Pardes v. Pardes

• Decision Date: 27 October 2021
• Docket Number: 3D19-2406
• Parties: Jill Pardes, etc., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Andria Pardes, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Jill Pardes, etc., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Andria Pardes, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 3D19-2406

Florida Court of Appeals, Third District

October 27, 2021

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lower Tribunal No. 14-10507 Stanford Blake, Voluntary Trial Resolution Judge.

Law Offices of Paul Morris, P.A., and Paul Morris; Law Offices of Kornreich & Assoc., and Gerald Kornreich and Amber Kornreich; Cotzen Law, P.A., and Michael Cotzen, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Barry S. Franklin & Associates, P.A., and Barry S. Franklin for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before EMAS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.

EMAS J.

INTRODUCTION

Jill Pardes, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Pardes ("Former Husband")^[1] appeals the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Andria Pardes ("Former Wife") cross-appeals the same final judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties, who have no minor children, were married for thirty-three years and, during the course of the marriage separated several times and twice filed petitions for dissolution. During their separations, the parties entered into several postnuptial agreements addressing their substantial assets. Following a five-day nonjury trial held before voluntary trial resolution judge Stanford Blake ^[2] the trial court issued the final judgment which is the subject of this appeal and cross-appeal.

Former Husband asserts the trial court erred in: 1) failing to reimburse him for monies paid toward monthly household expenses, which Former Wife was contractually obligated to pay; 2) finding Former Husband breached one of the postnuptial agreements by failing to disclose to Former Wife an investment in a company called Crystal Bay (the "Crystal Bay Investment"); and 3) determining the residence at 584 Ocean Boulevard ("the Ocean Boulevard Residence") was nonmarital property of Former Wife.

Former Wife asserts the trial court erred in: 1) failing to include, in the calculation of Former Husband's net worth, an investment known as the "Stargate Mobile Investment"; 2) reimbursing Former Husband for monies he spent improving the Ocean Boulevard Residence; and 3) awarding certain artwork ("the Tremblay artwork") to Former Husband.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's final judgment in all respects, except for the award of the Tremblay artwork to Former Husband.

ANALYSIS

A. Former Husband's Claims

1. Did the trial court err in failing to credit Former Husband for monies he paid toward monthly household expenses which Former Wife was contractually obligated to pay?

According to Former Husband, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement in 2002 (the "2002 House Agreement") which required Former Wife to pay $2800 monthly toward household expenses on the couple's marital home in Golden Beach (the "Golden Beach House"). Former Husband contends that because Former Wife failed to pay those expenses (thus requiring Former Husband to do so), the trial court erred in failing to credit Former Husband for those amounts.

Former Wife countered that 1) the parties subsequently agreed she would not have to pay the monthly household expense amount; and 2) the 2002 House Agreement was superseded by the couple's subsequent 2006 postnuptial agreement ("the 2006 Agreement"). The trial court found the greater weight of the evidence supported Former Wife's version of the events, and accordingly, did not credit Former Husband for the amount he claimed to be owed.

In reviewing a judgment rendered after a bench trial, any questions of law, including construction of the postnuptial agreements in the instant case, are reviewed de novo. Katz v. Riemer, 305 So.3d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). In addition, typically, "the trial court's findings of fact come to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Thus, they are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence." Underwater Eng'g Servs., Inc. v. Utility Bd. of City of Key West, 194 So.3d 437, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (additional citations omitted).

This case, however, is atypical in one important respect: It was tried before a voluntary trial resolution judge, pursuant to section 44.104, Florida Statutes. As such, the parties are bound by the provisions of that law, including section 44.104(11), which provides:

(11) Any party may enforce a final decision rendered in a voluntary trial by filing a petition for final judgment in the circuit court in the circuit in which the voluntary trial took place. Upon entry of final judgment by the circuit court, any party may appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Factual findings determined in the voluntary trial are not subject to appeal.

(Emphasis added). See also Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc., 35 So.3d 1033, 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that, pursuant to section 44.104(11), an appellate court is "bound by the factual findings of the trial resolution judge").

As such, the trial court's factual determinations-that the parties agreed Former Wife would no longer be responsible for the monthly household expenses, and that Former Husband never expected to be paid- are not subject to review by this court.^[3] In addition, and upon our de novo review, we conclude that the plain language of the 2006 Agreement modified the requirement (contained in the 2002 House Agreement) that Former Wife contribute to household expenses. The 2006 Agreement provided that the 2002 House Agreement would remain in effect "except to the extent it is modified by or inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement." This exception was triggered because, in that 2006 Agreement, the parties expressly agreed that Former Husband "shall pay all expenses attendant to and associated with" the marital home, thereby modifying the conflicting provision in the parties' 2002 House Agreement.

As a result of this modification, Former Wife was no longer obligated to pay the monthly household expenses. "When a contract is clear and unambiguous, 'the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties, and the plain meaning of that language controls.'" Anthony v. Anthony, 949 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Maher v. Schumacher, 605 So.2d 481, 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)). See also City of Florida City v. Public Risk Mgmt. of Fla., 307 So.3d 135, 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (same).^[4] 2. Did the trial court err in finding Former Husband breached the 2006 Agreement by failing to disclose to Former Wife the Crystal Bay Investment?

Former Husband contends the trial court erred in finding he breached the 2006 Agreement by failing to disclose to Former Wife the Crystal Bay Investment. As a result of this finding, the trial court ordered that the $1, 618, 555 Former Husband lost in this investment-a loss which Former Husband included in his net worth calculation-be removed as a liability in his net worth calculation.

Former Husband contends that the evidence at trial established that Former Wife was aware of the Crystal Bay investment, and thus there had been no breach of the 2006 Agreement. However, the 2006 Agreement plainly required Former Husband to obtain Former Wife's written consent before investing in the Crystal Bay Investment. Former Husband argues the parties' course of conduct was such that Former Wife's written consent was not required, only her knowledge and agreement to same. While Former Husband's premise may be correct (indeed, as we have already observed supra at note four, contracting parties may, by a course of conduct, abandon a contract), the trial court found as a matter of fact that Former Wife had no knowledge of the Crystal Bay Investment at the time Former Husband made the investment.

We hold the trial court committed no error of law, and Former Husband is bound by the trial court's findings of fact, which "are not subject to appeal by the parties." § 44.104(11), Fla. Stat. (2019).^[5]

3. Did the trial court err in determining the Ocean Boulevard Residence was nonmarital property of Former Wife?

Finally, Former Husband contends the trial court erred in determining the Ocean Boulevard Residence was nonmarital property of Former Wife. Although Former Husband acknowledges that Former Wife purchased the residence during the time of their prior separation, Former Husband asserts that the parties thereafter reconciled and lived at that residence together as a couple, and that it was their marital home for several years prior to Former Wife filing for divorce. Additionally, Former Husband asserts, he contributed monies to make several improvements to the Ocean Boulevard Residence. Relying on Hooker v. Hooker, 220 So.3d 397 (Fla. 2017), Former Husband asserts that the trial court should have found the Ocean Boulevard Residence was a marital asset.

Section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (2019), sets forth what is to be considered marital property in Florida:

(6) As used in this section:

(a) 1. "Marital assets and liabilities" include:

a. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them.

b. The enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both.

c. The paydown of principal of a note and mortgage secured by nonmarital real property and a portion of any passive appreciation in the property, if the note and mortgage

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