Parson v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 1971
• Citation: 275 A.2d 777
• Parties: Norman Benjamin PARSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 777

275 A.2d 777

Norman Benjamin PARSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Feb. 16, 1971.

Appeal from Superior Court in and for Sussex County.

Carl Schnee and Richard E. Poole, specially appointed defense counsel, and Richard A. Paul, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.

David P. Buckson, Atty. Gen., Dover, and Peter Warren Green and William Swain Lee, Sp. Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington and Georgetown respectively, for the State.

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is the second appeal in this cause. In 1964 the appellant, Norman Benjamin Parson, was indicted under 11 Del.C. § 571 for murder in the first degree in that he caused the death of Kathleen Rae Maull while attempting to perpetrate a rape upon her.

At his first trial Parson was found guilty and sentenced to death. He appealed to this court. We affirmed. Parson v. State, Del., 222 A.2d 326 (1966), cert. den. 386 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 961, 17 L.Ed.2d 807 (1967).

Parson thereupon filed a petition for a writ of Habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. Inter alia, the petition raised the question of whether or not Parson was competent to stand trial at the time of his conviction. The District Court concluded that there was a substantial question as to whether Parson was competent at the time of his trial, and that the fact of his competency at that time could not be determined some three years later. The District Court therefore required a new trial or release on federal constitutional grounds. United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 280 F.Supp. 565 (1967).

The Superior Court thereafter conducted hearings to determine the competency of Parson and ultimately concluded that he was competent to stand trial. He was thereupon tried again and found guilty without a recommendation of mercy, and sentenced to death. This appeal followed.

The facts are fully set forth in our opinion in the first appeal and will not be repeated here. The facts of the State's case at Parson's second trial do not differ materially from those recited in our first opinion. The State's case is almost entirely circumstantial. Not offered in evidence this time was a lengthy confession by Parson.

Parson raises a number of questions which, it is argued, require a reversal of his conviction and a remand for a new trial. We will consider them Seriatim in the manner and form in which they are stated in his brief.

I.

'THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THAT THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS DID NOT MEET THE ESSENTIAL DEMANDS OF FAIRNESS.'

11 Del.C. § 3301 provides as follows:

'When a juror is called in a capital case, he shall be first sworn or affirmed upon the voir dire and then asked, under the direction of the Court, if he has formed or expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar. If his answer is in the negative, he shall be sworn as a juror in the case, unless he has conscientious scruples against finding a verdict of guilty in a case where the punishment is death, even if the evidence should so warrant him, or unless he shall be peremptorily challenged, challenged for cause, or excused by consent of counsel on both sides. If his answer to the question be in the affirmative, he shall be disqualified to sit in the case, unless he shall say, upon his oath or affirmation, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he feels able, notwithstanding such an opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence; in which event he shall be a competent juror, if not otherwise disqualified, challenged or excused.'

The questioning of 197 prospective jurors upon their Voir dire occupied some nine and one-half trial days. Of these, 14 were seated as jurymen; 23 were peremptorily challenged, 20 by the defense and 3 by the State; 9 were discharged by the court for personal reasons not relevant to the issues raised here; 23 were discharged for cause by reason of their objections to capital punishment, and 128 were discharged for cause since they conceded having formed an opinion as to Parson's guilt which would have prevented them from reaching an impartial verdict.

In Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931), it was held that the extent of a Voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the questions to be permitted lay within the broad discretion of the trial judge. The exercise of this broad discretion is nevertheless subject to the essential demands of fairness.

The purpose of the Voir dire examination of prospective jurors is to give the trial judge sufficient information to determine whether or not a prospective juror is qualified. In addition, it aids the State and the defendant by eliciting facts upon which they can exercise intelligently rights to peremptory challenges. Any limitation imposed by the trial judge upon defendant's right to have prospective jurors questioned will not constitute reversible error unless the broad discretion reposed in the trial judge has been clearly abused to the prejudice of the defendant. State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).

The main question is broken down by Parson into three subquestions which we will consider in the order and form in which they are stated in Parson's brief:

'(1) The Court committed error by interrupting defense counsel's questioning; by questioning the jury, itself; by criticizing defense counsel in open court, and by limiting defense counsel's questioning in crucial areas.'

We will not review the questioning of each prospective juror but will select typical examples referred to in the Parson brief.

The first example called to our attention by Parson is the questioning of a prospective juror who testified that she had formed no opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of Parson. She also testified that she had heard opinions expressed both as to Parson's innocence and as to his guilt. Defense counsel thereupon sought to interrogate her as to the number of opinions of guilt or innocence she had heard. This was objected to by the State and sustained by the trial judge. We think the ruling of the trial court was proper since the only purpose, it seems to us, that the proposed line of interrogation would have served would have been to give factual basis for a renewal of a motion for a change of venue which had previously been denied. It had no pertinency to the qualifications of the prospective juror.

The next example was a prospective juror who was asked whether or not he felt that the fact that a prior jury had found Parson guilty would prevent him from reaching an impartial verdict in the case at bar. His answer was, 'I would have to see what the evidence was. I mean I haven't heard what the evidence is.'

Defense counsel then asked him whether he could disregard the fact that a jury had found Parson guilty. The Court interrupted and refused to permit further questions along that line since it had already been explored. This juror was then peremptorily challenged by the defense.

We think the trial judge was correct in his ruling since there must be practical limitations to Voir dire examination of prospective jurors. In the absence of limitations, unreasonable delay and frustration in the progress of the trial will result. We see no error in the judge's limitation of the probing of a particular field within the prospective juror's knowledge when that has already taken place.

The third example was a prospective juror who testified during questioning by defense counsel that she had an opinion as to his guilt, and that at that moment she could not presume him to be innocent. However, she also said that the opinion she had formed would not prevent her from being an impartial juror and that she could follow and apply the instructions of the court to the effect that every defendant brought to trial is presumed innocent until convicted. Defense counsel moved that she be removed for cause, which motion was denied. She was then peremptorily challenged by the defense.

11 Del.C. § 3301 provides, Inter alia, that a prospective juror who has formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence shall be disqualified 'unless he shall say, upon his oath or affirmation, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he feels able, notwithstanding such an opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence.'

It is apparent that the decision as to whether or not to excuse such a prospective juror for cause rests in the discretion of the trial judge who must determine from the witness' testimony whether or not he feels that the statement to the effect that she could, despite her opinion, nevertheless render an impartial verdict, was satisfactory. If the trial judge believes the witness' statement, then he may permit the individual to be drawn as a juryman.

We affirm the trial judge's ruling on the basis of 11 Del.C. § 3301, and we note that in other states, irrespective of the existence of a statute to the same effect, similar rulings have been upheld on appeal. Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 (1958) and People v. Duncan, 53 Cal.2d 803, 3 Cal.Rptr. 351, 350 P.2d 103, appeal dismissed Baldonado v. California, 366 U.S. 417, 81 S.Ct. 1355, 6 L.Ed.2d 380 (1960).

It seems to us Parson's position is that if a prospective juror has ever held an opinion as to guilt or innocence, he is forever disqualified from sitting in that case. Such, however, is not the law. The question is whether or not, irrespective of a prior opinion, the prospective juror can follow the instructions given by the trial judge, disregarding his prior opinion and deciding the issue of guilt or innocence upon the facts presented in the trial at bar.

Defense counsel also criticizes the rulings of the trial judge on the ground that they criticized defense c...