Patterson v. City of Bellmead
| Decision Date | 21 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-12-00357-CV,10-12-00357-CV |
| Parties | TINA PATTERSON AND LARRY PATTERSON, Appellants v. CITY OF BELLMEAD, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 74th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINIONIn this appeal, appellants, Tina and Larry Patterson, complain about a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee, the City of Bellmead (the "City"). In two issues, the Pattersons contend that: (1) the city ordinance involved in this case—Section 3-40 of the City's Municipal Code—is unconstitutional; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to compel and granting the City's motion to quash. We affirm.
On March 15, 2011, the City gave the Pattersons notice that they were in violation of Section 3-40 of the City's Municipal Code. As noted by Victor Pena, the City's manager, "Section 3-40 regulates the number of dogs and cats that could be kept on any one premise within the City." In fact, Section 3-40 provides that:
The maximum number of dogs and cats which may be kept on any one premise shall be four (4). Any person or persons who keeps more than a combined total of four (4) dogs or cats on any one premise shall be deemed to be maintaining a kennel and shall be assessed a kennel fee of three hundred dollars ($300.00) per year.
In their second amended petition for declaratory relief, the Pattersons asserted that they "started a small hobby of training and handling show-quality dogs" beginning in 1973.1 To prepare the dogs for various shows, the Pattersons admitted that they "have often maintained multiple dogs and cats, as well as several other types of animals on the Property."2 In any event, the Pattersons emphasized that they "have always operated this endeavor as a hobby rather than a business in order to retain an amateur status."
In an affidavit, Pena explained that he met with the Pattersons shortly after they received the City's notice. Pena recalled that he reviewed different options with the Pattersons, including applying for and obtaining a permit. If the Pattersons obtained apermit, they would no longer be in violation of Section 3-40. The Pattersons "asked for a few days to become compliant with the ordinance," which Pena believed was acceptable. But rather than obtaining the permit or achieving compliance with Section 3-40, the Pattersons filed this action, seeking a declaration that Section 3-40 is unconstitutional.
During the discovery phase of this case, the Pattersons attempted to depose a City representative. The Pattersons also propounded interrogatories and requested certain documents from the City regarding, among other things, prior enforcement of Section 3-40. The City objected to the Pattersons' discovery requests and also filed a motion to quash the deposition of the City representative. The Pattersons responded to the City's objection by filing a motion to compel, which was later denied by the trial court. In addition, the trial court granted the City's motion to quash.
Thereafter, the City filed a traditional summary-judgment motion, arguing that Section 3-40 is constitutional because the ordinance is not arbitrary or unreasonable and it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Pattersons filed a response to the City's summary-judgment motion, attaching the affidavits of Tina and Yvette Garza, the President of Lost Paws Rescue of Texas.
After a hearing on May 30, 2012, the trial court granted the City's summary-judgment motion. The trial court ordered that the Pattersons take nothing by their lawsuit. The Pattersons filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). This appeal followed.
The purpose of a declaratory-judgment action is to establish the existing rights, status, or other legal relationships between the parties. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (West 2008). Suits for declaratory judgment are intended to determine the rights of parties when a controversy has arisen, but before any wrong has been committed. See Armstrong v. Hixon, 206 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied); Montemayor v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 985 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
Declaratory judgments are reviewed under the same standards as other judgments and decrees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.010 (West 2008); Hawkins v. El Paso First Health Plans, Inc., 214 S.W.3d 709, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). We look to the procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the standard of review on appeal. See Hawkins, 214 S.W.3d at 719; Armstrong, 206 S.W.3d at 179; see also City of Galveston v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 196 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Because the trial court determined the declaratory judgment through summary judgment proceedings, we review the propriety of the trial court's declarations under the same standards that we apply to summary judgments. See City of Galveston, 196 S.W.3d at 221; City of Austin v. Garza, 124 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.); Lidawi v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
The function of a summary judgment is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses, not to deprive litigants of the right to a trial by jury. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a summary judgment de novo. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661.
In their second issue, the Pattersons argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to compel and granting the City's motion to quash. Specifically, the Pattersons allege that the trial court's rulings ostensibly prohibited them from engaging in the discovery process, which restricted their ability to meet their burden of proving that Section 3-40 is unconstitutional.
We review a trial court's actions denying discovery for an abuse of discretion. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that "'the ultimate purpose of discovery is to seek the truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.'" In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding)); see In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). Our procedural rules define the scope of discovery to include any unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject of the action, even if it would be inadmissible at trial, as long as the information sought is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993). Information is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the information. TEX. R. EVID. 401. The phrase "relevant to the subject matter" is to be "'liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial.'" Castillo, 279 S.W.3d at 664 (quoting Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990)).
Although the scope of discovery is broad, discovery requests must nevertheless show a "reasonable expectation of obtaining information that will aid the dispute's resolution." In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). Thus, discovery requests must be "reasonably tailored" to include only relevant matters. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; see In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713. Therefore, the preemptive denial of discovery isproper if there exists no possible relevant, discoverable testimony, facts, or material which would support or lead to evidence that would support a claim or defense. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d at 664. The scope of discovery is also limited by the legitimate interests of the opposing party to avoid overly broad requests, harassment, or disclosure of privileged information. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d at 553.
The party objecting to discovery bears the burden to present any and all evidence necessary to support its objections. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.4(a), 199.6; In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 151; see also In re Am. Power Conversion Corp., No. 04-12-00140-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9369, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 14, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
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