Pannell v. Thompson

• Citation: 589 P.2d 1235,91 Wn.2d 591
• Decision Date: 01 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 45684,45684
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles PANNELL, Delorise Davis, Genevieve Cotherman and Mary and Darrel Zumwalt on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Gerald THOMPSON, Secretary Department of Social & Health Services, State of Washington, Respondent.

Page 591

91 Wn.2d 591

589 P.2d 1235

Charles PANNELL, Delorise Davis, Genevieve Cotherman and Mary and Darrel Zumwalt on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Gerald THOMPSON, Secretary Department of Social & Health

Services, State of Washington, Respondent.

No. 45684.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Feb. 1, 1979.

Evergreen Legal Services, Gerald R. Tarutis Patrick H. McIntyre, Anthony Lee, Seattle, for appellants.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Walter F. White, Richard A. Mattsen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Social and Health Services, Olympia, for respondent.

STAFFORD, Justice.

This class action was submitted to the trial court by affidavit and documentary evidence only. The class has appealed from a judgment dismissing their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Appellants have not assigned error to any finding of fact, consequently, the unchallenged findings become established facts of the case. Lakeside Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Austin Constr. Co., 89 Wash.2d 839, 842, 576 P.2d 392 (1978). The findings and those facts upon which the parties appear to agree in their briefs indicate that appellants brought this action for declaratory judgment to prevent respondent Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) from implementing a proposed reduction in payments made under a "non-continuing" general assistance program (GAN).

The GAN program is an exclusively state-funded and state-administered plan of "non-continuing" general assistance for unemployed employable persons. Recipients of GAN funds must have exhausted all private nonexempt or public resources and must have applied for all other public benefits. WAC 388-37- 230. They also must have registered for employment with the Employment Security Department, must meet work registration and work search requirements and must accept bona fide employment offers. WAC 388-27-215(3)(7). Applicants are certified for a fixed period of time at the expiration of which they must reestablish eligibility as a new applicant. In most cases the certification period is 2 weeks although it may extend to 30 days. At trial it generally was agreed that approximately 5,000 persons a month received GAN payments. The GAN program is to be distinguished from "continuing" assistance programs under which recipients remain eligible until some change in circumstances results in termination (E. g., Aid to Family with Dependent Children).

Prior to August 1977 GAN recipients were provided between $53-$60 a month from the Basic GAN assistance appropriation. Proportionately higher amounts were authorized depending upon the number of recipients in a household. For the 1977-79 biennium, however, the Legislature specifically earmarked an Additional $6,090,000 to permit Increases in GAN payments above the amount provided in the Basic appropriation. Laws of 1977, 1st Ex.Sess ch. 339, § 57(7) p. 1444 (hereinafter § 57(7)). Pursuant to § 57(7) DSHS Increased the allowance from the Basic amount of $53-$60 funded under the Basic appropriation to $201-$212 per month. As with the Basic GAN payments, proportionately higher amounts were authorized based upon the number of recipients in a household. Significantly, however, the § 57 appropriation of funds for GAN Increases contained the following specific limitations:

The Appropriations contained in this section shall be subject to the following conditions and limitations :

(7) Not more than $6,090,000 shall be expended to provide increases in non-continuing general assistance grants.

(Italics ours.)

The trial court's oral opinion appears to bear out appellants' contention that both the Legislature and DSHS were aware $6,090,000 would be insufficient to support the Increase in GAN payments for the entire biennium. Some legislators thought the Legislature could reconsider the matter when the Governor called it into extraordinary session. However, the Governor did not call a special session and thus the Legislature was not able to consider whether additional funds should be appropriated to continue further support for the Increased GAN payment.

As might have been expected, the $6,090,000 appropriated for GAN grant Increases was fully expended well before the end of the biennium. When the funds allotted for such increased grants had been expended completely, the Governor directed DSHS to file Administrative Order 1316 with the Code Reviser. The order, filed July 17, 1978, reestablished the GAN grant levels in effect prior to the appropriation authorizing the Increase (I. e., between $53-$60). Based upon the total depletion of the $6,090,000, Administrative Order 1316 was characterized as an "emergency" order to take effect immediately as authorized by RCW 34.04.030. ¹ The DSHS statement in support of the alleged "emergency" asserted that the amount appropriated under § 57, for increases in GAN payments, had been depleted.

On July 17, 1978, appellants filed the instant class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Initially the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. However, after a hearing on the merits, the trial judge dismissed appellants' case with prejudice, dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Appellants' motion for a direct accelerated review by this court was granted. We affirm the trial court as modified herein.

In their opening brief, appellants assert the State has a constitutional duty to provide them with the Increased GAN payments, citing Const. art. 8, § 7. However, since they expressly abandon the claim in their reply brief, we decline to consider the issue further. Similarly, appellants appear to contend they have a "vested" statutory "right" to a continuation of GAN grants at the increased levels. This claim also was abandoned in their reply brief and therefore will not be considered.

Appellants now assert a statutory "entitlement" to the increased GAN funds which they assert stems from RCW 74.08.040 which provides in pertinent part:

For general assistance to Unemployed employable persons, the department Shall establish standards of assistance based upon annual living cost studies and Compatible with a minimum necessary for decent and healthful subsistence. Such standards shall permit the meeting of actual and emergent need on an individual basis.

(Italics ours.) They urge that the $53-$60 furnished them under the Basic GAN allowance fails to comply with RCW 74.08.040 in that it is not "compatible with a minimum necessary for decent and healthful subsistence" and does not meet "actual and emergent need on an individual basis."

No one appears to argue seriously that the Basic GAN payments of $53-$60 are sufficient to provide necessary subsistence for a single person. Clearly the grant levels under the basic GAN appropriation do not comply with the statement of need in RCW 74.08.040. Based on this fact appellants argue that DSHS is mandated to reinstate the Increased GAN allowance. They assert that additional GAN funds may be obtained from either of two sources (1) transfer of money from other DSHS controlled appropriations, citing Laws of 1977, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 339, § 51(7) p. 1438 (hereinafter § 51(7)) or, (2) a court order that DSHS must obtain, from the Governor or Legislature, the funds necessary to support the program at levels provided in RCW 74.08.040. We do not agree with either argument.

First, in light of the applicable legislation, any attempt to transfer funds from other DSHS programs to support Increased payments under the GAN program would have placed the Secretary in the unenviable position of potentially violating a specific legislative mandate. Despite a General legislative directive contained in § 51(7) authorizing DSHS to transfer up to $10 million among its programs and a General legislative directive in Laws of 1977, 1st Ex.Sess, ch. 339, § 51(5), p. 1438 (hereinafter § 51(5)), prohibiting rateable reductions in grant payments, there is a Specific directive applicable strictly to Increased GAN funds which places a specific limitation on the expenditure of those funds. It provides that Not more than $6,090,000 is to be expended on increases in GAN grant levels. § 57(7). Clearly there is an inconsistency between the General authorization for transfer of funds among DSHS- programs, the General directive against rateable reductions, and the Specific limitation placed upon the expenditure of Increased GAN funds in the GAN program. However, a basic rule of statutory construction reconciles this apparent inconsistency. When there is a conflict between one statutory provision which treats a subject in a General way and another which treats the same subject in a Specific manner, the Specific statute will prevail. Olson v. University of Washington, 89 Wash.2d 558, 562, 573 P.2d 1308 (1978); Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash.2d 441, 536 P.2d 157 (1975); Johnston v. Beneficial Man. Corp., 85 Wash.2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975); Knowles v. Holly, 82 Wash.2d 694, 513 P.2d 18 (1973); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.05 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). Consequently, the Specific limitation on expenditure of increased GAN funds to $6,090,000 prevails over the General authorization to transfer funds among DSHS programs and the General prohibition against rateable reductions.

An unchallenged finding of fact declared that the funds appropriated for increased GAN payments had been totally expended, I. e., the specific statutory limitation of § 57(7) had been reached. Because this specific limitation was reached, No further funds could be expended although funds remained in other DSHS programs and possibly in the Governor's emergency appropriation fund. In short, only an amendment of legislative authorization can correct the insufficient funding in light of the Legislature's own specific limitation on the specific appropriation for GAN grant increases.

Appellants...