Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stern

• Decision Date: 28 June 1985
• Parties: PARK SLOPE JEWISH CENTER v. Neilan STERN, et al.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 958

491 N.Y.S.2d 958

128 Misc.2d 909

PARK SLOPE JEWISH CENTER v. Neilan STERN, et al.

Supreme Court, Kings County.

June 28, 1985.

Milgraum & Rothman, New York City, for plaintiff; William F. Rothman, New York City, of counsel.

Joel Z. Robinson, New York City, for defendants.

HERBERT KRAMER, Acting Justice.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Park Slope Jewish Center (PSJC), is the product of the consolidation of three separate congregations.

Bnai Jacob was incorporated in 1884 as an "orthodox religious corporation." Bnai Sholaum was incorporated in 1896 to further the "interests of Judaism and for spiritual improvement." Tifereth Israel was founded in 1912 "to meet and conduct prayers." No express membership requirements were found in the founding papers of these congregations.

In 1941, Bnai Jacob and Tifereth Israel were consolidated by requisite court order. The bylaws state that the dictates of the Jewish Orthodox religion shall be the fundamental principles of the new congregation. ¹

In 1960, by court order, Cong. Bnai Jacob Tifereth Israel was consolidated with Cong. Bnai Sholaum to form PSJC. The PSJC's constitution and unsigned and undated bylaws have been admitted into evidence as a disputed document. ² Article I, Sec. 3, states that the congregation shall be affiliated with the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. The merger agreement states that an organ will be relinquished from Bnai Sholaum to the PSJC. The organ was used "in its usual function in a synagogue." ³ There is no express mention to a prescribed manner of service in any of PSJC's founding documents other than the disputed by-laws.

From 1960 to 1983, females were permitted limited participation purportedly in conformity with Orthodox Jewish tenets. In May, 1983, a majority of the congregation In 1983, the PSJC instituted suit to enjoin the minority from using the building and interfering with PSJC activities. In May 1984, the parties entered into a court-ordered stipulation which recognized and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the May 1983 vote on female participation and the February 1983 bylaws. These bylaws and the court-ordered stipulation required that any Jew, 18 years of age or older, be admitted to membership. The 1983 by-laws are silent as to the order of service other than "the promotion of the religious and social spirit of Judaism."

voted to grant females full participation in all religious activities. A minority faction, opposed to this undisputed variance from the previous order of service, began holding separate services in the Center. This engendered a religious dispute which culminated in vandalism and heralded this action. The 1983 bylaws (which were dated and signed) contain no statement affiliating PSJC with the Union of Orthodox Congregations of America.

The stipulation also allowed the defendants to utilize the lower area of the Center for separate Orthodox services. It provides for the ultimate building sale, demolition, etc. The defendant minority was to incorporate under the name Bnai Jacob and would pay PSJC a fee for the use of the lower area. In return, PSJC would credit Bnai Jacob for each member of Bnai Jacob belonging to PSJC as well. Several months later, Bnai Jacob forwarded multiple membership applications to the PSJC, which were rejected. The PSJC then amended its bylaws to require members to commit themselves to equality of women in religious services and to always support this principle in the future. The defendants then moved to void the amended bylaws as to said membership requirements.

DISCUSSION

Prior to Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666, a doctrinal implied trust was widely used in America and England to decide interchurch and intrachurch disputes. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (pp. 872-3). Courts examined religious doctrine to determine whether the departure from founding doctrine was sufficiently significant to constitute a breach of an implied trust. The courts awarded church property to the group remaining faithful to the implied intentions of the church's founders.

This approach was abandoned by Federal courts in 1871 in Watson, supra. The court held that in the absence of express language creating a trust, the court would defer to decisions of governing church bodies in hierarchal church disputes or to majority rule in congregational disputes.

State courts, however, continued to use the departure from doctrine analysis until 1969, when in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), the United States Supreme Court ruled this approach was in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Instead, the court endorsed the neutral principles of law approach. Thus, courts would decide claims to property owned by religious entities by looking at the relevant documents as in any property dispute.

The First Amendment is offended should the court's resolution of the matter involve interpretation of religious doctrine. Documents that civil courts may examine to settle religious disputes include those that are secular, such as deeds, relevant statutes, articles of incorporation, church documents and secular provisions of trusts and wills (1977 Wis.Law Rev. 905), but may utilize secular portions of documents which have religious purposes. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 446 N.E.2d 136 (1983). Ordinary principles of trust and property law can be used to settle these disputes without entangling the state in church affairs (First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454 (1984), cert. den. 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 514, 83 L.Ed.2d 404; Avitzur v. Avitzur, supra; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 [1979] ).

In 1st Presbyterian Church, supra, the court adopted the neutral principles of law approach. The court held that it may decide a property dispute without offending the prohibition against church/state entanglement contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Thus, a difference between competing church factions over religious doctrine does not permit a court to award property on the basis of religious doctrine (Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Dunkel, 33 N.Y.2d 456, 461, 354 N.Y.S.2d 631, 310 N.E.2d 307 (1974)). Similarly, use of the departure from doctrine analysis is no longer authoritative in light of Hull. (Benninson v. Sharp, 121 Mich.App. 705, 329 N.W.2d 466 (1982)).

Thus, all prior New York State decisions in this area may have limited value as precedent and must be subjected to the neutral principles analysis (see, e.g., Saint Nicholas Ukranian Orthodox Church v. St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church, 157 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1956) and Conklin v. State, 284 App.Div. 193, 130 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1954)).

Many commentators and courts have rejected the implied trust doctrine as impossible to administer without...