Justice" submitted by Charlotte Vogel.
Fifth, the court seeks to reassure plaintiff that while she was not allowed to read her lengthy "Response to the Order to Show Cause" into the record during the hearing, her Response has been filed, reviewed by the court, and is part of the record for appeal.
Finally, the court directs the clerk to send a copy of this order to plaintiff at the following address:
V. Marvalene Pankey c/o Box 154 Willard, Missouri 65781
The Montrose, Missouri address listed on plaintiff's complaint and application for in forma pauperis status are no longer valid.
Plaintiff claims that she cannot afford to pay the fees and costs associated with filing a complaint in federal court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may grant a plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs if the plaintiff is indigent. See id. § 1915(a); Local Rule 9. However, the court may also dismiss a case if the plaintiff's "allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). "Frivolous" complaints are those which "lack an arguable basis in law or fact" because they contain "inarguable legal conclusions" or "fanciful factual allegations." Id.
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the hearing and the materials now before it, the court finds that the present action is frivolous and that this case should be dismissed because: (1) plaintiff's claims lack an arguable basis in fact; (2) plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations are patently without merit; (3) plaintiff is utterly without standing to pursue this action; and (4) federal statutory and decisional law prohibits the court from granting plaintiff the relief she requests.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), a court may dismiss a complaint that contains factual contentions that are clearly baseless and describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke at 324, 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1831, 1833.
The gist of plaintiff's complaint is that the defendants have unlawfully refused to indict and punish Frank Lee Simpson for the murder of his wife, and instead have wrongfully punished Stacy Simpson Moran for the crime. Plaintiff alleges that this state of affairs is the result of a conspiracy of lawyers. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that former...
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