Pantoja v. Holland Motor Exp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-2658,90-2658
• Parties: 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2718, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,298, 7 IER Cases 1048 Joseph PANTOJA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLLAND MOTOR EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 323

965 F.2d 323

140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2718, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,298,

7 IER Cases 1048

Joseph PANTOJA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLLAND MOTOR EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 90-2658.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 17, 1991.

Decided June 3, 1992.

Dennis Carlson (argued), Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lynne R. Ostfeld, Cowen, Crowley & Nord, Chicago, Ill. and A. Read Cone, III (argued), Dean & Fulkerson, Troy, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Pantoja, a member of Teamsters Local Union No. 705 in Chicago, sued Holland Motor Express, Inc. (Holland), alleging that Holland's refusal to rehire him after he was involved in a trucking accident violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union and amounted to a retaliatory discharge under Illinois tort law. The district court granted Holland summary judgment on both claims, finding that the CBA claim was time barred and that Pantoja could not prove a retaliatory discharge because he failed to demonstrate that his termination violated any clearly mandated public policy of the State of Illinois. Pantoja next filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider, and the court granted it, in order that it might review its decision as to the applicable statute of limitations on the CBA claim. After a hearing on the issue, the court found that Pantoja was actually making a "hybrid" claim--one alleging both that the employer violated the CBA and that the union did not fulfill its duty of fair representation. Noting that a six-month statute of limitations applies to such claims, the court concluded that Pantoja's complaint was untimely because he filed his claim more than six months after it accrued and had been unable to prove any tolling of the limitations period. The Court thus reaffirmed the grant of summary judgment for Holland. Pantoja appeals, contending that summary judgment was improper as to each claim. We affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Joseph Pantoja was a "casual" truck driver for Holland, meaning he was hired out of the union hall on a day-to-day basis. On May 30, 1985, Pantoja was working for Holland when another truck unexpectedly backed into his truck while it was parked at a rest stop. Pantoja reported this accident to Holland and to Illinois police, as required by state law. Holland's company policy was that it would cease to employ "non-seniority" employees, including casuals, after they were involved in an accident, regardless of fault. As a result, it stopped hiring Pantoja.

As a casual employee, Pantoja was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between Teamsters Local 705 and Holland. Pursuant to the CBA, Pantoja filed a grievance with Local 705, hoping to have Holland "rehire" him. The matter went to a hearing, and the Local Grievance Committee found in favor of Pantoja, stating that "Tomorrow morning when the company calls for drivers, they will call Mr. Pantoja." Holland ignored this decision and stuck by its policy; it did not call Pantoja on the next day or any other day. The union, in turn, took no action to enforce the Grievance Committee's decision or have the plaintiff rehired.

When Holland refused to hire him as ordered, Pantoja filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), accusing the company of committing an unfair labor practice by discriminating against him for engaging in union activities, namely, for filing the grievance. See 29 U.S.C. § 158. The NLRB Regional Director refused to issue a complaint on this charge, and the General Counsel of the NLRB denied Pantoja's appeal. Some four months later, on October 30, 1985, a frustrated Pantoja wrote a letter to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the legal counsel for Local 705, and Louis Geick, secretary-treasurer of Local 705 and president of Joint Council 25, asking them to force the union to make Holland comply with the decision of the Grievance Committee. He received no response to the letter.

Sixteen months later, in March of 1987, Pantoja filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Holland removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment. As construed by the district court, the complaint alleged three causes of action. First, that Holland's refusal to rehire Pantoja violated the CBA. Second, that Holland chose not to rehire him because he had filed a grievance against it, a discriminatory act and an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). ¹ 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. Third, that Holland's refusal to rehire him, either because he had been in an accident or because it chose to disobey the Grievance Committee's decision, was contrary to Illinois public policy and therefore amounted to a retaliatory discharge. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Holland on all three claims. As to the CBA claim, it found that a six-month statute of limitations applied, citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Without discussing accrual or tolling, the court held that the claim was time barred. The court also rejected the unfair labor practice claim under the NLRA, noting that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision because the General Counsel of the NLRB had issued a final order in the case, and such orders may only be reviewed by federal courts of appeal. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Turning finally to the retaliatory discharge allegation, the court observed that Illinois only recognizes a cause of action for this tort when the discharge violates a "clearly mandated public policy." Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill.2d 520, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 630, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (1985). Pantoja argued that Holland violated such a policy in two ways: by ignoring the Grievance Committee's direction to rehire him, and by refusing to rehire him simply because he had been in an accident, even though he was not at fault. The district court did not believe that Illinois had a "clearly mandated public policy" preventing Holland from discharging Pantoja for either of these reasons, and so granted summary judgment.

Pantoja then filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider. The court granted this motion in order to review its decision as to the statute of limitations on the CBA claim. The court was concerned that this may have been a direct action against Holland, rather than a "hybrid" claim against both Holland and the union as it had assumed. Had it been a direct claim, a different limitations period would apply. As it turns out, the court's fears were unfounded. Relying on Pantoja's "latest brief" as asserting that the union failed to represent him fairly, the court decided that his claim was indeed a hybrid, subject to the six-month limitations period. Though Pantoja never formally amended his complaint to make a claim against the union, the court said that this formality was unnecessary, because it would construe the complaint on file as stating a claim against the union. In doing so the court actually did Pantoja a favor, as he needed to make a claim against the union in order to have standing to sue. ² The court next found that Pantoja's claim accrued, at the latest, on October 30, 1985, when he wrote the letter to union leaders. Statements in this letter revealed that Pantoja either knew or strongly suspected that the union would not pursue his claim further, and thus had breached its duty of fair representation. Once aware of this, he had no reason to delay bringing suit. Further, the court held that the limitations period was not tolled at any time between October 30, 1985 and the filing of the complaint on March 9, 1987. Thus, the court found that the claim was untimely and again entered summary judgment in Holland's favor.

II. ISSUES

This appeal raises two main issues. First, was the CBA claim barred by the statute of limitations, or was the limitations period tolled by the pursuit of internal union remedies? Second, was there any genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a state law claim for retaliatory discharge? ³ We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is proper when no issues of material fact remain, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When a party makes a properly supported motion, the non-movant must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR HYBRID CLAIMS UNDER § 301

The complaint alleged that Holland violated the CBA by refusing to use Pantoja even after being directed to do so by the Grievance Committee, whose rulings on disputes between Holland and the union were to be "final and binding" under the terms of the CBA. The district court also interpreted the complaint as charging the union with breaching its duty of fair representation by neglecting to attempt to enforce the Grievance Committee's decision and have Pantoja reinstated. It is well settled that a six month limitations period applies to hybrid claims under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Sosbe v. Delco Electronics Div. of General Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.1987). Pantoja filed his complaint on March 9, 1987, so the question here is whether his claim accrued within the six months prior to this date, or, if not, whether the limitations period was tolled so as to make the complaint timely. As to accrual, we have held that "[t]he six-month period begins to run 'when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of...