Parris v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 22 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:13-02318-TMC-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Brian Royce Parris, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Brian Royce Parris, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:13-02318-TMC-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

January 22, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging an onset of disability date of December 19, 2008.¹ [R. 135-141.] Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 102, 116-21, 125-31.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and, on January 6, 2012, ALJ Ivar E. Avots conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 64-100.]

The ALJ issued a decision on June 27, 2012, finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 11-23.] At Step 1,² the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2014, and he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 11, 2010. [R. 13, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had a severe impairment of anxiety. [R. 13, Finding 3.] The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: history of heart murmur; history of hepatitis C; diffuse esophageal spasm; allergic rhinitis; history of alcohol dependence; tremors in his hands; arthritis in his hands, feet, knees and hips; and degenerative disc disease and degenerative joint disease with mild bilateral changes in his knees and fingers. [R. 13-17.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 17-20, Finding 4.]

Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567, with moderate mental limitations but in spite of these he can concentrate, persist and work at pace to do simple, routine repetitive tasks at up to level three commonsense reasoning per the DOT, for extended periods say 2-hour periods in an 8-hour day, have no direct contact with the public, but can interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors in a stable routine setting.

[R. 20, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a stock control inventory clerk, bookkeeper, and quality control inspector. [R. 21, Finding 6.] Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, however, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 22-23, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from December 11, 2010, through the date of the decision. [R. 23, Finding 11.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Council declined review. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on August 26, 2013. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and claims the ALJ erred by

(1) failing to find in the RFC that Plaintiff had exertional and manipulative limitations due to his degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, arthritis in the hands and knees, hepatitis C, and cardiac murmur;

(2) improperly exalting the opinions of non-examining physicians over the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Roslyn Harris ("Dr. Harris"); and

(3) at Step 5, identifying two of three occupations that would support a finding of disability under Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06.

The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ

(1) reasonably determined Plaintiff's RFC and gave proper consideration to Plaintiff's severe and non-severe impairments;(2) reasonably evaluated the opinions of Dr. Harris; and,

(3) reasonably found that Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Accordingly, the Commissioner requests that the Court affirm the ALJ's decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963))("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary resultas finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See,e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation. See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).

In...