Patricia J. v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 18 August 1976
• Citation: 132 Cal.Rptr. 211,61 Cal.App.3d 278
• Parties: PATRICIA J., a minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 15299.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 211

132 Cal.Rptr. 211

61 Cal.App.3d 278

PATRICIA J., a minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 15299.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Aug. 18, 1976.

Sinclair & Mitchell, Roseville, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Dormeyer, Simmons, Shade & Kendall, Tweedy, Ferris & Duncan, Fitzwilliam, Memering, Stumbos & DeMers, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.

EVANS, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs John and Angie J., as guardians ad litem for Patricia J., appeal from judgments following an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of the County of Sacramento and orders granting judgment on the pleadings to the Sacramento City and Rio Linda Union School Districts. The sole issue on appeal is whether governmental immunity for injuries caused by or to a 'prisoner' conferred by Government Code section 844.6 extends to injuries caused by a minor who has been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed in the custody of his parent.

The facts are not in dispute and appear from the judgment roll.

In June 1973, Lawrence C. was found to have committed robbery and unlawful sexual intercourse (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 261.5), and was made a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He was committed to the custody of his mother and placed under supervision by the Sacramento County Probation Department. In August 1973, the Sacramento City School District as Administrator of the 'Neighborhood Youth Program' found employment for Lawrence in Rio Linda Union School District as an assistant custodian at the Orchard School. The work was not ordered or directed as a part of the wardship proceeding. At the outset of his employment and while engaged in his duties at the Orchard School, Lawrence enticed Patricia J., a seven-year-old girl, into a restroom at the school and raped her, infecting her with gonorrhea in the process.

In September 1974, following rejection of claims against the governmental entities, Patricia's parents filed a complaint on her behalf against Lawrence, the Rio Linda Union School District, the Sacramento City School District, and the County of Sacramento. The complaint charged that the governmental entitles knew or should have known that Lawrence had a prior juvenile criminal record, including rape and other illicit sexual conduct. It alleged that the Rio Linda Union School District negligently hired Lawrence and placed him where he constituted a danger to minor children; that the Sacramento City School District negligently failed to control the minor or warn the general public of his sexual propensities; and that the County of Sacramento negligently failed to exercise proper control or supervise him, and that they further failed to warn the school districts of his past record and the potential danger he presented.

The County of Sacramento demurred on the ground that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by prisoners. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and a judgment of dismissal was ultimately entered; both school districts answered and moved for judgment on the pleadings asserting the same grounds as did the county by its demurrer. The motions were granted and judgments of dismissal entered.

Preliminarily, defendant County of Sacramento contends that the judgment of dismissal entered against it is not appealable; it argues that because the judgment was entered upon motion of plaintiffs, it was a 'voluntary' dismissal within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision 1, ¹ and is therefore nonappealable. (See Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971), Appeal, § 58, pp. 4073--4074.)

The county was ordered to prepare the order and notice of order sustaining its demurrer; the notice was prepared immediately but not the order. Approximately one month later, plaintiffs prepared the order sustaining the demurrer which dismissed the complaint as to the county and caused it to be signed and filed.

Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision 3, ² provides for dismissal by either party in circumstances as here presented.

The subdivision authorizes dismissals after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend upon motion of Either party. The mere fact that the moving party is the plaintiff does not make a judgment of dismissal 'voluntary' and nonappealable. Plaintiffs were required to prepare the order sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the complaint in order to establish their right of appeal. (See Witkin, supra, § 64, p. 4078.) The argument urged by the county borders upon the frivolous, and is viewed with disfavor by this court.

The substance of the appeal is directed to the trial court's extension of governmental immunity to the defendants.

California tort claims statutes render governmental entities generally liable for the negligence of employees acting in the scope of their employment. (Gov.Code, § 815.2.) However, Government Code section 844.6 ³ dealing with police and correctional activities, provides immunity for injuries caused by a 'prisoner.' In pertinent part that section reads: '(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, . . . a public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner. (2) An injury to any prisoner.' We are called upon to determine whether the term 'prisoner' as used encompasses a juvenile court ward committed to the custody of his parent and not retained in custodial detention.

Government Code section 844 provides the fundamental definition of the term 'prisoner' from which our inquiry flows: 'As used in this chapter, 'prisoner' includes an immate of a prison, jail or penal or correctional facility.' Appellate courts, since the adoption of that section, have struggled with its meaning; some have said the section is exhaustive and that the word 'prisoner' means only inmates of an institution under restraint (Larson v. City of Oakland (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 91, 97, 94 Cal.Rptr. 466), while others have sought to ascribe an expansive meaning to the section because of the use of the word 'includes.' (Datil v. City of Los Angeles (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 655, 658, 69 Cal.Rptr. 788.)

Some definitions of the word 'prisoner' assist in our inquiry: '(A) person serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison is, in contemplation of law, a prisoner therein, as well when at work outside under the surveillance of prison guards as when confined within its walls, . . .' (Bradford v. Glenn (1922) 188 Cal. 350, 351, 205 P. 449; People v. Vanderburg (1924) 67 Cal.App. 217, 219, 227 P. 621.) 'The term 'prisoner' is commonly used in law to designate a person in legal custody charged with some crime or public offense, . . .' (People v. Mackie (1929) 100 Cal.App. 292, 293, 279 P. 821.) One who is deprived of his liberty; one who is against his will kept in confinement or custody. (U.S. v. Curran (2 Cir. 1924) 297 F. 946, 950.) 'A person restrained of his liberty upon any action, civil or criminal, or upon commandment.' (Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968.) 'A person held under restraint.' (Webster's Third New Internat. Dict. (1969).)

Civil Code section 13 provides a basic rule of statutory construction as follows: 'Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and apropriate meaning in law, or are defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.'

Also, the meaning of particular words or phrases may depend upon the company they keep. We therefore examine the provisions of the article embracing Government Code section 844 to determine other usage of the word 'prisoner.' In Government Code Chapter 3 entitled 'Police and Correctional Activities' we find that all sections utilize the term 'prisoners' as one describing confined persons; section 845.4 deals with interference with a 'prisoner's' right of legal review of his confinement; section 845.6 refers to furnishing medical services to a 'prisoner' in custody; section 845.8 limits liability of a public entity or a person employed by the public entity for damage caused by a 'prisoner' while escaping from confinement or custody of the employee.

In 1970, the Legislature saw fit to expand the scope of immunity for damage caused by an escaping 'prisoner' to include an escaping arrested person and an escaping person resisting arrest. (§ 845.8 as amended Stats.1970, ch. 1099, p. 1958.)

The legislative comment to section 844 provides some insight into the intended meaning of the term 'prisoner' as used in that section. The comment reads: 'A person in the custody of a law enforcement officer but undergoing medical treatment in a county hospital would be considered a prisoner as defined in this section. The work camps for prisoners would be considered penal or correctional facilities. Although a prisoner or ward of the juvenile court engaged in fire suppression would be considered a prisoner as defined in this section, a person on parole would not be considered to be a prisoner.' The comment supports our conclusion that a prisoner is one under restraint by confinement in some type of an institution. The term 'prisoner,' as used, is synonymous with the term 'inmate.'

A history of the general area of sovereign immunity discloses that in 1957, the Legislature authorized the California Law Revision Commission to conduct a study on the question of such immunity. The California Tort Claims Act statutorily entitled, 'Claims and Actions against Public Entities and Public Employees' ⁴ was largely the product of the law revision commission's study and recommendation. (See Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability (Cont.Ed.Bar) Introduction, pp. xxx--xxxi; 2 Pacific L.J. 697, 699.) In part the commission report...