Parr v. Cook Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2021
• Docket Number: A21A0655
• Citation: 359 Ga.App. 823,860 S.E.2d 114
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: PARR et al. v. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

359 Ga.App. 823

860 S.E.2d 114

PARR et al.

v.COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

A21A0655

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 16, 2021

John Crawford Spurlin, Tifton, for Appellant.

Daniel Laverne Studstill, Nashville, Patrick Doyle Dodson, for Appellee.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

David and Carrie Parr, individually and as next friends of their minor child Hope Parr, sued a county school district and several of its alleged employees. The trial court dismissed the entirety of the Parrs’ suit on immunity grounds. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Parrs’ complaint alleged that on November 3, 2017, Hope was burned by food in the lunchroom of the Cook County Elementary School. Specifically, the complaint alleged that as she was transferring corn nibblets from her Styrofoam cup to her plate, the substance fell on her body resulting in burn injuries; and that the food had been heated to an excessive temperature and was not adequately secured in the cup. Seeking damages for negligence, the Parrs named five defendants as follows: (i) the Cook County School District (hereinafter "School District"); (ii) Gwyn Thornton, as a teacher and/or paraprofessional assisting Hope with that day's lunch actions; (iii) Haley Pennington, as a teacher and/or paraprofessional who was responsible for ensuring that either she or her paraprofessional appropriately assisted Hope with her lunch; and (iv and v) Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, as lunchroom employees of the School District. The four individual defendants, as the Parrs further alleged in their complaint, had breached ministerial duties to: maintain a reasonable and safe temperature of the food prepared and served in the lunchroom; supervise their child during all lunchroom activities; serve the food in a secure and safe manner; and ensure that the food was not served at an excessive temperature and in an unstable and unsafe cup.

The defendants filed a motion requesting the trial court to "dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) and 12 (b) (6) and/or for [j]udgment on the [p]leadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The defendants argued that the School District and its employees were entitled to immunity from the Parrs’ claims. Discerning that the Parrs’ claims were barred either by sovereign immunity or official immunity, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion.

For reasons explained more fully below, we agree that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the School District and against the individual defendants in their official capacities. We disagree, however, with the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities on grounds of official immunity.

1. Sovereign immunity. "We review de novo a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, bearing in mind that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proof to establish waiver." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)

Everson v. DeKalb County School Dist. , 344 Ga. App. 665, 666 (1), 811 S.E.2d 9 (2018) ; see Fulton County School Dist. v. Jenkins , 347 Ga. App. 448, 449, 820 S.E.2d 75 (2018).

In Georgia, sovereign immunity "protect[s] governments at all levels from unconsented-to legal actions." Gilbert v. Richardson , 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1), 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994). In 1991, an amendment to Georgia's Constitution authorized our General Assembly to ["]waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act, in which the General Assembly may provide by law for procedures for the making, handling, and disposition of actions or claims against the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees, upon such terms and subject to such conditions and limitations as the General Assembly may provide.["] Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (a). Under this authority, the General Assembly enacted the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. "The Georgia Tort Claims Act provides for a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity for the torts of its officers and employees, but it expressly excludes school districts from the waiver. OCGA § 50-21-22 (5)." Wellborn v. DeKalb County School Dist. , 227 Ga. App. 377, 379-380 (4), 489 S.E.2d 345 (1997). Consequently, [the Parrs’] tort claims against the School District and [its alleged employees], in [their] official capacit[ies], are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See id. ; Price v. Dept. of Transp. , 257 Ga. 535, 537, 361 S.E.2d 146 (1987) (suits against public employees in official capacities are in reality suits against the state; employees so sued are entitled to sovereign immunity).

(Punctuation omitted.) Everson , 344 Ga. App. at 666-667 (1), 811 S.E.2d 9 (determining that "[the plaintiff's] claims ... against the [s]chool [d]istrict and [its former superintendent], in his official capacity, [were] barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity," where [the plaintiff] failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity for [his] claims"). See also Fulton County School Dist. , 347 Ga. App. at 453, 820 S.E.2d 75 (concluding that the school district was entitled to dismissal of the guardian-grandmother's negligence claims against the school district – which alleged that the school bus driver failed to ensure her special needs grandchild exited the bus along with the other students, and the child consequently remained on the bus for hours after the driver had parked it for the evening – because the guardian-grandmother failed to demonstrate a statutory waiver of the school district's sovereign immunity); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes , 216 Ga. App. 293, 296, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995) (concluding that the school district was entitled to sovereign immunity after a student fell and fractured her elbow during recess in the school's gymnasium, where there was no legislative act specifically providing for a waiver of the school district's sovereign immunity).¹

The Parrs have spent much of their brief discussing how ministerial acts differ from discretionary ones, but any such distinction is unavailing with regard to whether sovereign immunity bars their claims. See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham , 296 Ga. 576, 582 (2), 769 S.E.2d 320 (2015) (reiterating that whether an act performed by a governmental employee is ministerial or discretionary is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the governmental entity's sovereign immunity has been waived, because "sovereign immunity applies equally to, i.e., bars claims arising from, both ministerial and discretionary acts"); Seay v. Cleveland , 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1), 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998) (espousing that the county's sovereign immunity applied equally to ministerial and discretionary acts).

2. Official Immunity. Official immunity is also known as qualified immunity. McDowell v. Smith , 285 Ga. 592, 593, 678 S.E.2d 922 (2009).

[Such doctrine] offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity. Official immunity protects individual public agents from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Under Georgia law, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Everson , 344 Ga. App. at 667 (2), 811 S.E.2d 9.

In their complaint, the Parrs made no claim that the individual defendants had acted with malice or an intent to injure; instead, and as detailed above, the Parrs sought to hold the individual defendants liable for alleged ministerial acts negligently performed.² Confronted by the defendants’ motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, the Parrs argued, inter alia, that dismissal would be premature, urging that "determinations of discretionary and ministerial duties require[d] a ... fact specific inquiry which require[d] that the Motion be dismissed until discovery [could] be completed." The trial court rejected the Parrs’ position, dismissing their claims expressly under Barnett v. Atlanta Independent School Sys. , 339 Ga. App. 533, 792 S.E.2d 474 (2016), aff'd as modified by Barnett v. Caldwell , 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018). In Barnett , this Court espoused that "it is well-established that the task of supervising and controlling students is a discretionary act entitled to official immunity." Barnett , 339 Ga. App. at 537, 792 S.E.2d 474.

When considering the question of whether the trial court erred in granting [the defendants’] motion to dismiss based upon qualified immunity, we must remember that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Everson , 344 Ga. App. at 668-669 (2), 811 S.E.2d 9.

Here, we cannot say that the Parrs would not be entitled to relief "under any state of facts which could be proved in support of [their] claim[s]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Everson , 344 Ga. App. at 669 (2), 811 S.E.2d 9. As the parties and the trial court ascertained, "the pivotal determination in this case is whether the school officials’ [alleged]...