Pannell v. Jones

• Decision Date: 26 March 1975
• Citation: 36 N.Y.2d 339,329 N.E.2d 159,368 N.Y.S.2d 467
• Parties: , 329 N.E.2d 159 In the Matter of Samuel A. PANNELL et al., Respondents, v. Howard A. JONES, as Chairman of the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of William L. BALL, Respondent, v. Howard A. JONES, as Chairman of the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 467

368 N.Y.S.2d 467

36 N.Y.2d 339, 329 N.E.2d 159

In the Matter of Samuel A. PANNELL et al., Respondents, v. Howard A. JONES, as Chairman of the Narcotic Addiction

Control Commission, et al., Appellants.

In the Matter of William L. BALL, Respondent, v. Howard A. JONES, as Chairman of the Narcotic Addiction

Control Commission, et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 26, 1975.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Frederick R. Walsh and Jean M. Coon, Albany, of counsel), for appellants.

Herman Schwartz and Edward I. Koren, Amherst, for respondents.

BREITEL, Chief Judge.

The issue on these consolidated appeals in two separate CPLR article 78 proceedings is whether a person certified and committed for treatment as a narcotic addict who has been released as an 'outpatient' is entitled to a full due process hearing, including the assistance of counsel, before outpatient status may be revoked.

The first appeal involves Victor Young who had joined as petitioner with Samuel A. Pannell and Larry Lynch. Both Pannell and Lynch are no longer parties to that proceeding. The second appeal involves William Lee Ball who is an original petitioner in a separate proceeding.

The Supreme Court held in each case that petitioner, as a certified narcotic addict released as an outpatient, was entitled to a hearing and the assistance of counsel before he could be reconfined. The Appellate Division affirmed.

There should be an affirmance in the Young matter and a modification in the Ball matter with respect to the right to counsel. The due process required in criminal prosecutions has limited application to the drug addiction program, the only proper purpose of which is treatment of the addict. Where revocation of outpatient status is based upon conduct or other factors unequivocally suggesting a medical need for reconfinement then the addict is entitled only to notice of the reasons for revocation and an opportunity to be heard. Where revocation is based upon conduct or other factors which, on their face, do not suggest unequivocally a medical need for reconfinement then there must be a preliminary as well as a final revocation hearing with the assistance of counsel.

The extent of due process of the law does not depend upon the label, that is, whether civil or criminal, attached to State action which deprives a person of liberty or some other substantial personal or property interest (see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22--27, 49--52, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Matter of James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 552--553, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531, 536--537, 240 N.E.2d 29, 32--33). Equally true, is that due process is a flexible concept and the procedural protection required, it has been said, will vary depending upon the governmental function involved as well as the substantiality of individual interests affected (see Morrissey v. Brewer,408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 57--59, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19--21, 312 N.E.2d 158, 160--161; People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 303, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21).

In People v. Fuller (supra) this court recognized that treatment of disease was the purpose of the drug addiction control program and that, consequently, all of the procedural safeguards required in criminal prosecutions did not apply with equal force to addiction certification (p. 303, 300 N.Y.S.2d p. 107, 248 N.E.2d p. 21). In particular, the Fuller case held that an addict's statement to an examining physician, made in the absence of counsel, was admissible at the commitment hearing and, even more significant, that addiction may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt (compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470--475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361--364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368).

That revocation of a certified addict's aftercare status parallels, to some degree, parole revocation, cannot be doubted. There is, however, nothing in the record to suggest that the reconfinement for treatment as an addict is in effect punishment rather than medical treatment. The difference between the purposes of imprisonment for crime and rehabilitative confinement for narcotic addiction, however, allow for different and less restrictive procedure when outpatient status is sought to be revoked (see People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 302--303, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21, Supra).

Revocation of outpatient status should, of course, be based only upon considerations relevant to treatment of the addict. Such considerations are many and will vary in relevance depending upon the individual addict and his case history. There may be unequivocal conduct or circumstances indicating that the patient has lapsed into bad habits or surroundings which require reconfinement to allow for proper treatment or control. On the other hand, conduct or circumstances unrelated to narcotic addiction or the susceptibility to readdiction may make reconfinement unjust or even a devious mode to punish for crime without conviction.

When an outpatient's conduct, or external factors,...