Paul v. State

• Decision Date: 11 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC11–690.,SC11–690.
• Citation: 112 So.3d 1188
• Parties: Charles PAUL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

112 So.3d 1188

Charles PAUL, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC11–690.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 11, 2013.

Background: Defendant convicted of shooting into occupied vehicle and sentenced as prison release reoffender filed motion for postconviction relief. The 17th Judicial Circuit Court, Broward County, Michele Towbin–Singer, J., denied motion, and defendant appealed. The District Court of Appeal, 59 So.3d 193, affirmed and certified conflict with Crapps v. State, 968 So.2d 627.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Quince, J., held that:

(1) shooting into occupied vehicle was forcible felony as matter of law, within meaning of prison release reoffender statute, disapproving Crapps v. State, 968 So.2d 627, and

(2) statute criminalizing “shooting into or throwing deadly missiles ... at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or private bus or any ... vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person,” proscribed multiple and separate offenses with distinct elements, for purposes of determining whether conviction was for forcible felony, within meaning of prison release reoffender statute.

Judgment of Fourth Court of Appeal approved; judgment of First District Court of Appeal disapproved.

Polston, C.J., concurred in result.Kerry Cooper Collins of Howell & O'Neal, Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Consiglia Terenzio, Bureau Chief and Melanie Dale Surber and Joseph Albert Tringali, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review Paul v. State, 59 So.3d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), wherein the Fourth District certified conflict with the First District's decision in Crapps v. State, 968 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies for prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, section 775.082(9)(a)1. o, Florida Statutes (2001). We approve the Fourth District's decision below because we find that the offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual, and therefore, qualifies as a forcible felony under the catch-all provision of the PRR Statute. We disapprove the opinion in the conflicting case of Crapps.

Paul

Charles Paul was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Paul, 59 So.3d at 194. Persons convicted under section 790.19 may be subjected to penalties under section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the “prison releasee reoffender” (PRR) statute, which specifies that a defendant who commits “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” (i.e., the catchall provision) within three years of being released from a state correctional facility is a PRR who is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentences specified in section 775.082(9)(a) 3. In Paul's case, the trial court determined that he qualified as a PRR under the catchall provision and thus sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen years for the second-degree felony of shooting into an occupied vehicle. See§ 775.082(9)(a) 3.c., Fla. Stat. (2001) (providing that upon proof that a defendant is a prison release reoffender as defined in the statute, the defendant must be sentenced “[f]or a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years”).

After receiving an enhanced sentence under the violent felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, Paul filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in the trial court, disputing the validity of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion as untimely and successive. On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Paul disputed his enhanced sentence, claiming that his conviction was not a qualifying felony under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute. Paul, 59 So.3d at 194.

The Fourth District affirmed the trial court order by summarily denying Paul's rule 3.850 claim. Id. The court also found that even if the claim had been raised in a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), it lacked merit and had already been rejected on direct appeal. Id. The Fourth District concluded that “this offense necessarily includes the use of force or violence against an individual. To commit a violation of section 790.19, a vehicle must be occupied.” Id. The Fourth District noted that, as required by this Court's decision in State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007), when a court is determining whether a particular offense constitutes a “forcible felony” the court may only consider the statutory elements of the offense, and not the particular circumstances of the case. Id. The Fourth District went on to clarify that “although a court may not look to the facts of the case in deciding whether the use of force is involved, a court is not required to ignore the elements of the particular provision of the statute under which appellant is charged.” Id.

The Fourth District distinguished Paul's case from previous cases which involved shooting into a building, reasoning that under section 790.19 a building may be occupied or unoccupied and a conviction under that provision of the statute does not necessarily require the use of force against an individual. Id. The Fourth District recognized and certified direct conflict with the decision of the First District in Crapps, on the issue of whether the offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes, necessarily includes the use or threat of force against an individual. Id.

Crapps

Alander Crapps was convicted of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), which contained the same language as the 2001 version of the statute at issue in Paul.Crapps, 968 So.2d at 627. Crapps appealed his conviction to the First District Court of Appeal, and argued that his conviction was not a qualifying offense to classify him as a PRR, under section section 775.082(9)(a) 1. o, Florida Statutes (2005)—the same argument that Paul made to the Fourth District. Id.;Paul, 59 So.3d at 194. The First District agreed with Crapps that throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle was not a qualifying offense for him to be classified as a PRR under the catch-all forcible felony provision. Crapps, 968 So.2d at 628.

The First District did not state its rationale for this conclusion. However, its parenthetical explanations of the cited cases offer some insight. The parenthetical explanation of Hudson v. State, 800 So.2d 627, 628–29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) states that the Third District held “that the crime proscribed by section 790.19 is not a forcible felony because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings and, thus, does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual [.]” Crapps, 968 So.2d at 628 (emphasis added). The First District's parenthetical explanation of State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 216 (Fla.2007), states that this Court reiterated “that the only relevant consideration in determining whether an offense constitutes a forcible felony is the statutory elements of the offense and that if ‘ “the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual” ’ is not a necessary element of the offense, then the offense is not a forcible felony[.]” Id. The First District's parenthetical explanation of Peterson Paul v. State,¹958 So.2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), acknowledges the Fourth District's holding that the defendant “who was convicted of shooting a deadly missile into a dwelling, did not qualify as a PRR[.]” Id.

Based on the parenthetical explanations, we can conclude that the First District applied the Hearns statutory elements test to Crapps' offense of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle. Further, the First District implied that this offense did not qualify as a forcible felony under the Hearns test because force against an individual is not a necessary element of at least one portion of the statute.

ANALYSIS

[1][2] The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether, as a matter of law, shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualified for enhanced sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, i.e. section 775.082(9)(a) 1. o, Florida Statutes (2001). This issue involves a question of statutory interpretation and thus is subject to de novo review. See State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004) (“This question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review.”).

In Hearns, this Court determined that only the statutory elements of an offense are to be considered in determining whether an offense qualifies as a forcible felony, regardless of the particular circumstances involved. 961 So.2d at 212. In order for this Court to apply the Hearns analysis, we must first determine the statutory elements of section 790.19.

[3]Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001) reads:

Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.—Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, or public or private bus or any train,...