Parker v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 08 April 1901
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: MARGARET J. PARKER, JENNETTE F. GRIGGS and ELIZABETH ASHTON, Trustees, Appellants, v. B. B. QUINN, Assessor and S. J. LYNCH, Treasurer for Salt Lake County, Respondents

64 P. 961

23 Utah 332

MARGARET J. PARKER, JENNETTE F. GRIGGS and ELIZABETH ASHTON, Trustees, Appellants, v. B. B. QUINN, Assessor and S. J. LYNCH, Treasurer for Salt Lake County, Respondents

Supreme Court of Utah

April 8, 1901

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.-- Hon. Ogden Hiles, Judge.

Action to enjoin the collection of taxes on the premises described in the complaint, upon the ground that they are used exclusively for charitable purposes. From a judgment dismissing the action plaintiffs appealed.

REVERSED.

N. V Jones, Esq., for appellants.

The plaintiffs contend, as appears by their assignment of errors numbered one and two, that it was error for the trial court to hold the property in question liable for taxation, when the whole of said property was received by voluntary contributions for charitable purposes, and all of the rentals and other proceeds and receipts of said society are used exclusively for charitable purposes and not for pecuniary gain, either of said society or its members.

The contention is that the words "used exclusively" do not, within the purview of our statute, necessarily mean actual occupancy, but should be construed in a broader sense.

That the fact of the ownership and control of said premises together with the acknowledged appropriation and use of all the rentals received from said premises for exclusively charitable purposes, is practically, and within the spirit of the statute, an exclusive use of the premises and of the capital sum upon which said interest or rental is derived, as much so as if the premises were occupied by said relief society for work rooms or any other necessary use.

The policy of the law, it would seem, is rather to encourage labors and works of a charitable nature, than to restrict them, for by encouraging them, the State is relieved of many of its burdens and some of its expense.

In support of appellant's contention see the following authorities. Temple Grove Seminary v. Cramer, 20 N.Y.App. 428, 98 N.Y. 121.

Upon the proposition that the appropriation of the rental and proceeds from the property exempts the capital stock from taxation, see, Congregation United Brethren of Salem v Comrs. of Forsythe County, 20 S.E. 626. See, also, Sisters of Charity v. Collector of Chatam, 20 At. Rep. 292; New Orleans Female Orphan, etc., v. Asylum, 37 La. Ann. 68; City of New Orleans v. Poydras Asylum, 33 La. Ann. 851; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202; People ex rel. Hospital v. Purdy, 12 N.Y.S. 307; Mt. Hermon Boys School v. Gill Township, 145 Mass. 139, 13 N.E. 354; Town of New Haven v. Trustees of Sheffield, 59 Conn. 163; St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 R.I. 307; People v. Dohling, 6 A.D. 86.

The third and fourth assignments of error are to the effect that the court erred in holding all of said property to be taxable because, in any event, only that part could be taxed under the law, which produces a rental or revenue, the remainder being exempt beyond question.

The contention is that if any of said property is taxable it is simply taxable pro tanto, and that the attempt to tax the whole property without segregating it and assessing that part which is properly taxable, is an unlawful attempt to tax and sell property which is exempt by law from taxation.

As to the relative value of that part of the building which produces the rental, it is stated in the findings that its value is $ 600. The same rule applied to the real estate would determine that part of the property producing revenue at sixty per cent of the aggregate value.

The right of the citizen to be protected in his exemption rights is as sacred as the right of the State to tax, and his property should be protected from taxation when it is fairly and clearly within the exemption, as it is shown to be by the findings of fact in this case. Upon the foregoing proposition, see: Bank of Commerce v. Tenn., 104 U.S. 493; Cambridge v. Middlesex Co., etc., 114 Mass. 337; State v. Leester Collr., 28 N. J. L. 103; People v. Sayles, 53 N.Y.S. 67; Mulroy v. Churchman, 52 Iowa 238; First M. E. Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 482; Cleveland v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253; 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), 323.

The sixth assignment of error relates to appellants' claim to have the county treasurer enjoined from the collection of the tax for the year A. D. 1900, for reasons heretofore stated.

If the appellate court shall find that the property is exempt from taxation, then, in such case, in support of appellant's right to enjoin the defendants, we cite: St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Elk County, 43 At. Rep. 321; Pomeroy's Equity, secs. 1347-1348-1357, and notes; also 249-251, and on pages 251, 252, sec. 252. Spelling Ex. Relief, secs. 16, 59, 60, 626, 642-644-664-666-672-726, and citations under note five, secs. 921-930-1021-1024; Valle v. Ziegler, 84 Mo. 214; Bank v. Kansas, 73 Mo. 555; Northern Pacific R. R. v. Cartland, 5 Mont. 146, 3 P. Rep. 134; Floyed v. Galbreath, 27 Ark. 675; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), p. 859-860. See notes and citations; Shimer v. Morris Canal Co., 27 N.J.E.

Graham F. Putnam, Esq., and Ray Van Cott, Esq., for respondents.

BARTCH, J. Baskin, J., and Hart, D. J., concur.

OPINION

BARTCH, J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

From the statement of facts admitted in this case, it appears that the plaintiffs, as trustees, held the legal title to certain premises, situate in Salt Lake City, for the "Fifteenth Ward Relief Society," organized and acting exclusively for charitable purposes--ministering to the poor, sick and destitute members of the community. Upon the premises there is a two story brick building, the upper floor of which has been used continuously by the relief society for the holding of meetings and the performance of work by its members in furtherance of its charitable purposes. The lower floor contains two storerooms, one of which is rented for $ 12.50 per month, and the other is being offered for the same rent but at present is vacant. All the rental so received is used for charitable purposes, and forms a part of the sums disbursed annually by the society; and all the members of the society serve as such without remuneration. In 1898, the premises, having been assessed, were sold for taxes, and the purchaser at the tax sale paid the taxes for the year 1899. The plaintiffs then brought an action to remove the lien and cloud upon the title to the premises, and the court granted the relief prayed for and entered a decree accordingly. In 1900, the premises were again assessed, and, respecting this assessment, the court, at the trial of this cause, found that the land was valued at $ 1,060, and the building and improvements at $ 1,000; and that a fair apportionment of the assessment on the building is $ 600 for the lower story, and $ 400 for the upper.

This suit was brought, after the levy of the taxes had been made, for the purpose of enjoining the taxation of these premises, as long as they are used exclusively for charitable purposes, but at the trial the relief prayed for was refused and the action dismissed. The plaintiffs then appealed.

BARTCH, J.--The appellants contend that the court erred in holding that, under the laws of this State, the property in question is subject to taxation. The general rule is that all property of what kind soever and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation, and when any kind of property is exempt it constitutes an exception to this rule. The reason of the rule is that it is just and equitable that every species of property within the State should bear its equal proportion of the burdens of the government. When, therefore, an owner claims that certain property is exempt from taxation, the burden is upon him to show that it falls within the exception. And an exemption will not be aided by judicial interpretation. It must be shown to exist by express terms of the enactment which, it is claimed grants it.

"The presumption is that all exemptions intended to be granted were granted in express terms. In such cases the rule of strict construction applies, and, in order to relieve any species of property from its due and just proportion of the burdens of the government, the language relied on, as creating the exemption, should be so clear as not to admit of reasonable controversy about its meaning, for all doubts must be resolved against the exemption. The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is essential to the existence of the state." Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P. 1097; Stahl v. Educational Ass'n, 54 Kan. 542, 38 P. 796; Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17, 22 N.E. 845.

Applying these principles, it remains to be seen whether the property, in question, in this case, is exempt under the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this State.

In section 3, article 13, Constitution, it is, so far as material here, provided: "That the property of the United States, of the State, counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation."

The statutory provision on this subject is found in section 2503, Revised Statutes, and reads: "The property of the United States, of the State, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public libraries and lots with buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation."

It will be noticed that the provisions of the Constitution and of the statute are practically the same, except that the statute omits the words "municipal...