Patton v. State Of Miss.
| Decision Date | 13 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-KP-01699-SCT.,2008-KP-01699-SCT. |
| Citation | 34 So.3d 563 |
| Parties | Edgar PATTONv.STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
[34 So.3d 563 564]
Edgar Patton, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
EN BANC.
¶ 1. In this felony prosecution, the trial court allowed the defendant to represent himself without first obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. We reverse on this important constitutional violation.
¶ 2. Edgar Patton was indicted for the crime of false pretenses. He unsuccessfully represented himself in the trial court. He appeals, claiming as one of nine assignments of error that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because this issue is dispositive, we decline to address the others.
¶ 3. The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 1 As is true with most constitutional rights, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be
[34 So.3d 563 565]
waived. Indeed, many states' constitutions,2 including Mississippi's,3 grant criminal defendants the right to represent themselves. However, it is not enough to say the defendant waived the right to counsel-the waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made. Accordingly, the narrow constitutional question presented is whether Patton's waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made.
¶ 4. Our decision today is framed in the thirty-five-year shadow of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
[T]he integrity of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by the lame explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the “freedom to go to jail under his own banner....” The system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction.
Id. 422 U.S. at 839-40, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ( citing
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1965)).
¶ 5. According to the record, Patton never expressly waived counsel. His only utterance concerning self-representation was when the trial judge asked him if he intended to represent himself and Patton replied: “Well, I'm in consulting.” Nevertheless, under the narrow facts of this case as presented in the record, we are satisfied that Patton's actions 4-coupled with the trial judge's several admonitions that he obtain counsel-amounted to a manifestation of his intent to waive his right to counsel. However, our inquiry on the subject does not conclude until we focus on whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.
¶ 6. Almost a half-century ago, this Court held that a criminal defendant's waiver of counsel was insufficient unless-prior to accepting the waiver-the trial court determined it was knowingly and intelligently made. Conn v. State, 251 Miss. 488, 170 So.2d 20 (1964). Specifically, the Conn Court held:
Id. at 23 ( citing
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 83 (5th Cir.1959)).
¶ 7. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court stated:
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
¶ 8. The “dangers and disadvantages” of self-representation require that appellate courts may uphold waivers of the right to counsel only where the defendant's decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly and intelligently. United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.2006). Accordingly, it is to the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” of concern to the Faretta Court-and to how we ensure defendants are made aware of them before waiving counsel-that we now turn.
¶ 9. We fully recognize that every case is different. The circumstances presented to a trial court will always require a case-by-case evaluation. Curlee v. State, 437 So.2d 1, 2 (Miss.1983). However, while courts have not always agreed on exactly what must be done to confirm that a waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, they generally agree that something must be done.
¶ 10. In providing assistance to trial judges faced with pro se criminal defendants; in setting forth the minimum examination that must take place to ensure that waivers of the right to counsel are knowingly and intelligently made; and in addressing the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” mentioned in Faretta, this Court-pursuant to its constitutional duty and authority to make rules governing the judiciary-promulgated Rule 8.05, which provides:
3. The court will not relax or disregard the rules of evidence, procedure or courtroom protocol for the defendant and that the defendant will be bound by and have to conduct himself/herself within the same rules as an attorney, that these rules are not simple and that without legal advice his/her ability to defend himself/herself will be hampered.
URCCC 8.05 (emphasis added).9
¶ 11. Thus, according to the rule's mandatory provisions, the trial judge in this case was required to advise Patton-on the record-of his rights and the warnings set forth in the rule. Then, having set forth those rights and warnings, and having made sure Patton understood them, the trial judge was required to ascertain if Patton still wished to proceed pro se, or if he wanted an attorney to assist him in his defense. If, after being advised of the rights and warnings as required by the rule, Patton still wished to proceed pro se, the court was required to determine whether Patton's waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. And all of this should have been on the record.
¶ 12. And as a final matter, if Patton-having been fully informed of the matters set forth in the rule-waived his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, then the court was required to consider whether Patton needed an attorney to assist on procedure and protocol, even though he did not desire an attorney to try his case.
¶ 13. According to the record before us, the trial judge wholly failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 8.05. During a May 13, 2008, motions hearing, the trial judge stated:
After ruling on the motions, the trial judge stated:
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